The Conjunctive Account of Knowing by Roald, Nashi
  
   
THE CONJUNCTIVE ACCOUNT OF KNOWING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Roald Nashi 
January 2008
  
© 2008 Roald Nashi
 THE CONJUNCTIVE ACCCOUNT OF KNOWING 
 
Roald Nashi, Ph. D.  
Cornell University 2008 
 
This thesis argues for a conjunctive account of knowing, one according to which, the 
condition picked out by our ordinary uses of the verb “knows” is the conjunction of a 
mental and a non-mental component. I argue for a specific version of this account, one 
that identifies rational belief as the mental component of knowing.  The account sheds 
light on the relations between three important epistemic concepts: knowledge, rational 
belief, and evidence. It also fixes the “boundary” between the mental and the non-
mental in a way that undermines certain, otherwise, plausible skeptical arguments 
against the possibility of rational belief. In both cases, the account offers substantive 
answers to important questions in epistemology and philosophy of mind and brings in 
focus the points of connection between the two fields. 
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 PREFACE 
 
This dissertation discusses issues at the interface of epistemology and 
philosophy of mind. There is a certain consensus in epistemology that knowledge is 
hard to attain, while belief is easy. The consensus is, in part, motivated by the thought 
that attaining belief—like any other mental state—depends exclusively on getting the 
subject to be in a particular internal condition. By contrast, attaining knowledge—at 
least knowledge of the external world—requires in addition the “cooperation” of one’s 
external environment: at the very least, what one believes must turn out to be true in 
order for one to be able to know.   
Quite often, a picture of the mind that goes by the name of internalism, is 
behind this thought. According to a popular version of internalism, mental states are 
internal, physical states obtaining within the confines of one’s own body. All other 
states of the world—whether they are states of one’s environment, or conjunctions of 
internal and environmental states—are not purely states of one’s mind.   So, if 
internalism is correct, knowledge—which constitutively depends on the state of one’s 
environment—is not purely a mental state; and, since the mental state of the subject 
plays some role in the obtaining of this condition, knowledge cannot be purely a 
condition of one’s environment either. So, it must be the conjunction of mental and 
environmental constituents. This metaphysical conclusion motivates the project of 
analyzing knowledge in terms of its mental and non-mental components, respectively 
thought to be belief and truth. Hence, the picture of the mind proposed by 
internalism—in addition to explaining the relative easiness of attaining belief 
compared to that of attaining knowledge—supports a substantive answer to a central 
question in epistemology:  what is knowledge?  
Internalism’s way of fixing the boundary between the mental and the non-
 x
 mental also motivates a particular kind of skeptical argument about knowledge. The 
argument is of the following template:  
(1) If one is in exactly the same mental state in two situations then one 
knows in one what one knows in the other.  
(2) One is in exactly the same mental state in the good and the bad case.1  
(3) So, one knows as much in the good case as one does in the bad case.  
(4) One knows very little, if anything, in the bad case.  
(5) Therefore, one knows very little, if anything, in the good case.  
It’s easy to get a nod for the stipulation that the subjects in the good and bad 
case are internal, physical duplicates.  When combined with internalism about mental 
states, the innocent stipulation entails the second premise.2 In so far as the plausibility 
of the skeptical argument depends on the plausibility of the second premise, 
internalism helps motivate skepticism about knowledge. So, internalism supports a 
substantive answer to the other central question in epistemology:  how much do we 
know? 
These two implications of internalism show that where the philosophy of mind 
places the boundary between the mental and the non-mental is an issue that matters to 
epistemology. This point is rarely missed after the emergence of the literature on 
content externalism. 3 An important lesson of content externalism is that internalism 
misplaces the boundary:  if the internal is understood as that part of physical reality 
which obtains within a subject’s skin, then mental states, including belief, outstrip the 
boundaries of the internal—they constitutively depend on the state of one’s external 
environment. The lesson was immediately employed to diffuse the kind of skeptical 
                                                 
1  Here I am using “good case” and “bad case” to stand respectively for a case where things  
appear as they ordinarily do and are that way, and a case where things appear as they ordinarily 
do and are not that way. 
2  Chapter One makes this argument precise. 
3  See Hilary Putnam’s (1973) and Tyler Burge’s (1979, 1986a, 1986b). 
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argument sketched above, by calling into question the internalist picture supporting 
the second premise. 4 More recently, content externalism is used to undermine the 
view of knowledge as a composite condition, constituted of a mental and a non-mental 
component, and the project of analysis of knowledge that this metaphysical view helps 
generate.5  
In short, epistemologists have gradually come to recognize that where the 
philosophy of mind draws the boundary between mind and world is an issue that 
matters to their work. What is often missed is that the river flows both ways: the way 
we answer certain questions in epistemology has important implications for 
philosophy of mind in general, and the question about the boundary between mind and 
world in particular.  I try to show that questions about what constitutes a subject’s 
evidence in a particular case are of paramount importance in this respect.  
The positive conclusion of this dissertation is twofold. First, rational belief—
as understood in the technical sense specified in Chapter One—is a mental state:  two 
subjects are in the same mental state only if there is no proposition that is rationally 
believed by one but not the other. The conclusion is rather surprising, for the picture of 
rational belief emerging from our discussion depicts it as a factive, propositional 
attitude—an attitude one can only bear to true propositions—and there is strong 
prejudice against the view that factive attitudes can be mental. Second, skeptical 
arguments about rational belief (of the template sketched earlier) are untenable, even if 
these arguments are plausible in the case of knowledge. Implications about the nature 
of knowledge and the prospect of the project of analysis are explored along the way. I 
argue that knowledge is a composite condition, the conjunction of a mental and a non-
mental component, where rational belief plays the former role.  This is true even on 
 
4  See Putnam (1973), Williamson (2000) and Chalmers (http://consc.net/papers/matrix.html) for  
this kind of response to skepticism.  
5  See Williamson (2000).  
 the assumption of a strong version of content externalism. So, the expectation 
of a successful analysis of knowledge in terms of rational belief retains a strong 
metaphysical backing, despite the externalist results about content defended by certain 
philosophers of mind. The next, introductory section maps out the three central 
chapters of the dissertation in more detail.
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
0.0 Three Questions. The next three chapters discuss three interrelated questions in the 
following order:  
Q1: Is knowledge a mental state? 
Q2: Do factive, stative attitudes entail knowledge? 
Q3: Is knowledge a requirement for evidence? 6  
I will try to motivate the negative answer in each case. The discussion will be 
concerned exclusively with propositional knowledge. Propositional knowledge is a 
kind of propositional attitude, an attitude a subject bears towards a proposition.7 For 
the purpose of this dissertation, I assume that propositions as structured entities—they 
are entities made up of constituents in some broad sense.8 The reason behind the 
assumption is purely dialectical. The versions of content externalism used to support 
the views that I try to undermine in this dissertation assume this picture of 
propositions. For ease of engaging these views in their own terms I make the same 
assumptions.  
 Paradigmatic propositional attitudes are believing that p, hoping that p, seeing 
                                                 
6  The questions are not new.  This will be obvious to those familiar with Timothy  
Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits. Williamson defends positive answers to all three 
questions. Helpful discussions of Williamson’s answer to Q1 include (Brueckner 2002), 
(Jackson 2002), (Yablo 2003), (Magnus and Cohen 2003).  Earlier discussions of Q2 include 
(Dretske 1969), (Unger, 1972) and (Kvart, 1993). Whitcomb (manuscript) provides several 
counterexamples to Williamson’s (positive) answer to Q2. For previous discussions of Q3 see 
(Maher 1996), (Achinstein, 1996); for discussions of Williamson’s view on evidence see 
(Joyce 2004), (Bird 2004) and (Weatherson, manuscript). The negative answers to all three 
questions are not new either: (Brueckner 2002), (Jackson 2002),  (Magnus and Cohen 2003) 
defend the negative answer to Q1. (Whitcomb, manuscript) defends the negative answer to Q2; 
(Joyce 2004) and (Weatherson, manuscript) defend the negative answer to Q3. 
7  Whether or not all propositional attitudes constitute mental states, in the sense relevant to Q1,  
is a matter of debate; otherwise the positive answer to Q1 would be uncontroversial. In his  
argument against the negative answer to Q1 Williamson (2000: chaps. 1-3) doesn’t assume that 
all propositional attitudes constitute mental states. This is sometimes missed by his 
commentators. (See Whitcomb manuscript: 1) 
8  See for example Salmon (1986) for an exposition and defense of this view.  
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 that p, remembering that p (where p stands for some proposition). “Propositional 
knowledge” refers to the state of knowing that p. Sections 0.1 through 0.3 provide 
informal clarifications of the three questions. Section 0.4 takes a preliminary step 
towards showing how they are interrelated. Section 0.5 sketches the big picture that 
my answers intend to motivate.  
 
0.1 Is knowledge a mental state? According to a common view knowing that p 
requires believing that p. Hence, in an undemanding sense of “mental” knowing is a 
mental state: there is a mental state—believing that p—such that being in it is 
necessary for knowing that p. This undemanding sense of “mental” is not what is at 
issue in Q1. The question is whether knowing is a mental state in a more restrictive 
sense. Knowledge is a mental state in this more restrictive sense if and only if there is 
a mental state such that being in it is both necessary and sufficient for knowing that p. 
It is this demanding sense of “mental” that concerns us in Q1.  
 
0.2 Do factive, stative attitudes entail knowledge? Factive, stative attitudes constitute a 
class of propositional attitudes. A propositional attitude is factive if and only if, 
necessarily, one has it only to true propositions.9 Factive, propositional attitudes 
include seeing that p, remembering that p, forgetting that p. The first two attitudes 
constitute states; the third is a process. It is factive, stative, attitudes (FSAs) that we 
are concerned with in Q2.10 FSAs entail knowledge if and only if for every factive, 
stative attitude A, subject S, and proposition p, S bears A towards p only if S knows 
that p.  
 
                                                 
9  See (Williamson 2000: 34) for a similar definition.  
10  I will provide a more formal account of FSAs by way of introducing four characteristics that  
distinguish them from other members of the class of propositional attitudes in Section 0.6. 
2 
 0.3 Is knowledge a requirement for evidence? The discussion of Q3 will assume a 
propositional and categorical view of evidence. The view is propositional in the sense 
that one’s evidence is a set of propositions that satisfies some further criteria.11 The 
view is categorical in the sense that for every proposition p, p either is, or is not part of 
one’s evidence. Knowledge is a requirement for evidence if and only if for every 
proposition p that is part of one’s evidence one knows that p.   
 
0.4 How are the three questions interrelated? Chapter One develops in detail a view 
that is inconsistent with the positive answer to the first question. I call it the 
Conjunctive Account of Knowing (CK). According to (CK) knowledge is a composite 
state:  the conjunction of a mental and a non-mental component. I try to motivate and 
defend a version of (CK)—one that identifies rational belief as the mental component 
of knowledge—against recent objections. I argue that the only potentially damaging 
argument against this version of (Ck) depends on the assumption that knowledge is a 
requirement for evidence. In Chapters Two and Three I argue against this assumption. 
The argument has two parts.   
 In Chapter Two, I argue as follows: 
1. For every proposition p, if one bears a factive, stative attitude towards p, 
then p is part of one’s evidence. Some factive, stative attitudes don’t entail 
knowledge.  
2. Hence, knowledge is not a requirement for evidence.   
The conclusion of Chapter Two is tentative: there is a residual worry that the 
attitudes involved in motivating (2) are not factive, stative attitudes after all, for unlike 
certain uncontroversial members of this category, they are insufficient for securing 
                                                 
11  I have little new to offer in defense of this view; as I hope it will be clear by my discussion, my  
ambitions lie elsewhere. For a defense of the propositional view of evidence see  
(Williamson 2000: 194-200).  
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 evidence. In the background of this objection lies the assumption that only known 
propositions are part of one’s evidence. Chapter Three investigates the merits of this 
assumption. It considers two ways of arguing for the assumption: an indirect way 
based on certain general desiderata that a theory of evidence must satisfy; and a direct 
way that appeals to our intuitions about particular cases. I show that neither is 
successful. A better understanding of the category of factive stative attitudes is gained 
as a result. I close by trying to motivate a theory of evidence that identifies evidence 
propositions with those towards which one bears a factive, stative attitude.  
 
0.5 The Big Picture. The overall picture that emerges from the discussion in the three 
main chapters is the following:  
1. If a version of (CK) is true then knowledge is not a mental state. (Chapter 
One) 
2. A version of (CK) is true unless knowledge is a requirement for evidence. 
(Chapter One) 
3. Knowledge is not a requirement for evidence. (Chapters Two and Three) 
4. Hence, a version of (CK) is true, and knowledge is not a mental state.   
The conclusion reached in (4) is important for a key question in epistemology: 
what is knowledge? If knowledge is a composite state, as suggested by the version of 
(CK) that I defend, then there is a reasonable expectation for an informative answer to 
the first question: the concept “knows” can be analyzed in terms of the concepts 
corresponding to the mental and the non-mental component of knowledge. 12  
On the other hand, identifying the mental component of knowledge is 
important for a key question in philosophy of mind: where lies the correct boundary 
                                                 
12  Even if knowledge is a mental state (in the demanding sense indicated in Section 0.1) this  
doesn’t mean that the concept “knows” is unanalyzable. But a strong motivation, as well as a 
guide, for the project of analysis—that provided by the Conjunctive Account of Knowing—is 
lost.  
4 
 between mind and world? It is one of the conclusions of this dissertation that the 
mental component of knowledge is rational belief. The sketch of rational belief 
(developed in Chapter One) combined with a theory of evidence that requires evidence 
propositions to be true (developed in Chapter Three), renders rational belief a factive 
condition: one cannot rationally believe that p, unless p is true. If rational belief is both 
factive and a mental state some interesting results follow about the boundary between 
the mental and the non-mental. 
 One version of internalism—that according to which mental states are those 
that depend exclusively on conditions that obtain within the subject’s skin—is shown 
to be false. This version is arguably incompatible with content externalism, which is 
assumed in this dissertation. So, this result is not surprising. However there is another 
version of internalism that is compatible with one strain of content externalism—what 
in Chapter One I call concept externalism. It simply maintains that a representational 
state is mental only if it is non-factive in the sense that being in it doesn’t entail the 
truth of the content of the representation.13 This version of internalism is intuitively 
plausible. However, if the picture of rational belief that emerges from our discussion is 
correct, this version of internalism is also false. This result is both interesting and 
surprising.   These implications are discussed in more detail in the Conclusion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13  I make this point precise in the concluding chapter.  
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 CHAPTER ONE 
 
The Conjunctive Account of Knowing 
Introduction  
This chapter analyzes and tries to motivate a view that is inconsistent with 
knowledge being a mental state in a demanding sense to be specified below. I will 
refer to it as the conjunctive account of knowing14, (CK). According to (CK) knowing a 
proposition p is a composite condition: the conjunction of a mental and a non-mental 
component. (CK) is a metaphysical view about the condition that one knows p; not a 
view about the analysis of the concept knows, despite the fact that (CK) provides a 
motivation for the project of analysis of knows in terms of other concepts.  
The first part of the chapter is expository: it clarifies what it means for 
knowledge to be a mental state in a demanding sense and it develops a general 
framework for (CK), the view that is inconsistent with knowledge being a mental state 
in that sense. The rest of the chapter discusses a version of  (CK) that identifies the 
condition that one rationally believes p as the mental component of knowledge, (CK-
RB).  
It has been argued that (1) (CK-RB) is false on the assumption of content 
externalism and internalism about mental conditions, and (2) unmotivated on the 
assumption of content externalism and externalism about mental conditions. The 
second part of the chapter distinguishes between two versions of content externalism; 
concept externalism and strong singular thought theory.  The third part shows that the 
argument for (1) and (2) relies on the latter. The rest of the third part argues that,  
 
                                                 
14  I borrow the term from Williamson (2000: 48).  
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 (i) The argument for (1) is straightforward and sound but potentially 
harmless for (CK-RB): according to a prevalent view content 
externalism entails that internalism about mental conditions is false. 
If this view is correct, an argument that enlists both content 
externalism and internalism about mental conditions as premises to 
the denial of (CK-RB) is unsound.  
(ii) The case for (2) is subtle and potentially harmful for (CK-RB), but 
ultimately inconclusive. Its success depends on a controversial view 
of evidence.  
The results of this chapter will be tentative. I will not conclude that we should 
endorse the conjunctive account of knowing. My overall strategy is to show that the 
motivation for one version of it, (CK-RB), is independent of internalism about mental 
conditions and mental content.  I also try to cast sufficient doubt on the argument 
against a version of  (CK-RB) that concedes content externalism and externalism about 
mental conditions to allow for the more cautious conclusion that the case against the 
conjunctive account of knowledge is inconclusive: it crucially depends on a theory of 
evidence according to which evidence entails knowledge. I argue against this theory in 
the next two chapters. Some of the connections between three important epistemic 
concepts — knowledge, rational belief and evidence — will hopefully be brought into 
focus in the course of the discussion. 
 
1.1 Williamson’s thesis. In recent work (1995, 2000) Timothy Williamson has argued 
that knowledge is a mental state in the following demanding sense: for some mental 
state S, being in S is necessary and sufficient for knowing p. (2000: 21) This is a claim 
about propositional knowledge, which like other paradigmatic mental states 
(believing, hoping, fearing) is an attitude to propositions. If propositional attitudes are 
7 
 understood as relations of subjects to propositions, the mental state S in Williamson’s 
claim is a mental relation between a subject and the proposition p. 15 
 
1.2 Preliminaries. Employing terminology introduced by Williamson16 we can state 
the thesis that knowledge is a mental state (in the demanding sense specified above) 
more rigorously as follows:  
(W): For every proposition p, and every case α, there is a mental condition 
with respect to α—call it condition Mp—such that the condition that 
one knows p obtains in α if and only if Mp obtains in α.17  
A case is to be understood as a nomically “possible world, but with a 
distinguished subject and time: a ‘centered world’ in the terminology of David 
Lewis.”(Williamson 2000: 52) A case is thus an ordered triple <w, i, t> where w is the 
uncentered, possible world where the case is located, and i-t, the individual-time pair 
on which the possible world is centered.  
 “Condition” will be used in the sense explained by Williamson: “[c]onditions 
are specified by that clauses.” For example, the condition that one knows the 
proposition p, or the condition that one is in pain. “The pronoun ‘one’ and the present 
tense in such clauses refer to the distinguished agent and time respectively.” For any 
case α and condition C, C either obtains or doesn’t obtain in α.  (Williamson 2000: 
52) Two conditions C and D are identical if and only if each entails the other. “A 
condition C entails a condition D if for every case α, if C obtains in α then D obtains 
in α.” (Williamson 2000: 52). The only truth function for conditions relevant to our 
                                                 
15  Williamson’s subsequent discussion relies on this understanding of propositional knowledge.  
(See, especially pp. 49-60.) 
16  I will provide characterizations of the terms involved below.  
17  By contrast, a less demanding sense of knowledge being a mental condition would be the  
following: knowing is a mental condition in the sense that for every proposition p, there is a 
mental condition Mp such that for every case α the condition that one knows p obtains in α 
only if Mp obtains in α. (See Williamson 2000: 21.)  
8 
 discussion will be that for conjunction: for every case α the conjunction of two 
conditions C and D obtains in α if and only if both C and D obtain in α.   
The locution “mental condition” will also be used in a specified sense. I will 
define “mental condition C obtaining in case α” by reference to “ the subject 
distinguished by α being in a mental state S in the uncentered, possible world w where 
α is located” 18. Like Williamson, I will rely on the intuitive notion of “mental state”; 
a formal definition of “mental state” “would require a formal definition of the mental,” 
and that is unavailable. (1995: 538) The definition of “mental condition” is 
straightforward: for any case α,  <w, i, t>, and any condition C, C is a mental 
condition with respect to α, if and only if for some mental state S, C is identical to the 
condition that i is in S. The definition of “non-mental condition” is less 
straightforward. We start with a definition of "non-mental state": E is a non-mental 
state if and only if for some nomically possible world w, and every mental state S, S 
doesn’t obtain in w, and E obtains in w. Now we can define “non-mental condition” by 
reference to “non-mental state”: for any case α,  <w, i, t>, C is a non-mental condition 
with respect to α if and only if C is either (a) identical to the condition that i* is in S,  
(where S is a mental state and i*≠ i); or (b) identical to the condition that E obtains, 
where E is a non-mental state; or (c) identical to the conjunction of conditions C1 
through Cn, where each conjunct is a condition that satisfies either (a), or (b).19  
To illustrate, suppose Hillary is in pain at time t in the (uncentered) world w. 
Then for any case α located in w, the condition that Hillary is in pain is a mental 
condition with respect to α only if the subject distinguished by α is Hillary. The 
                                                 
18  A case is located in a world w, if and only if w is the first member of the ordered triple that is  
that case. (See Gendler and Hawthorne [2002: 44] for a similar definition.) There is, then, a 
unique uncentered, possible world corresponding to every case, the possible world in which 
the case is located, but the converse doesn’t hold. “It may happen that two centered worlds are 
situated within the same uncentered possible world: only their designated individuals-at-times 
differ.” Lewis calls these cases “collocated.” (Lewis 2001) 
19  Thanks to Zoltan Szabó for noticing a problem with, and helping me fix, an earlier definition  
that gave rise to an undesired result.  
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 condition that Hillary is in pain is a non-mental condition with respect to a case β, 
where the subject distinguished by β is Bill (and Bill is not identical to Hillary). So, 
more generally, the definition of “non-mental condition” states that for any inhabitant i 
of α that is not identical with the subject distinguished by α, and any mental state S, 
the condition C that i is in S is a non-mental condition with respect to α. Intuitively in 
a world centered on myself, a condition is mental if and only if it is a condition of my 
mind; if I and Barack Obama inhabit the same world, the condition that Barack Obama 
believes that he should be the next president is not a condition of my mind, but rather 
a condition of my surroundings20.  The bottom line is that a condition is mental or 
non-mental relative to a case: what conditions are (non)mental in a case is (in part) 
determined by reference to the subject distinguished by the case. I say “in part” 
because some conditions, such as the condition that water is H2O, are non-mental 
conditions in every case.  
By the definitions for “mental” and “non-mental condition”, if a condition is 
mental with respect to α, then it is not non-mental with respect to α, and vice versa. In 
other words, the categories “mental” and “non-mental” are mutually exclusive with 
respect to a case. 
For every case α, some conditions are mental with respect to α (e.g., the 
condition that one believes that Michael Vick should not run for president); some are 
non-mental with respect to α (e.g., the condition that water is H2O); and some 
conditions are composite with respect to α (e.g., the condition that one believes that 
Michael Vick should not run for president and such that water is H2O).  A condition C 
is composite with respect to α if and only if it is the conjunction of a mental condition 
                                                 
20  “Environment” would be a more fitting term, but Williamson uses “environment” to denote the  
totality of conditions obtaining outside a subject’s skin in a case centered on that subject. So, I 
am avoiding it and using ”surroundings” instead to denote the totality of the non-mental 
conditions obtaining in a case, i.e. those conditions that are not conditions of a subject’s mind 
in a case centered on the subject, whatever these non-mental conditions turn out to be.  
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 (with respect to α) and a non-mental condition (with respect to α).21  
Every mental condition with respect to α is trivially composite with respect to 
α: it is identical to the conjunction of itself with the non-mental condition that holds in 
every case whatsoever.22 A condition C is non-trivially composite with respect to α if 
there is no mental condition (with respect to α) or non-mental condition (with respect 
to α) such that it entails C.23 If a condition is non-trivially composite with respect to α 
then it is not mental with respect to α for if it were it would be trivially composite with 
respect to α: the conjunction of itself with the non-mental condition that holds in every 
case whatsoever. Neither is a non-trivially composite condition with respect to α, a 
non-mental condition with respect to α. Every non-trivially composite condition with 
respect to a case is the conjunction of a mental and a non-mental condition with 
respect to that case. This conjunctive condition fails to satisfy the disjunctive 
requirement for being a non-mental condition, laid out earlier.  
If a condition is mental with respect to a case then it is not a non-trivially 
composite condition with respect to that case for if it were it would fail to entail itself. 
                                                 
21  This is the only point where the terminology I employ diverges from that employed by  
Williamson. Williamson defines a composite condition as a conjunction of a narrow and an 
environmental condition. This definition corresponds to my definition of a composite condition 
only on the internalist assumption that all mental conditions are narrow.  
22  Proof: Let N be a non-mental condition that holds in every case. Let M be a mental condition  
with respect to α. Let M Λ N be the conjunction of M and N. Let γ be a case where M obtains.  
N obtains in γ because N obtains in every case. By the truth-condition for the conjunction of 
conditions M Λ N obtains in γ because both M and N obtain in γ. So, for every case γ, if M 
obtains in γ then M Λ N obtains in γ. So, M entails M Λ N. Let β be a case where M Λ N 
obtains. By the truth-condition for the conjunction of conditions M obtains in β. So, for every 
case β, if M Λ N obtains in β then M obtains in β. So, M Λ N entails M. Since M both entails 
and is entailed by M Λ N, M is identical to M Λ N. 
23  According to this definition of non-trivial compositeness, the base condition, i.e., the  
conjunction of the mental condition that holds in every case with the non-mental condition that 
holds in every case, if there was one, would not be non-trivially composite with respect to any 
case (it violates the requirement of non-trivial compositeness twice, both its mental and non-
mental components entail the condition). But, notice, that given our definition of a case there 
is no base condition, because there is no mental condition that holds in every case. As 
indicated earlier a case is a possible world with a distinguished subject and time, such that 
different cases distinguish different subjects. Hence there is no mental condition, that one is in 
S, such that it obtains in every case: for in each case the pronoun “one” refers to the 
distinguished agent at that case and different cases distinguish different agents. 
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 For the same reason if a condition is non-mental with respect to a case then it is not a 
non-trivially composite condition with respect to that case. The bottom line is that 
mental, non-mental and non-trivially composite conditions are mutually exclusive: if a 
condition falls in one of these categories with respect to a case then it doesn’t fall in 
any of the other two categories with respect to that same case.24 However, they are not 
jointly exhaustive with respect to a case. Certain conditions involving quantification 
over mental states are neither mental, nor non-mental, nor non-trivially composite in 
the sense specified above. For example the condition the one inhabits a world where 
someone is in pain.25 The arguments below do not assume that the three conditions are 
jointly exhaustive.  
For the purpose of readability, in what follows, I will drop the qualifications 
“with respect to x” (where x stands for the name of a particular case); I trust the reader 
will bear in mind that conditions are (non-)mental and  (non-)trivially composite 
relative to the case under discussion. The next two sections introduce two different 
challenges to (W).  
 
1.3 The Internalist Challenge. The first challenge relies on a picture of the mind 
Williamson calls internalism. According to a popular version of internalism “if one 
fixes [the]…physical and functional states and processes of a person’s body…one has 
thereby fixed the person’s mental states and processes.”26 (emphasis mine) In 
Williamson’s terms, internalism is the thesis that all mental conditions are narrow; 
where a condition is narrow if and only if for all cases α and β, if the total internal 
                                                 
24  According to this taxonomy, not every non-mental condition is mental, and not every condition  
that fails to be mental is automatically non-mental: in each case the condition can be non- 
trivially composite. 
25  See the definitions for “mental” and “non-mental” conditions laid out earlier in this chapter.  
Thanks to Zoltan Szabo for calling this issue to my attention.  
26  See, Burge 1985: 62. As both Burge (1985: 62) and Williamson (2000: 21) point out this  
characterization of internalism (in Burge’s case, individualism) neglects dualist versions of 
internalism, which for ease of exposition I, following Williamson, will leave to one side.  
12 
 physical state of the agent in α is exactly the same as the total internal physical state of 
the agent in β27, then the condition obtains in α if and only if the condition obtains in 
β. (2000: 52). In other words, duplicate the physical states inside one’s skin and you 
have duplicated the person’s mental states no matter what the world outside the skin is 
like.  
If this version of internalism is true (W) is false: for at least some propositions p -- 
those about the state of the world outside one’s body -- physical duplicates can differ 
with regard to their knowledge that p. Of two subjects in exactly the same internal 
physical state, one may know that the object in front of her is a cat, while the other 
staring at a fake, but visually indistinguishable replica of the cat, falsely believes that 
it is. Since by internalist lights physical duplicates are mental duplicates, for at least 
some propositions p there is no mental condition such that it obtaining is sufficient for 
knowing p.     
 
1.4 The challenge from the conjunctive account of knowing. The second challenge to 
(W) comes from the position I called the conjunctive account of knowing (CK).  
(CK) For all propositions p and every case α (1) the condition that one knows 
p (from now on Kp) is the conjunction of a mental condition Mp and a 
non-mental condition Np and (2) there is no mental condition Mp or 
non-mental condition Np such that it (alone) entails Kp. 
Condition (2) renders Kp non-trivially composite.  
(CK) For all propositions p and every case α the condition that one knows p 
is a non-trivially composite condition, the conjunction of a mental 
condition Mp and a non-mental condition Np. 
                                                 
27  For all cases α and β, if the total internal physical state of the agent in α is exactly the same as  
the total internal physical state of the agent in β, then α is internally like β. (Williamson, 2000: 
52) 
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  (W) can also be stated in terms of (non)trivial compositeness. According to 
(W) for every proposition p and every case α there is a mental condition Mp such that 
the condition that one knows p obtains in α if and only if Mp obtains in α. By 
entailment the mental condition Mp both entails and is entailed by Kp, which is to say 
that Mp is identical to Kp. If so, then Kp is identical to the conjunction of Mp with the 
non-mental condition that holds in every case whatsoever. 28 This makes Kp in our 
taxonomy trivially composite, the conjunction of a mental condition with the non-
mental condition that holds in every case. If (CK) is true (W) is false. 
Is (CK) true? The affirmative answer will be motivated piecemeal. The next 
section explores the constraints that a plausible version of (CK) would have to place on 
Mp, the mental component of knowledge.  
 
1.5 Requirements for the mental component of knowledge. This section identifies four 
requirements that Mp must satisfy in order for (CK) to be true. Three of them are 
compatible with (W). The fourth requirement constitutes the point of disagreement 
between (CK) and (W). Identifying it facilitates understanding the arguments for and 
against (CK) that will be discussed in the chapter.  
Let Mp* be the condition which obtains in a case α if and only if the condition 
that one knows p obtains in some case mentally like α.29  A case β is mentally like a 
case α if and only if one is in exactly the same (total) mental condition in α as in β. 
(Williamson 2000: 55) One is in exactly the same (total) mental condition in α as in β 
if and only if for every mental condition C, C obtains in α if and only if C obtains in 
                                                 
28  Proof: Since Mp is mental then it is identical to the conjunction of itself and the mental  
condition that holds  
in ever case whatsoever (see, note 8 for the proof). If Kp is identical to Mp then Kp is also 
identical to the conjunction of Mp and the non-mental condition that holds in every case, 
because condition identity is transitive.  
29  The argument for isolating the mental component of knowledge is structurally similar to  
Williamson’s argument (on behalf of the internalist) for isolating the internal component of 
knowledge. (2000: 66) 
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 β.30  Mp*satisfies the following three requirements: 
• Mp* is a mental condition.31  
• Kp entails Mp*.32  
• Mp* entails every mental condition that Kp entails.33  
Let Np* be the condition which obtains in a case α if and only if the condition 
that one knows p obtains in some case that is non-mentally like α.  A case α is non-
mentally like a case β if and only if one is in exactly the same (total) non-mental 
condition in α as in β. (Williamson 2000: 55) One is in exactly the same (total) non-
mental condition in α as in β if and only if for every non-mental condition C, C 
obtains in α if and only if C obtains in β. The three arguments for Mp* apply mutatis 
mutandis to Np*34. Hence,  
• Np* is non-mental 
• Kp entails Np*  
• Np* entails every non-mental condition that Kp entails.  
If Kp is the conjunction of a mental and a non-mental condition then it is the 
                                                 
30  Williamson gives an equivalent definition of mental likeness in terms of mental states: α is  
mentally like β if and only if one is in exactly the same (total) mental state in α as in β. “One is 
in exactly the same (total) mental state in α as in β” if and only if “for all mental states S, in α 
one is in S if and only if in β one is in S”. (2000:55) 
31  Proof: Suppose Mp* is non-mental. Then, for some case α, and some case γ which is mentally  
like α, Mp* obtains in α and Mp* doesn’t obtain in γ.  If Mp* obtains in α then there is some 
case β, mentally like α such that one knows p in β (by the definition of Mp*). Mental likeness 
is symmetrical: if γ is mentally like α, then α is mentally like γ. Mental likeness if transitive: if 
β is mentally like α, and α is mentally like γ, then β is mentally like γ. But if one knows p in a 
case β which is mentally like a case γ, then Mp* obtains in γ (by the definition of Mp*). 
Contradiction: Mp* both obtains and doesn’t obtain in γ. Therefore, Mp* is mental. 
32  Proof:  Suppose Kp obtains in α. Then Mp* obtains in a case mentally like α. Mental likeness  
is reflexive: α is mentally like α. Therefore, Mp* obtains in α. Since for all cases α, if Kp 
obtains in α then Mp* obtains in α, then Kp entails Mp*.  
33  Proof: Suppose Kp entails a mental condition Mp** and Mp* obtains in a case α. Then Kp  
obtains in some case β mentally like α (by the definition of Mp*). Since Kp entails Mp**, 
Mp** obtains in β. Since β is mentally like α, and Mp** obtains in β, then Mp** obtains in α. 
Since for every case α, if Mp* obtains in a case α then Mp** obtains in α, Mp* entails Mp** 
(for every mental condition Mp** that Kp entails).  
34  We use the proofs laid out in the three preceding footnotes substituting “Mp*” with “Np*”.  
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 conjunction of Mp* and Np*.35  
Both (W) and (CK) maintain that Kp is the conjunction of a mental and a non-
mental condition. So, for both (W) and  (CK) the mental component Mp must satisfy 
the following three requirements:  
(a) Mp is a mental condition.  
(b) Mp is such that Kp entails Mp. 
(c) For every mental condition Mp+ that Kp entails, Mp entails Mp+.  
For (W) the mental component Mp is identical to Kp; so in addition to (a)-(c), 
Mp satisfies a fourth requirement: Mp entails Kp. By condition (2) of (CK) there is no 
mental condition Mp such that it (alone) entails Kp. Hence according to (CK) the 
mental component of knowledge must satisfy the following further requirement: (d) 
Mp doesn’t entail Kp. If (d) is a requirement that Mp must satisfy then Kp is not a 
mental condition. Proof: Suppose Kp is a mental condition. Then, by (c) and the fact 
that Kp entails itself, Mp entails Kp. By (d) Mp doesn’t entail Kp. Therefore, Kp is not 
mental. Conversely, if Kp is a mental condition then there is no mental condition that 
satisfies (a)-(d). If there is no mental condition that satisfies (a)-(d), (CK) is false. In 
summary, (CK) maintains, and (W) denies, that there is a mental condition that 
satisfies (a)-(d). (W) maintains, and  (CK) denies, that there is a mental condition that 
satisfies (a)-(c) and the negation of (d).  
 
                                                 
35  Proof: Suppose, Kp is the conjunction of Mp** and Np**. Then (a) Kp entails Mp** and (b)  
Kp entails Np**. If so then (a1) Mp* entails Mp** and (b1) Np* entails Np**, because Mp* 
entails every mental condition that Kp entails and Np* entails every non-mental condition that 
Kp entails. By (a1) and (b1), (and the truth-function for conjunction of conditions) the 
conjunction of Mp* and Np* entails the conjunction of Mp** and Np**. Since, the 
conjunction of Mp** and Np** is identical to Kp and since Kp entails both Mp* and Np* and 
as a consequence their conjunction, then the conjunction of Mp** and Np** entails the 
conjunction of Mp* and Np*.  Since (a2) the conjunction of Mp* and Np* entails the 
conjunction of Mp** and Np** and (b2) the conjunction of Mp** and Np** entails the 
conjunction of Mp* and Np*, then the two conjunctions are identical. In summary, if Kp, is a 
conjunction of a mental and a non-mental component then the mental component Mp must be 
Mp*. 
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 2.1 The relation between the two challenges. The first part of the chapter introduced 
two challenges to (W): the internalist challenge, and the (CK) challenge. Now we are 
in a position to see why they are different and how they overlap. Internalism motivates 
a particular version (CK), which Williamson discusses under the rubric of Primeness.36  
(I-CK):  For every proposition p, knowing p is a non-trivially composite  
condition, the conjunction of a narrow condition (what Williamson 
calls virtual-K37) and an environmental condition (what Williamson 
calls outward-K38).39 
We already know what narrow conditions are: a condition is narrow if it’s shared 
by physical duplicates in every case. A condition is environmental if it’s shared by 
environmental duplicates in every case.40 Bottom line, (I- CK)41 maintains that for 
every proposition p, knowing p is the conjunction of a narrow and an environmental 
condition. This version of (CK) voices the internalist assumption that the mental 
component of knowledge, whatever it turns out to be, must be a narrow condition. By 
contrast, (CK) as formulated above, is consistent with externalism about mental 
conditions, where the latter is understood as the denial of internalism. More 
                                                 
36  See, Williamson 2000: 65-92.  
37  Virtual-K is a technical term coined by Williamson; it refers to the condition that obtains in a  
case α if and only if K (knowledge) obtains in some case internally like α. Virtual-K is the 
strongest narrow condition that being in a state of knowledge entails, in the sense that it entails 
every other narrow condition entailed by being in a state of knowledge. (See proof in 2000: 66)   
38  Outward-K is also a technical term coined by Williamson; it refers to the condition which  
obtains in a case α if and only if K (knowledge) obtains in some case externally like α. 
Outward-K is the strongest environmental condition that being in a state of knowledge entails 
in the sense that it entails every other environmental condition entailed by being in a state of 
knowledge.  
39  Williamson proves that “if knowledge is the conjunction of any narrow and environmental  
conditions at all it is the conjunction of virtual-K and outward-K.”  
40  More rigorously a condition is environmental if and only if for all cases α and β, if the total  
physical state of the environment outside the agent’s body in α is exactly the same as the total 
physical state of the environment outside the agent’s body in β, then the condition obtains in α 
if and only if the condition obtains in β.  
41  I use the acronym (I-CK) to stand for the internalist version of (CK); I will use the acronym (E- 
CK) to stand for the externalist version of (CK), where externalism is to be understood as the 
denial of internalism.  
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 specifically, (CK) is consistent with the mental component of knowledge being broad. 
Hence, (CK) doesn’t entail (I-CK); (CK) entails (I-CK) only on the assumption of 
internalism about mental conditions.  More to the point, a successful argument against 
(I-CK) doesn’t tell against (CK) unless one also assumes internalism.42  
A version of (CK) that rejects the internalist constraint on mental conditions 
allows Mp, the mental component, to be broad, in the sense that physical duplicates 
can differ with regard to whether or not they are in Mp. Call this version of (CK), (E-
CK). The logical relation between (E-CK) and (W) is the same as that between (CK) 
and (W): if (E-CK) is true (W) is false. The third part of the paper analyzes and tries to 
motivate a version of (E-CK).  
 
2.2 The conjunctive account of knowing and content externalism. As indicated in the 
last section, (CK) is consistent with externalism about mental conditions, the thesis 
that some mental conditions are broad (in the sense that they are determined (in part) 
by the state of one’s environment43). One argument for externalism about mental 
conditions relies on externalism about mental content:  
1. Some propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, fears, hopes) are 
(paradigmatic) mental conditions.  
2. These mental conditions are determined (in part) by their contents.44  
3. The contents of these mental conditions are determined (in part) by the 
state of one’s environment. (Content Externalism) 
                                                 
42  For an argument against (I-Ck) see the “Primeness” chapter in Williamson 2000, especially pp.  
65-75.  
43  “Environment” here is to be understood in the technical sense specified by Williamson (2000:  
49-50).  
44  Burge writes: “Since mental acts and states are individuated (partly) in terms of their contents,  
the differences between Earth and Twin-Earth include differences in the mental states and acts 
of their inhabitants.” (1982: 107) 
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 4. Therefore, some mental conditions are determined (in part) by the state of 
one’s environment.45  
If the argument is valid then internalism about mental conditions is false, if content 
externalism is true.   
The defenders of premise (3)—whose work I review below—agree on two 
things: contents are (a) entities structured of parts46; and (b) in part individuated by 
these parts. 47 Here, I think, the agreement ends. The disagreement concerns (a). There 
are two different answers to “what are the content-building parts?” question. The two 
answers give rise to two different motivations for content externalism: Burge’s 
concept externalism (CE) and the McDowell/Evans strong singular thought theory48 
(SSTT). The difference matters: CE and SSTT are two fundamentally different ways 
of classifying contents. One could combine CE with SSTT to articulate a strong 
version of content externalism. Yet there is a weaker version of content externalism: 
one that accepts CE, but rejects SSTT. Distinguishing between the weaker and 
stronger versions of content externalism aids in evaluating Williamson’s claim that a 
combination of (CK) with content externalism makes the denial of  (W) either false or 
                                                 
45  See Burge 1979, 1982 for examples of this type of argument. The argument assumes that the  
determination relation is transitive.   
46  Defenders of premise (3) in the argument sketched above, include philosophers who do not  
accept (a); Robert Stalnaker (1999: chap 3) is an example. As indicated in the introduction, I 
focus on the work of those content externalists who hold a structured view of propositions for 
ease of engaging with Williamson’s defense of the view that I try to undermine in this chapter.  
47  It is often assumed that we get at the contents of propositional attitudes by scrutinizing attitude  
attributions. So, for Burge they are  “the semantical value[s] associated with the oblique 
occurrences in attributions of propositional attitudes.” (Burge 1982: 119, ft. 2) An expression 
occurs obliquely in a propositional attitude attribution if the substitution of co-referring 
expressions may affect the truth-value of the attribution. For example “Brown rats roam the 
NYC subway” occurs obliquely in the propositional attitude attribution: “Ralph believes that 
brown rats roam the NYC subway”, because replacing  “brown rat” with the co-referring 
expression “rattus norvegicus” may affect the truth-value of the attribution: Ralph might not 
believe that large rattus norvegicus roam the NYC subway, because he has never heard the 
scientific term for brown rats.  An expression occurs non-obliquely if co-referential 
substitution wouldn’t affect the truth of the attribution as in “Ralph believes that that rat is 
really fast”. The truth-value of the attribution would not change if “rat” is replaced by “rattus 
norvegicus” even if Ralph has never heard the latter term. (See, Burge 1979: 599 and Burge 
1982: 118, ft. 1.) 
48  I borrow the term from (Segal: 1989) who in turn borrows it from (Blackburn: 1984).  
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 “ill-motivated” (2000: 58). We start with a short review of Burge’s (CE).  
 
2.3 Concept externalism. Concept externalism has two prongs: the “concept” prong 
and the “externalism” prong. I review them below in that order. According to concept 
externalism, the constitutive parts of content are concepts such as water, aluminum, 
gold, polio, arthritis and so on.49 Burge wants to remain neutral about the ontology of 
both concepts and contents. The former are to be intuitively understood as “context-
free” ways one thinks about “a stuff, a thing, or a group of things” (1982: 120, ft. 14) 
context-free “means of representing objects in thought” (1977: 345-346) or context-
free “thought symbols”(1977: 351). Contents, the wholes constituted by these ways of 
thinking, are thought-tokens. Hence, thought-token and content will be used 
interchangeably in what follows.  
Concepts are context-free in the sense that these ways of thinking determine their 
extensions -- the stuff, thing, or group of things the thought-token is about -- 
independent of the context in which the thought-token occurs.50 For any thought-token 
(e.g., of the thought type water is wet) the thought-symbol “water” nets the same stuff-
- the set of all aggregates of H2O molecules, together probably with the individual 
molecules”—as the stuff the thought token is about in every context. 51 In that regard a 
concept is different from other ways of thinking, such as those expressed by 
                                                 
49  Burge 1982: 120, ft. 14. In earlier work (1979) Burge uses “notions” instead of “concepts.”  
However, the point is the same: he uses “notion” “to apply to components or elements of 
content.” (Burge 1979: 598) 
50  It is important to notice that Burge is holding on to the view that a concept determines its  
extension. (See, especially Burge 1982: 10.) As Kent Bach (1994: 275) observes Burge “is not 
challenging either the Fregean view that meaning determines extension or the Fregean 
conception of the meaning of a term as the concept associated with it. Rather he is challenging 
the traditional view of concepts. He claims that having a natural kind concept such as the 
concept of water is not simply a matter of being in a certain internal state.” In other words, as 
Segal (2000: 27) points out, Burge rejects the view that one could separate the “the relationally 
determined aspect” of a concept “from some more internal factor” akin to Putnam’s stereotype.  
51  Burge 1982: 120, ft. 14.  
20 
 demonstratives (whether bare or complex) and proper names.52 These ways of 
thinking fail to determine an object of thought independent of context. The objects of 
the thought-tokens in which they occur are determined relationally53 by features 
unique to the context of the subject-object encounter.54  
Since the ways of thinking expressed by demonstratives, do not determine an 
object as the object of a thought-token independent of a context, the thought tokens in 
which they occur do not have context-independent truth-conditions. The semantic 
structure of these thoughts is either [x][F] where the demonstrative thought-symbol is 
represented by the free variable, or [Rx][F] where Rx represents the complex-
demonstrative thought-symbol (e.g., “that red flag”, or in the special case of proper 
names “that Ralph”). Keeping with the tradition I will call these singular thoughts.  
The upshot of this view is the following: singular thoughts are (a) semantically 
incomplete and (b) object-independent. They are semantically incomplete in the sense 
that they are not truth-evaluable in themselves.  To borrow an example from Segal 
                                                 
52  “Indexicals like ‘this’ are to be treated as analogues to proper names, except that they do not  
express a predicative element.” (Burge 1977: 354) For Burge (a singular unmodified) proper 
name “is a predicate true of an object if and only if the object is given that name in an 
appropriate way” (1970) In this view proper names (e.g., Ralph) functioning as singular terms 
(as in “Ralph cries”) have the semantical structure of complex demonstratives – like “that 
book” – in the case of a proper name, “this/that Ralph” and like demonstratives, their 
extensions are determined in part by contextual features. 
53   The terminology of “relational” and “satisfactional” determination of referent is borrowed  
from Bach (1994). According to Bach (1994: 12) the objects of general, descriptive thoughts 
are determined satisfactionally in the sense that “the fact that the thought is of that object does 
not require any connection between thought and object.” The objects of singular thoughts are 
determined relationally in the sense that for something to be the object of a singular thought “it 
must stand in a certain kind of relation to that very thought.” Bach thinks that this is a kind of 
causal relation supplied by the context of the encounter between subject and object of thought. 
The distinction is similar to that pointed out by Burge: singular thought is sponsored “by a 
contextual not purely conceptual relation between thinkers and objects.” (Burge 1977: 361-
362) (emphasis mine) 
54  As Burge points out, this is not to deny that the mental means by which the object of thought is  
determined in the case of de re beliefs don’t include conceptual elements from the believer’s 
repertoire of concepts; this is obviously false in the case of complex demonstratives. The point 
is that however rich in conceptual elements a demonstrative thought symbol is, its success in 
netting an object as the object of the thought-token in which it occurs depends “partly but 
irreducibly to factors unique to the context of the encounter with the object”, factors which 
“are not part of the mental or linguistic repertoire of the believer.” (Burge 1977: 352) For a 
similar point see also (Segal 2000: 109) and (Bach: 1994: 13, ft. 5).  
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 (2000: 106-107) if Peggy observing the Chrysler Building thinks to herself that is 
great her thought is true if the object that the demonstrative “that” refers to in the 
context of her utterance (in this case the Chrysler Building) is great. What object 
“that” refers to is determined relationally by factors unique to the context of her 
encounter, most likely in this case by Peggy perceiving the building. Singular thoughts 
are object-independent in the sense that in different contexts “they can pick out 
different objects”: Twin-Peggy living in Twin-Earth has the same thought in her 
Twin-encounter with the Twin- Chrysler Building. She also has the same thought with 
Triplet-Peggy who in Triplet-Earth hallucinates the Triplet-Chrysler building. The 
same thought picks out the Chrysler Building on Earth, the Twin Chrysler Building on 
Twin Earth and fails to pick out something on Triplet Earth.  
“Externalism” in concept externalism stands for the claim that (at least some of 
the) concepts we think in terms of are individuated in part by environmental 
conditions; physical duplicates think in terms of different concepts if located in 
superficially indiscriminable but microstructurally different environments. Since 
concepts are non-propositional parts of contents and contents are individuated in part 
by their non-propositional parts, the contents of one’s propositional attitudes are 
individuated in part by the environments of those who think through these concepts.55 
 
2.4 Singular thought theory. SSTT claims that the picture of singular thought 
recommended by CE rests on the conflation of two different ways of thinking about 
concepts: “concepts as parts or aspects of the content of a representational state” and 
“concepts as means of representation” of objects in thought. (McDowell 1984: 286-
287) (emphasis mine) An example from Gareth Evans helps clarify the distinction. 
                                                 
55  See Burge 1979, 1982, 1985. 
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 “[A] subject thinks on [day] d1 about d1 to the effect that it is fine by thinking ‘Today 
is fine’, and thinks on [day] d2, about d1, to the effect that it is fine by thinking 
‘Yesterday was fine’.” [Evans 1982: 193] The means by which the subject represents 
d1 in thought on d1 and on d2 are different, respectively “today” and “yesterday”. 
However this doesn’t show that the subject has two different singular thoughts on d1 
and d2: if the subject “keeps track” of d1 “as it recedes into the past, thinking of it 
successively as today, yesterday, the day before yesterday and so on that enables [the 
subject] to hold on to thoughts about it [d1]—thoughts that preserve their identity 
through the necessary changes in how they might be expressed.” (McDowell 1984: 
285) So, even though d1 is represented in thought by different means (“today” on d1 
and “yesterday” on d2) there is a way of thinking about d1, a way of keeping track of 
it, that preserves its identity through its representation by different means. McDowell 
calls this way of thinking of an object its de re sense. (McDowell 1984: 285) Like 
Burge’s concepts de re senses are context-free: the way of thinking about d1 
determines the same object as the object of a thought-token both on d1 and on d2. In 
that regard it is not different from the ways of thinking about water, aluminum and 
polio.  
De re senses are not to be confused with means of representation in thought; 
the latter are “vehicles of content”56 which “the changing of circumstances force us to 
change in order to keep hold of a constant reference and a constant thought.” (Evans 
1982: 194) In Evans’ expressive analogy, “we must run to keep still.” (1982: 194) By 
contrast de re senses “are parts or aspects of content” (emphasis mine) on the same 
footing with other concepts.57   
                                                 
56  The term is borrowed from McDowell 1984: 285. 
57  How are de re senses acquired and maintained? Sticking with the case of demonstrative  
thoughts, de re senses are what Evans calls “demonstrative Ideas”. [Evans 1982: 173] One 
acquires such an Idea, “in virtue of the existence of an information link between oneself and 
the object, which enables one to locate the object in egocentric space…if there is no one object 
with which the subject is in informational contact—if he is hallucinating, or if several different 
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 In summary, according to SSTT singular thoughts (e.g., that is F) are semantically 
complete, in the sense that they are truth-evaluable in themselves: they are true if the 
object corresponding to the de re sense figuring in the singular thought is F, and false 
otherwise. Singular thoughts are object-dependent: Peggy observing the Chrysler 
Building on Earth and thinking to herself that is great, has a different thought from 
Twin-Peggy living in Twin-Earth thinking that is great while observing the Twin- 
Chrysler Building. She also has a different thought from Triplet-Peggy who in Triplet-
Earth hallucinates the Triplet-Chrysler building, because Triplet-Peggy lacks the 
relevant singular thought, she only thinks she has one. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
objects succeed each other without his noticing—then he has no-Idea-of-a-particular object, 
and hence no thought…the information link on which demonstrative identification proper 
depends is really serving three functions. In the first place its previous and present deliveries 
provide the subject with his governing conception of the object…Second, the subject remains 
in contact with the object and is thus (unmediately) disposed to alter his governing conception 
in response to certain information received from the object…But finally and crucially, the 
subject is able upon the basis of the link, to locate the object in egocentric space, and thereby 
in objective space.” [emphasis added] Evans 1982: 173] So, demonstrative Ideas are governing 
conceptions of objects acquired through an informational link between subject and object. 
Despite its changes in response to the transformations the object undergoes, the governing 
conception determines the same reference. An example by Kent Bach will illustrate the point: 
“Say a card-sharp shows you three playing cards, an ace and two tens, and places them face 
down. They look alike but you think of the ace as the one on the right. He then begins 
interchanging them.” (Bach 1994: 43). As you keep your eye on the ace you can continue to 
think of it under a governing conception.  This governing conception is ace-dependent and the 
singular thoughts you form with this governing conception as a constituent (e.g., that card is 
moving fast) are ace-dependent too: if you lose track of the ace during an interchange of cards 
and start keeping track of the ten, you acquire a different governing conception and think 
different singular thoughts from the ones you would have thought if the ace instead of the ten 
were to move in space in the way the ten is actually moving. The singular thought “that card is 
moving fast” while you are keeping your attention on the ace is a different thought from the 
thought “that card is moving fast” if you were keeping your attention on the ten because they 
have different governing conceptions as their semantic constituents no matter how similar 
things might seem from the inside. A corollary to this position is that we can be mistaken 
about the contents of our own minds.  
What happens if the card-sharp removes the ace but it still appears to you that you are tracking 
the ace? Aside from this being a great trick on the part of the card-sharp, as far as your singular 
thoughts are concerned things are quite simple: you have lost your ability to locate the ace in 
egocentric space because you have lost your governing conception of the ace. You have lost 
that because the information link between you and the ace is severed. Any singular thoughts 
you think you are forming, you aren’t. All you have is second-order thoughts that you have a 
first order thoughts of the form that card is doing such and such and those second-order 
thoughts are false. 
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 2.5 CE, SSTT and Williamson’s argument against the conjunctive account of knowing. 
I have gone on at some length about these two different versions of content 
externalism to emphasize that their standards for the classification of thought-tokens 
(contents) -- and indirectly mental states -- if the argument in Section 2.2 is sound -- 
are different. The following example illustrates the point. Jodie says to herself  “that is 
full of water” while observing a bathtub on Earth. Twin-Jodie on Twin-Earth — where 
the liquid that comes out of faucets is superficially indistinguishable, but of a different 
chemical composition from the Earth-liquid (call it twater) — says to herself “that is 
full of water” while observing a bathtub on Twin-Earth. Triplet-Jodie on Triplet-Earth 
— where the liquid that comes out of faucets looks the same and has the same 
chemical composition as the Earth-liquid — hallucinates a bathtub full of water. For 
Burge’s CE Jodie and Twin-Jodie entertain different thoughts; but Jodie and Triplet-
Jodie entertain the same thought. For the McDowell/Evans SSTT, Jodie entertains 
different thoughts from both Twin-Jodie and Triplet-Jodie. In fact, Triplet-Jodie 
entertains no first-order, singular thought at all; she only entertains a second-order 
thought that she has a first-order singular thought of the form that is full of water.  
In summary both CE and SSTT maintain that intentional content is 
individuated by features of the environment outside one’s skin, but they differ 
regarding which features affect the individuation. For CE these are features relevant to 
the individuation of concepts such as water, aluminum, polio and so on; for SSTT they 
include features relevant to the individuation of de re senses.  
Distinguishing between these two versions of content externalism is important 
for the following reason: Williamson’s strategy “is to show that objections to the 
involvement of factive attitudes in genuine mental states are sound only if objections 
to the involvement of broad contents in genuine mental states are also sound.” (2000: 
51) Spelled out with regard to knowledge the strategy is to show that objections to (W) 
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 are sound only if objections to content externalism are sound. As it applies to (CK) 
Williamson’s argument tries to establish that (CK) is either false or unmotivated on the 
assumption of content externalism. The last four sections have argued for a distinction 
between two versions of content externalism: CE and SSSTT. Section 3.3 (below) will 
show that CE has no bearing on Williamson’s argument against (CK); the argument 
relies exclusively on SSTT. So the argument, if successful, doesn’t show that (CK) is 
either false or unmotivated on the assumption of content externalism as such; at best it 
shows that the view is false or unmotivated on the assumption of SSTT. The rest of the 
chapter argues that Williamson’s argument doesn’t even show that.  
The next section sketches one strategy of arguing for (CK) and thus indirectly 
against (W). The rest of the paper tries to use this strategy to motivate a version of 
(CK) that is consistent with both (CE) and (SSTT).  
 
3.1 Sketching the argument for the conjunctive account of knowing. To make his case 
the defender of (CK) has to isolate a condition Mp, that is “genuinely mental”58 (i.e., of 
the kind that one is in S, where S is a mental state) and such that it satisfies 
requirements (b) through (d), laid out in Section 1.5. So, overall, she must identify a 
condition that satisfies conditions (a), (b), (c) and (d). There are conditions that 
(almost) uncontroversially satisfy (a), (b) and (d). The most obvious candidate is the 
condition that one believes p:  (a) is satisfied because believing is paradigmatically 
mental, (b) is satisfied because it’s generally agreed that the condition that one knows 
p entails it59, and (d) is satisfied because it doesn’t entail the condition that one knows 
p, (at least in some cases one believes something which one doesn’t know). The 
challenge is to show that it also satisfies (c), i.e., the requirement that there is no 
                                                 
58  Williamson (2000: 54) alludes to this requirement in his discussion of Broadness; our  
definition of “mental condition” and the general version of (Ck) allows us to see quite clearly 
why this is a requirement for the plausibility of (Ck).  
59 Williamson concedes this point in (2000: 1.5;  202). 
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 mental condition that knowing p entails such that the candidate condition for Mp 
doesn’t entail it. Does the condition that one believes p satisfy (c)? If so, how could 
we show that it does? The general challenge to the defender of (CK) can be stated as 
follows: how can you show for a particular mental condition Mp that uncontroversially 
satisfies (a), (b) and (d), that it also satisfies (c)?  Below I sketch a strategy that is 
available to the defender of (CK). 
Let Mp be a condition that uncontroversially satisfies (a), (b) and (d). We can 
show that Mp satisfies (c) by way of (Add)60:  
(Add):   For all propositions p and cases α, if Mp obtains in α, then there  
is a case β which is mentally like α and Kp obtains in β.61  
If (Add) is true then for every mental condition Mp+ that Kp entails, Mp entails 
Mp+. Proof: Suppose there is a mental condition Mp+ such that Kp entails Mp+ and Mp 
doesn’t entail Mp+. By Entailment, if Mp doesn’t entail Mp+, then there is a case α, 
such that Mp obtains in α and Mp+ doesn’t obtain in α. Let this case be γ. Since Mp 
obtains in γ, by (Add) there is a case β which is mentally like γ such that Kp obtains in 
β. If Kp obtains in β, then by Entailment Mp+ obtains in β, because Kp entails Mp+. 
But if Mp+ obtains in β, then Mp+ also obtains in γ, because γ is mentally like β. So, 
Mp+ both obtains and doesn’t obtain in γ, which is a contradiction. Hence, there is no 
mental condition Mp+ such that Kp entails Mp+ and Mp doesn’t entail Mp+. If (Add) is 
true for a condition Mp that uncontroversially satisfies (a), (b) and (d), then Mp 
satisfies (c).  
 
                                                 
60  (Add) gives formal expression to the intuition that there is some mental condition such that  
knowledge adds nothing mental to it.  Stich (1978: 574) and Kim (1993: 188) take it to be the 
condition that one believes p.  
61  Principles (5), (6) and (7) in Williamson’s discussion of Broadness are instances of (Add).  
(2000: 56-57) 
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 3.2 Rational belief as the mental component of knowledge. Until now the discussion of 
(CK) and its rival (W) has been fairly abstract. That changes in the following sections. 
Williamson discusses two prima facie eligible candidates for Mp: the condition that 
one believes p (Bp) and the condition that one rationally believes p (RBp). If RBp is 
eligible, Bp is disqualified as a candidate for Mp by default: it fails to satisfy condition 
(c) (there is a mental condition that Kp entails, namely RBp, such that Bp doesn’t entail 
it).  
Williamson argues forcefully and convincingly that (Add) is false for Mp = Bp: 
if one believes p in a case α “solely for sufficiently confused and irrational reasons” 
then there is no case β mentally like α, where one knows p, for if β is mentally like α, 
one would believe p for the same sufficiently confused and irrational reasons in β and 
that is incompatible with knowing p in β. (2000: 57) Hence, the discussion that 
follows will concern the only running candidate RBp. The version of (CK) that I will 
develop and defend is one according to which Kp is non-trivially composite: the 
conjunction of RBp with a non-mental condition Np. Call this version (CK-RB). 
According to (CK-RB), (Add) holds for Mp = RBp. Call this instance of (Add), (Add-
4-RB).  
Williamson’s argument against (CK-RB) has two prongs:  
A. On the assumption of content externalism and internalism about mental 
conditions (CK-RB) is false.  
B. On the assumption of content externalism and externalism about mental 
conditions (CK-RB) is unmotivated.  
Either way this makes the denial that Kp is a mental condition on the grounds of 
(CK-RB) “ill-motivated.” (Williamson 2000: 58) Let’s start with the A-prong. 
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 3.3 The first prong of Williamson’s argument against (CK-RB). The argument for (A) 
is complex. I will present it in parts. The first part has the following structure: 
Williamson introduces an example where a subject comes to form a belief that p. He 
then argues that if the subject rationally believes p in this example then (Add-4-RB) is 
false. If (Add-4-RB) is false, then RBp doesn’t satisfy condition (c), and consequently 
(CK-RB) is false. Here is the example:  
Dog 
Suppose that it looks and sounds to me as though I hear a 
barking dog; I believe that a dog is barking on the basis of the 
argument “That dog is barking; therefore a dog is barking’. 
Unfortunately I am the victim of an illusion, my demonstrative 
fails, my premise sentence thereby fails to express a proposition, 
and my lack of the corresponding singular belief is a feature of my 
mental state, according to the content externalist. If I rationally 
believe that a dog is barking, then by [Add-4-RB] someone could 
be in exactly the same mental state as I actually am and know that a 
dog is barking. But that person too would lack a singular belief to 
serve as the premise of the inference and would therefore not know 
that a dog is barking.  (2000: 58) (emphasis mine) 
 
So, if the subject rationally believes that a dog is barking, there doesn’t exist a 
case which is mentally like the illusion case in which one knows that a dog is barking. 
Hence, if one rationally believes that a dog is barking in the illusion case then (Add-4-
RB) is false.  
There are a few things to notice right away. First, it is crucial to remember that 
the argument is a conditional proof and the conclusion is a conditional: if one 
29 
 rationally believes that a dog is barking in the illusion case then (Add-4-RB) is false. 
If (Add-4-RB) is false then (CK-RB) is false.  
Second, the argument doesn’t appeal to concept externalism (CE): “the content 
externalist” in the example is the defender of SSTT. So the example relies on SSTT to 
establish that the victim of the illusion lacks the singular belief that that dog is 
barking. That conclusion cannot be reached merely on the assumption of CE. (See 
Sections 2.1 - 2.5 above for a discussion of the distinction between CE and SSTT.)  
Third, an analogous argument that invokes CE to a similar conclusion seems 
prima facie unmotivated. A structurally similar argument would involve an example 
of the following type: for some proposition p, a prerequisite of one coming to know p 
in a case is one’s reasoning to p on the basis of a premise Bi -- where Bi is a member of 
a set of premises B: ⎨B1, B2…Bn⎬ -- where each Bi involves a concept C, for example 
the concept water, which for concept externalist reasons is not available in a case α, 
located on Twin Earth where the liquid that fills the rivers and runs from faucets is 
twater.  In α one reasons to the conclusion that p on the basis of premise Bi* which 
involves twater, instead of water, but is otherwise like its counterpart premise Bi in 
every respect. The belief that p one comes to form in α is prima facie rational, but one 
doesn’t know p. And there is no case β mentally like α, where one knows p, for in any 
such case one would base his belief that p on a premise that involves twater instead of 
water. Hence if the subject’s belief in α is rational, then (Add-4-RB) is false. Now, if 
p involves the concept water, then α is impossible: one cannot come to believe p in α, 
because by stipulation the concept water is not available in α. If p doesn’t involve the 
concept water, it is not clear why coming to know p would require one’s reasoning to 
p on the basis of a premise that involves the concept water. So, Williamson has not 
shown that the same conclusion can be reached on the assumption of content 
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 externalism; at best, he has shown that the conclusion can be reached on the 
assumption of SSTT.  
Assuming that the argument crucially involves SSTT, the argument doesn’t 
show that (Add-4-RB) is false, unless we also assume that the subject’s belief in the 
illusion case is rational. The defender of (CK-RB) can argue as follows: both (Add-4-
RB) and SSTT are true; therefore, the subject’s belief that a dog is barking in the 
illusion case is not rational. Williamson thinks that this response doesn’t save an 
internalist version of (CK-RB). Here is how the argument can be spelled out:  
1. Suppose, (a) internalism about mental conditions is true (all mental 
conditions are narrow); and (b) SSTT is true. 
2. If (CK-RB) is true RBp satisfies conditions (a), (b), (c) and (d) (laid 
out in Section 1.5).  
3. The subject’s belief that p in Dog is either rational or irrational.  
4. If the subject’s belief that p is rational and SSTT is true then (Add-4-
RB) is false. (This is what Dog shows.) 
5. If (Add-4-RB) is false, then RBp doesn’t satisfy condition (c). 
6. So, if the subject’s belief in Dog is rational (CK-RB) is false. 
7. If the subject’s belief in Dog is not rational, then RBp is not a narrow 
condition; it is broad, because whether or not it obtains 
constitutively depends on the environment outside the subject’s skin. 
62  
8. If all mental conditions are narrow then RBp is not mental: it fails to 
satisfy condition (a). 
                                                 
62  That is what I take Williamson to argue in the following paragraph: suppose the subject  
doesn’t “rationally believe that a dog is barking even though there need be nothing internal  
wrong with [her] thought processes. Consequently, if the contents of beliefs depend like that 
on the external environment, then so too does the attitude of rational belief to that content.” 
(2000: 58) (emphasis mine) 
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 9. If RBp doesn’t satisfy condition (a), then (CK-RB) is false. 
10. So, if the subject’s belief in Dog is not rational (CK-RB) is false. 
11. Therefore, if both SSTT and internalism about mental conditions are 
true, (CK-RB) is false. (By Conditional Proof) 
The crucial premise is (7). One straightforward argument for (7) would go like 
this: let α be the illusion case; there is a case β (the case where one perceives that that 
dog is barking) where one is in the same internal physical state as in α and one 
rationally believes p. Since the condition that one rationally believes p obtains in α 
and not in β, and α is internally like β, the condition that one rationally believes p is 
not narrow. I will assume this argument succeeds; as indicated above my aim is to 
develop and defend a version of (CK-RB) that concedes both SSTT and externalism 
about mental conditions, i.e., a non-internalist version of (CK-RB).  
Assuming it succeeds, what does the argument show? It shows that SSTT,  
(CK-RB) and internalism about mental conditions are jointly inconsistent. As far as 
(CK-RB) is concerned it shows that the view is false on the assumption of SSTT and 
internalism about mental conditions. But if the argument from content externalism to 
the denial of internalism about mental conditions succeeds (see Section 2.2) this lesson 
is harmless as far as (CK-RB) is concerned: internalism and SSTT can’t be jointly 
assumed because one entails the negation of the other.  
Suppose that the argument sketched in Section 2.2 doesn’t succeed. The 
defender of (CK-RB) still has two options: she can reject SSTT, or she can reject 
internalism about mental conditions. In other words, both an internalist version of (CK-
RB) that rejects SSTT and a version of (CK-RB) that endorses SSTT and rejects 
internalism about mental conditions seem prima facie motivated at this stage. As 
indicated in the introduction, I am assuming the strongest version of content 
externalism in this dissertation, which means that I am assuming SSTT. That renders 
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 the first option unavailable by default. This still leaves the defender of (CK-RB) with 
the other option: the trio, (CK-RB), SSTT, and externalism about mental conditions. Is 
this trio motivated? This is the question pursued in the remainder of this chapter. 
 
3.4 The broadness constraint on rational belief. As a preliminary we must notice a 
constraint that one of the members of the trio, SSTT, places on (CK-RB): if SSTT is 
true, the condition that one rationally believes p, is broad. To see this consider a 
variation on the argument sketched above that doesn’t assume internalism about 
mental conditions.  
1. Suppose (CK-RB) and SSTT are true.  
2. If (CK-RB) is true RBp satisfies conditions (a), (b), (c) and (d) (laid out in 
Section 1.5).  
3. If the subject’s belief that p in Dog is rational and SSTT is true then (Add-
4-RB) is false. (This is what Dog shows.) 
4. If (Add-4-RB) is false, then RBp doesn’t satisfy condition (c) and 
consequently (CK-RB) is false. 
5. But (CK-RB) and SSTT are both true, so the subject’s belief in Dog is not 
rational.  
6. If the subject’s belief in Dog is not rational, then RBp is not a narrow 
condition: it is broad, because whether or not it obtains constitutively 
depends on the environment outside the subject’s skin.  
7. Therefore, if (CK-RB) and SSTT are both true, RBp is a broad condition.  
The conclusion seems prima facie unproblematic given the third member of the 
trio, externalism about mental conditions, but trouble is on the way for the defender of 
(CK-RB). 
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 3.5 The second prong of Williamson’s argument against (CK-RB). “If taking the 
externalist attitude of rational belief to a given content can contribute to one’s mental 
state, why cannot taking the externalist attitude of knowledge to that content also 
contribute to one’s mental states?” (Williamson 2000: 58) The worry seems to be the 
following: if RBp is both broad and mental, the prejudice that Kp is broad cannot 
motivate the denial that Kp is a mental condition. If so what is left to motivate the 
denial that Kp is mental? A straightforward answer to this worry would require 
providing a non-internalist, yet restrictive sense of the “mental” that classifies RBp and 
Kp respectively as mental and non-mental conditions. This in turn would require a 
formal definition of the “mental” which as indicated earlier (Section 1.3) is 
unavailable.  A less direct answer would be the following:  the denial that Kp is a 
mental condition is as motivated as (CK). What motivates (CK) is simply the claim that 
some mental condition — i.e., a condition that satisfies requirement (a) — also 
satisfies requirements (b), (c), and (d). (CK-RB) claims that RBp does. So, whether 
broad or narrow, if RBp satisfies conditions (a)-(d), then Kp, is not a mental condition, 
for if it was by (c) RBp would entail it and by (d) it doesn’t. If (CK-RB) is true, the 
denial that Kp is mental is well-motivated. So, the question is, does RBp satisfy (a)-(d) 
on the assumption of SSTT and externalism about mental conditions? If the answer is 
“yes” the trio (CK-RB), SSTT, and externalism about mental conditions is motivated, 
otherwise not.  
 It is important to notice that the same argument cannot be easily mounted 
against the claim that RBp is a mental condition. To be able to mount such an 
argument we must be able to identify a condition Mp that is  (a) mental, (b) such that 
RBp entails it, (c) such that it entails every mental condition that RBp entails and (d) 
such that it doesn’t entail RBp. Analogously to the case of knowledge, if there is a 
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 condition that satisfies (a), (b) and (d) and the following principle holds between it and 
RBp then the condition also satisfies (c): 
(Add-4-M)  For all propositions p and cases α, if Mp obtains in α, then there  
is a case β, which is mentally like α and RBp obtains in β.  
But there doesn’t seem to be a mental condition that satisfies (Add-4-M). Certainly 
belief, or even true belief, cannot play the role of Mp. If I believe, or even truly believe 
that p, for sufficiently bizarre and confused reasons in a case α, there is no case β, 
which is mentally like α where I rationally believe that p—for if I rationally believe 
that p in β, I can’t believe p based on the same bizarre reasons for which I believe it in 
α. No other condition seems to suggest itself as good candidate for the mental 
component of rational belief. If no condition can satisfy the requirements for being the 
mental component of RBp an argument that RBp is not a mental condition cannot be 
mounted from that premise.  
 
3.6 Rational belief and the requirements for being the mental component of 
knowledge. The argument that RBp doesn’t satisfy (a)-(d) on the assumption of SSTT 
and externalism about mental conditions is subtle. It begins with what has already 
been established: if the subject’s belief that p in Dog is rational and SSTT is true then 
(Add-4-RB) is false. To save (Add-4-RB) the defender of (CK-RB) concedes that the 
belief in the illusion case is irrational. But the question is on what grounds? Here is 
Williamson’s way of raising the worry:  “We could make  [Add-4-RB] trivially true 
by defining ‘in case α one rationally believes p’ as ‘in some case β one is in exactly 
the same mental state as in α and one knows p’.  [But this] would neither isolate the 
mental component of knowing in independent terms, nor provide any reason to 
suppose the mental component to fall short of knowing itself.” (Williamson 2000: 58) 
(emphasis mine) 
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 The worry is twofold:  
(1) The response to Dog raises the suspicion that the defender of (CK-
RB) lacks an independent grasp of the concept “rational belief”: his 
pronouncements with regard to whether a belief is or isn’t rational 
are made based on whether or not (Add-4-RB) is preserved. The 
account of rational belief developed as a result is gerrymandered to 
preserve (Add-4-RB) and thus can’t be used to isolate the mental 
component of knowing in a way that provides independent support 
for (Add-4-RB).   
(2) How can we be sure that the condition isolated by this 
gerrymandered account of rationality is one that falls short of the 
condition that one knows p?  The worry becomes even more 
pressing on the assumption that RBp is broad: If RBp is narrow then 
it uncontroversially satisfies (d), because Kp is broad. If RBp is 
broad all bets are off, because RBp’s satisfaction of (d) cannot be 
motivated by the narrow/broad distinction. 
Williamson promises to argue that (1) is not just a suspicion: we don’t have an 
independent grasp of the concept “rational belief” because “considerations of rational 
belief depend on considerations of knowledge.” 63 (2000: 59) He makes good on this 
promise by developing an account of rationality according to which considerations of 
rational belief depend on considerations of knowledge, on the further assumption that 
one’s evidence in a case is all and only what one knows. However, as I will show, this 
account of evidence is not mandatory for his account of rationality: one can reject the 
former and accept the latter. If we reject the equation of knowledge and evidence, we 
                                                 
63  This stronger claim is crucial to Williamson’s overall strategy of changing the order of  
explanation in epistemology from that of providing complex explanations of “knows” in terms 
of concepts such as “evidence”,  “rationality” and “justification” to that of using the concept of 
knowledge in “partial elucidation” of these other concepts. 
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 are left with an account of rational belief that is in agreement with our pre-theoretical 
intuitions about rational belief, provides a grasp of the concept “rational belief” that is 
independent of considerations of knowledge, and preserves (Add-4-RB) in face of 
Dog and similar counterexamples. Or so I will argue in what follows.  
 The next section considers a preliminary response on behalf of the defender of 
(CK-RB) to the worry raised by (1) and (2).  
 
3.7 A preliminary response. The suspicion raised by (1) is unfounded: we do have an 
independent grasp of the concept of rationality. Very roughly, whether one rationally 
believes p, depends exclusively on three things: the evidence one has, the degree to 
which one’s evidence supports p, and how well one reflects this support in forming 
one’s opinions about whether or not p. By contrast whether one knows p depends both 
on the evidence one has but also on evidence that one doesn’t posses, but which is 
relevant to p. In other words the supervenience base for rational belief is prima facie 
narrower than that for knowledge. That is the reason why (2) shouldn’t be a worry 
either: in two cases where one has conclusive evidence for p (one’s evidence entails 
p), one can rationally believe p in both, but might fail to know p in one due to relevant 
misleading evidence that one doesn’t posses. The challenge to the defender of (CK-RB) 
is to develop this view into an account of rational belief that meets all the constraints 
introduced up to this point. I summarize them in the next section. 
 
3.7 The challenge clarified. The preceding discussion posses a complex challenge to 
the defender of (CK-RB). To motivate the trio – (CK-RB), SSTT, and externalism about 
mental conditions – he must sketch a plausible theory of RBp that meets the following 
three conditions: the sketch must, 
(i) define RBp in terms independent of knowledge.  
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 (ii) preserve (Add-4-RB) by ruling the belief in the illusion case irrational. 
(iii) account for the intuition that RBp doesn’t entail Kp. 
Interestingly enough Williamson’s discussion of rationality provides the groundwork 
for meeting this challenge.  
 
3.8 A sketch of a theory of rational belief. According to Williamson, “properly 
understood” the claim that “rational thinkers respect their evidence” is “a platitude.”64 
(2000: 164) One way of cashing out this requirement is to claim that rationality 
requires one to proportion one’s belief in a proposition in a case to its probability on 
one’s (total) evidence in that case. (2000: 223) Call this the proportionality 
requirement (PR). (PR) is a formal constraint on the rationality of individual degrees 
of beliefs, rather than systems of degrees of belief. So the kind of rationality (PR) is 
concerned with is local, rather than global rationality.65 What local rationality requires 
vis-à-vis a particular proposition p is not always transparent to the believing subject: 
“Rationality may be a matter of doing the best one can with what one has, but one 
cannot always know what one has or whether one has done the best one can with it.” 
(2000: 179) Less metaphorically, the subject is not always in a position to know what 
her evidence is, or what the probability of the proposition p is on her evidence.66 One 
can believe irrationally that p without being in position to know that one’s belief is 
irrational.67  
                                                 
64  This is often considered a starting point in discussions of epistemic rationality. See, for  
example, Christensen 2004: 4. 
65  See Christensen 2004: 8-11 for a discussion of the distinction between local and global  
rationality.  
66  Both are non-trivial conditions, and if Williamson’s Anti-Luminosity Argument is correct  
(2000: chap. 4), no non-trivial conditions are luminous. 
67  “[T]he rationality of believing a given proposition must sometimes differ between cases that  
are indiscriminable to the subject, because indiscriminability is not a non-transitive relation.” 
(2004: 315) 
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  Williamson doesn’t give a precise definition of “probability on one’s 
evidence”, but he provides some guidance: the probability of p conditional on one’s 
total evidence e, P(h/e), is a number in the interval [0, 1], with P(h/e) = 0 if e is 
inconsistent with p and P(h/e) = 1 if e entails p. “Between those extremes, the initial 
probability distribution provides a continuum of intermediate cases, in which the 
evidence comes more or less close to requiring or ruling out” the proposition.” (2000: 
212) If P is one’s “prior probability distribution”, eα  “the conjunction of all old and 
new evidence for one in a case α, and Pα(p) the evidential probability of a proposition 
p for one in α,” then, Pα(p) is given by the following formula:  
 ECOND  Pα(p) = P(p/eα) = P(p∧eα) / P(eα) (Williamson 2000: 220) 
By ECOND one’s evidence propositions in α have evidential probability 1 in α.  
Williamson (2000: 221) admits that, “different conceptions of evidence are 
compatible with ECOND.” He defends a particular conception according to which 
“one’s total evidence in eα is the conjunction of all the propositions one knows in α,” 
but ECOND doesn’t require that. Despite rampant disagreement among those who 
hold a propositional view of evidence68, there is a broad consensus that one’s 
evidence in a case is a subset of the propositions one believes in that case.69 
Williamson is part of this consensus. 
                                                 
68  As the name suggests, according to the view one’s evidence is a set of propositions, as opposed  
to, for example, mental states.  
69  According to Alston (2005: 83) “complete generality [requires us] to speak of evidence as  
consisting of beliefs [propositions that one believes] rather than facts [true propositions].” 
(emphasis mine) The subjective Bayesian might agree with Alston if the propositions that one 
believes are understood as propositions of “maximal personal probability” i.e., subjective 
probability 1. (Van Fraassen 1995) For Feldman (2004:226), the “total possible evidence” one 
has at a time “includes everything [every proposition] that one has actively believed and could 
recall with some prompting”: one’s “total actual evidence” is a subset of one’s total possible 
evidence. For Williamson, one’s total evidence is one’s total knowledge. But he grants that 
knowing a proposition entails believing it (2000 1.5, 202). So, the propositions constituting 
one’s evidence are for Williamson a subset of the propositions one believes. The common 
denominator of these views on evidence is that believing p is a necessary condition on p being 
a member of one’s total evidence set. 
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 (PR) is a constraint on the rationality of “credences,” or “degrees of belief.”: it 
requires one to distribute credences to propositions in accordance with the 
propositions’ probabilities on one’s evidence; one must give the highest credence to a 
proposition entailed by one’s evidence and the lowest credence to a proposition that is 
inconsistent with one’s evidence. If we model the lower and upper bounds for 
credence as 0 and 1, there is a function μ, from the set of credences Fc to the interval 
[0, 1]: μ: Fc → [0, 1]. If Cp is one’s credence in proposition p in a case α (PR) requires 
that μ (Cp) = Pα(p), where Pα(p) is the evidential probability of p in α. The following 
is a summary of Williamson’s account of rationality developed so far:  
 
W-RB 
(E=K)   One’s evidence in a case α is the set of propositions one knows in α.  
(PR)   One’s credence in p (Cp) is rational in α only if Cp is proportionate to  
the probability of p conditional on one one’s evidence in α.  μα (Cp) = 
Pα(p) 
(ECOND)  Pα(p) = P(p/eα) = P(p∧eα) / P(eα)70         
 
The defender of (CK-RB) can selectively use elements of (W-RB) to give an 
alternative model of rational belief that meets the three-fold challenge introduced in 
Section 3.7. The proposal is this: accept (PR) and (ECOND), but reject (E=K). (PR) 
can serve as a constraint on the rationality of believing that p, the condition entailed by 
knowing that p, if we employ what Christensen calls a unification account71 of belief, 
                                                 
70  Is W-RB relevant to the condition that one rationally believes p? Williamson’s answer is not  
clear, but his most recent discussion (Williamson 2004: 313-316) suggests that the answer 
might be “yes”: the evidential probability of a proposition in a case α, Pα(p), determines the 
degree to which it is rational to believe p in α. So, if Pα(p) > Pβ (p), then it is more rational to 
believe p in α than in β; if Pα(p) = Pβ (p) then it is equally rational to believe p in α and β and 
so on. 
71  See Christensen 2004: chap. 2.  
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 according to which believing p is identical to a particular kind of credence in p.72 If 
the highest credence one can give to a proposition amounts to believing it then belief
identical to credence 1
 is 
                                                
73. Identifying believing p with giving p credence 1 is consistent 
with the three other elements of the account of rational belief developed so far: the 
consensus that one’s evidence is a subset of the set of propositions one believes, 
ECOND and (PR). Here is why. If proposition p is a member of eα then by ECOND 
Pα(p) = 1. If Pα(p) = 1, then (PR) requires one to give credence 1 to p in α. The 
requirement of (PR) is consistent with the identification of belief with credence 1, 
since by being a member of one’s evidence set in α, p is a proposition one believes in 
α.  
If believing p is giving p credence 1, then according to (PR) one rationally 
believes p in α only if Pα(p) = 1. This is not a sufficient condition for one rationally 
believing p in α: one might come to believe p irrationally, even when the propositions 
constituting one’s evidence set entail p, as the case would be when one’s belief is not 
based on one’s evidence. According to Williamson (2000: 191) a belief can be based 
on one’s evidence in two different ways: explicitly or implicitly. The belief that p is 
explicitly evidence based “if it is influenced by prior beliefs about the evidence for p”; 
the belief is implicitly evidence based “if it is appropriately causally sensitive to the 
 
72  Williamson’s discussion in (2000) introduces a threefold distinction:  
(i) Outright belief 
(ii) Degrees of outright belief 
(iii) Credences 
“One believes p outright when one is willing to use p as a premise in practical reasoning… 
Outright belief still comes in degrees for one may be willing to use p as a premise in practical 
reasoning only when the stakes are sufficiently low… One’s degree of outright belief in p is 
not in general to be equated with one’s subjective probability for p.” (2000: 99) At least the 
following is clear: “credences are not the degrees of outright belief”. (2000: 209) This still 
doesn’t help clarify the relation between credences and outright belief? Is “outright belief” the 
same as credence 1? What is the relation between “believing that p”, understood as the mental 
condition entailed by “knowing that p”, and outright belief; are they the same thing? 
Williamson’s answers to these questions are not clear. What is important is that (PR) can serve 
as a constraint on rational belief, if we answer both questions affirmatively.  
73  See Halpern 1991, Halpern 1996, and Halpern 2005, chap. 8 as an example of this probabilistic  
model of binary belief.  
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 evidence for p.” The distinction is important in explaining why there is no regress of 
explicitly evidence-based belief: one’s beliefs about one’s evidence for p need not be 
explicitly evidence based; it is sufficient for them to be implicitly-evidence based.  
One can have implicitly evidence-based belief even if one is prone to misidentifying 
one’s evidence: implicit evidence based belief requires mere causal sensitivity to one’s 
evidence and “[c]ausal sensitivity need not be perfect to be genuine. There can be a 
non-accidental rough proportionality between the strength of the belief and the 
strength of the evidence, even if distortions sometimes occur.” (2000: 192) Whether 
implicitly or explicitly evidence-based, a belief that p is based on one’s evidence in a 
case only if the strength of the belief is non-accidentally proportionate to the strength 
of one’s evidence in that case. The strength of one’s evidence for p in a case is 
measured by the conditional probability of p on one’s total evidence in that case.  
 The following is a sketch of the account of rational belief developed on behalf 
of the defender of (CK-RB) so far.   
 
Minimal RB 
1. (E ⊆ B) One’s evidence in a case α is a subset of the propositions one 
believes in α.  
2. The condition that one believes p is identical to the condition that one gives 
p credence 1. 
3. (PR) One rationally believes p in α if and only if one’s belief in p is non-
accidentally proportionate to the probability of p conditional on one one’s 
evidence in α.  μα (Cp) = Pα(p) =1      
4. (ECOND) Pα(p) = P(p/eα) = P(p∧eα) / P(eα)     
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 The main way in which Minimal RB departs from W-RB is in weakening the 
requirement on evidence. But in that regard it remains within the bounds of consensus 
with regard to evidence: one’s evidence is a subset of propositions one believes. Yet, 
one might worry that Minimal RB makes rational belief very hard to come by 
identifying belief with credence 1: our evidence rarely entails a proposition. The 
worry is premature: as stated Minimal RB is quite flexible. It is true that by (PR) and 
(ECOND) we rationally believe a proposition p only if our evidence entails p but 
depending on whether the constraint we place on what counts as evidence is weak or 
strong by Minimal RB we can end up rationally believing a lot or very little. As stated 
Minimal RB doesn’t have skeptical consequences. The next section will show that on 
the assumption of SSTT, Minimal RB meets the first two parts of the challenge laid 
out in Section 3.7.  
 
3.9 Meeting the first two parts of the challenge. We start with the second part. If 
Minimal RB is true, the belief that p, a dog is barking, in Dog is irrational. If SSTT is 
true, one doesn’t believe the proposition q, that dog is barking: the demonstrative fails 
to refer and consequently one lacks the singular belief that q.  One only has the 
second-order belief r, that one believes that q, and that belief is false. By Minimal RB 
believing q is a necessary condition on q being a member of one’s total evidence set; 
hence q ∉ edog. If it was, the probability of the proposition p conditional on edog would 
be 1, and by (PR) the subject’s belief that p would be rational. What does edog include? 
According to Williamson the subject believes that s, it appears to him that that dog is 
barking. (2000: 198-9) If SSTT is true the subject also has the second order belief r, 
that she has a first-order belief that q. By the stipulation of the counterexample this is 
all the relevant evidence for p that the subject has in this case. Therefore, at best the 
subject’s evidence for p is limited to s and r. Neither r nor s (nor their conjunction) 
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 entails p; so, P(p/ edog) is less than 1. If that is so then by Minimal RB believing p, 
(i.e., giving p credence 1) in Dog is irrational.  
Prima facie condition (i) is satisfied too: the concept “rational belief” is 
defined in terms independent of the concept “knows”. What about condition (iii): does 
RBp entail Kp according to Minimal RB?  The next section analyzes a well-worn case 
to motivate the negative answer. The argument for (CK-RB) will be ultimately 
inconclusive: its success or failure will depend on what we take to be the correct 
theory of evidence.  
 
4.1 Meeting the third part of the challenge. Let’s start with a well-worn case where 
intuitively one doesn’t know the proposition p, that’s a barn.  
 Fake Barn Bad 
 
Henry is driving in the countryside with his son. For the boy’s edification Henry 
identifies various objects in the landscape as they come into view. ‘That’s a cow’ says 
Henry, ‘That’s a tractor,’ ‘That’s a silo,’ ‘That’s a barn,’ etc. Henry has no doubt 
about the identity of these objects; in particular he has no doubt that the last 
mentioned object is a barn, which indeed it is. Each of the identified objects has 
features characteristic of its type. Moreover, each object is fully in view, Henry has 
excellent eyesight, and he has enough time to look at them reasonably carefully since 
there is little traffic to distract him….Suppose we are told that, unknown to Henry, the 
district he has just entered is full of papier-mache facsimiles of barns. These 
facsimiles look from the road exactly like barns but are really just facades, without 
back walls or interiors, quite incapable of being used as barns. Having just entered the 
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 district, Henry has not encountered any facsimiles; the object he sees is a genuine 
barn. (Goldman: 1976: 772)74 
 
 Now consider another case, Fake Barn Good, where everything is just like in 
Fake Barn Bad except there are no fake barns in the district Henry has just entered; all 
the barns are real. Henry identifies the same barn as it comes into view: ‘That’s a 
barn’. Intuitively Henry knows in Fake Barn Good. Now if Henry rationally believes 
that p in both cases but knows p in one of them (Fake Barn Good) but not in the other 
(Fake Barn Bad), then RBp doesn’t entail Kp.  
                                                 
74  Fake Barn Bad is a case of non-misleading evidence that one doesn’t posses: the  
proposition r, the area is filled with fake barns isn’t prima facie evidence for 
believing a false proposition. Another type of case that could motivate the same 
conclusion is a case of misleading evidence that one doesn’t posses. The distinction 
between misleading and non-misleading evidence is similar to the distinction that 
Klein (1976) draws between misleading and non-misleading defeaters. The distinction 
is not clear; I am inclined to think the difference is one of degree rather than kind but 
am not prepared to argue for it here. Cases of misleading evidence one doesn’t posses 
are those introduced by Harman 1973: chap. 9. The following case introduced by 
Dretske 1981: 123-124 is a clear illustration of a case of misleading evidence one 
doesn’t posses.   
Pressure Gauge (Bad) 
A sensitive and completely reliable instrument (a pressure gauge) is used to 
monitor the pressure within a certain boiler. Since the boiler pressure is a critical 
quantity, in that too much pressure can result in a dangerous explosion, the gauge is 
made from the finest materials, to the most exacting standards, by the most careful 
methods. These instruments have always been completely reliable. The gauge is 
located in a console. An attendant checks it periodically. No one has the slightest 
hesitation abut saying that the attendant knows what the boiler pressure is when he 
consults the gauge. The gauge delivers the relevant information. Nevertheless despite 
an impeccable performance record, a nervous engineer becomes concerned about a 
possible failure in the pressure sensing mechanism and the consequent accuracy of the 
gauge. He decides to install an auxiliary system whose function it is to detect 
malfunctions in the main channel of communication (the pressure sensing system). If 
things go wrong with the pressure gauge, a small light will flash on the attendant’s 
console, alerting him to the problem. The auxiliary system is installed, but before the 
attendant can be told about the additional precautions that have been taken, a failure 
occurs in the auxiliary device. The warning light flashes on the attendant’s console, 
but the pressure gauge, operating in its old reliable way, indicates a completely 
normal boiler pressure. We may suppose that the attendant either doesn’t see the 
flashing light or sees it but ignorant of its purpose ignores it in coming to the belief 
(on the basis of the pressure gauge reading) that the boiler pressure is normal. 
Question does the attendant know that the boiler pressure is normal?  
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 Henry knows p, that’s a barn in Fake Barn Good. On the plausible 
assumption75 that if one knows p in α, then p is a member of eα, p is part of Henry’s 
evidence in Fake Barn Good. Hence P(p/egood) = 1: Henry both knows and rationally 
believes p in Fake Barn Good. 
  Does Henry have the same evidence in Fake Barn Bad?76 77 If Henry’s 
evidence is the same in both cases, then P (p/egood) = P (p/ebad) =1. Consequently 
Henry rationally believes but doesn’t know p in Fake Barn Bad, which is to say that 
RBp doesn’t entail Kp.  
How can the defender of (CK-RB) motivate the sameness of evidence claim? I 
think the most straightforward strategy would be the following: Henry sees in both 
cases that the building is a barn. Seeing that p is what Williamson calls a “factive 
mental attitude”: if one bears it with regard to a proposition p, then p is true. 
Williamson claims that knowing is the most general factive mental attitude: so, “ if 
you see that it is raining, then you know that it is raining.” (2000: 37). However he 
admits that such entailments are “plausible but not uncontroversial.” (2000: 37) Going 
back to Fake Barn Bad why does Henry fail to see that that’s a barn? He has the 
relevant concept of a barn, he has 20/20 vision, the weather conditions are favorable 
and so on. I will paraphrase the answer Williamson gives in a similar case: Henry 
cannot see that that’s a barn precisely because he does not know what he sees to be a 
situation in which the object in front of him is a barn (given the unfavorable 
evidence).78  
                                                 
75  See Williamson (2000: 203-207) for an argument for the claim that all knowledge is evidence.  
See also Joyce (2004). The claim is controversial; see Weatherson (manuscript) for an 
argument against it.  
76  In his original presentation of the case Goldman claimed that: “Henry’s evidence for the  
proposition that the object is a barn is the same in both cases.” (Goldman 1976: 000) 
77  If only knowledge is evidence then the answer is “no”: Henry doesn’t know p in Fake Barn  
Bad; according to Williamson he only knows q, that appears to be a barn. If so then Henry  
doesn’t rationally believe p in Fake Barn Bad because P(p/ebad) is less than 1(Henry’s relevant 
evidence for p in Fake Barn Bad is at best q and P (p/q) is less than 1).  
78  The paragraph I am paraphrasing is the following: “By looking in the right direction, you can  
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 I think the explanation is question-begging: it assumes that in order for one to 
see that p one must know that p, and that’s precisely what is at issue here. To 
summarize, the following three claims are individually plausible and jointly 
inconsistent:  
• Henry doesn’t know that that’s a barn in Fake Barn Bad.  
• If Henry sees that that’s a barn then he knows that that’s a barn.  
• Henry sees that that’s a barn in Fake Barn Bad.  
Williamson accepts the first two and rejects the third. If Henry doesn’t see that the 
object is a barn, the attempt to argue that the proposition p is part of Henry’s evidence 
in Fake Barn Bad via the claim that he sees that p fails. The defender of (CK-RB) 
accepts the first and last claims and rejects the second. Who is right? A definite 
answer is premature.  The suggestion is that the knowledge requirement on evidence—
only knowledge is evidence-- depends in part on a controversial view about factive 
mental attitudes such as seeing that p, hearing that p, remembering that p; according to 
this view, bearing a factive mental attitude to a proposition entails knowing it. The 
view is controversial; so the knowledge requirement on evidence is controversial. If 
the knowledge requirement on evidence is removed, the account of rational belief 
developed in Minimal RB can give a satisfactory response to the two worries sketched 
in Section 3.5. It can also give a systematic explanation for the failure of rationality in 
the Dog case. As noted in Section 3.7 these are the only challenges posed to a version 
of (CK-RB) that concedes content externalism and externalism about mental 
conditions and Minimal RB can meet all three of them. So, the argument against the 
trio (CK-RB), content externalism and externalism about mental conditions, is 
ultimately inconclusive. 
                                                                                                                                            
see a situation in which it is raining. In the imagined case moreover, you have enough concepts 
to grasp the proposition that it is raining. Nevertheless you cannot see that it is raining, 
precisely because you do not know what you see to be a situation in which it is raining (given 
the unfavorable evidence).” (2000: 38) 
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4.2 Evidence one doesn’t posses. Contemporary epistemology takes for granted the 
intuitive distinction between evidence that one possesses for a proposition p (EP) and 
relevant evidence that one doesn’t posses (EDP).79 So, for example in Fake Barn Bad, 
the proposition r, this area is full of fake barns, is relevant evidence for p that Henry 
doesn’t posses; r is not part of Henry’s evidence and if r became part of Henry’s 
evidence then the probability of p, that’s a barn, conditional on the new evidence 
would be less than 1. Knowing that p, as the Fake Barn case shows, constitutively 
depends on EDP. According to Minimal RB rationally believing that p depends on EP 
and the relation between EP and the belief that p. Up to this point Williamson and the 
defender of (CK-RB) are in agreement. What they disagree about is what constitutes 
one’s EP. If Williamson is correct and EP in a case α is all and only what one knows 
in α, then rationally believing that p constitutively depends on EDP, because EP does: 
one can believe the same true propositions in α and β, while one’s total evidence in α 
being different from one’s total evidence in β. This is a blow to a version of (CK-RB) 
that takes Minimal RB to be the correct theory for rational belief for two reasons: (1) 
if evidence is knowledge then Minimal RB fails to provide an independent 
characterization of rational belief: “considerations of rational belief [ultimately] 
depend on considerations of knowledge”. (2000: 59) and if that is the case then 
Minimal RB has failed to meet the first part of the challenge sketched out in Section 
3.7; (2) Cases of evidence one doesn’t posses cannot motivate the claim that RBp 
doesn’t entail Kp. More generally the original intuition that RBp satisfies condition (c) 
because Kp has a broader supervenience base than RBp is shown on reflection to be 
                                                 
79  See especially chap. 9 in Harman 1973 titled “Evidence One Does not Posses”. See also Klein  
1976, Lycan 1977, Dretske 1981.  
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 baseless.  The upshot of all this is the insight that the disagreement between (W) and 
(CK-RB) can be traced back to a disagreement about the correct account of evidence.  
The challenge to the defender of (CK-RB) is to defend a theory of evidence 
according to which Henry’s evidence remains the same in Fake Barn Good and Fake 
Barn Bad. More generally, he has to defend a theory of evidence according to which 
what evidence one has doesn’t constitutively depend on what evidence one doesn’t 
posses. Can this be done? The arguments in Chapters Two and Three try to motivate 
the “yes” answer.  Suppose for a moment that those arguments work; how will the 
case for  (CK-RB) look on the completion of this project?  
 
4.3 Summary. On the plausible assumption that all knowledge is evidence, by Minimal 
RB, Kp entails RBp; so RBp satisfies condition (b). If the defender of (CK-RB) 
succeeds in defending a theory of evidence according to which one rationally believes 
but doesn’t know in cases of evidence one doesn’t posses, then RBp satisfies condition 
(d): RBp doesn’t entail Kp. If Minimal RB is true then Dog is not a counterexample to 
(Add-4-RB). In the absence of a counterexample to (Add-4-RB), there is no reason to 
think that RBp doesn’t satisfy (c). With regard to (a), the assumption that rational 
belief is a mental condition doesn’t clash with any pre-theoretical reasons for thinking 
otherwise. As I also tried to show in Section 3.5 there are no good theoretical reasons 
that call RBp’s status as a mental condition into doubt, for there is no condition that 
can plausibly play the role of its mental component. It is true that Minimal RB makes 
rational belief a broad condition, but any reasons for arguing against the mental status 
of RBp based on it being broad are internalist in nature. Our challenge was to show 
that (CK-RB) is motivated on the assumption of SSTT and externalism about mental 
conditions, assumptions on which an internalist constraint on the mental is rejected by 
default.  
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Conclusion 
I have tried to analyze and motivate a version of (CK-RB) that concedes SSTT and 
externalism about mental conditions.  I have argued that this version can resist some 
strong objections recently advanced against (CK-RB). The argument doesn’t show that 
we should endorse the conjunctive account of knowing. At best, it shows that the 
arguments against this account are not conclusive.  
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 CHAPTER TWO 
 
Factive, Stative Attitudes and Knowing 
Introduction 
When one can see, hear, or smell that things are a certain way, one is in 
possession of evidence that they are that way. This I will take to be uncontroversial. 
Can one see, hear or smell that things are a certain way, without knowing that they are 
that way? This is a matter of dispute. Timothy Williamson (2000: 33-41) has argued 
that propositional attitudes like seeing, hearing and smelling that p (where p stands for 
some proposition), are instances of a category of conditions that entail knowing that p. 
Williamson calls the conditions factive, stative attitudes: the attitudes are factive in the 
sense that necessarily one bears them only to truths, and stative in the sense that they 
are states, as opposed to events or processes.80  
Using terminology introduced in the previous chapter81 we can state the thesis 
more rigorously as follows:  
K-Entailment: Necessarily, for any case α, proposition 
p and factive, stative attitude Φ, if the condition that one 
bears Φ to p obtains in α, then the condition that one 
knows p obtains in α.  
This chapter argues against this thesis. If the argument is successful, there are certain 
factive, stative attitudes that guarantee evidence, but not knowledge. If that is so, then 
knowledge is not a requirement for evidence.  
The argument has three parts. The first part is straightforward: I try to show 
that there are cases where for some factive, stative attitude Φ and proposition p, one 
                                                 
80  See Parsons 1990: Chapter 3 for a discussion of the threefold distinction.  
81  See Section 1.2 in the “The Conjunctive Account of Knowing”.  
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 bears Φ to p, but doesn’t know p in those cases. Though straightforward the argument 
in part one is not conclusive. The residual worry is that the condition obtaining in 
those cases where the corresponding knowledge condition doesn’t is not the 
uncontroversially factive, stative attitude Φ, but some other condition—call it Ψ—that 
is easily confused with Φ. According to the objection, unlike Φ, Ψ is not a factive, 
stative attitude, and thus the argument against K-Entailment fails.  
The second part of the chapter takes this objection seriously: it tries to show 
that even if we concede that condition Ψ is different from Φ, there are no prima-facie 
good reasons for thinking that Ψ is not a factive, stative attitude. If Ψ is a factive, 
stative attitude on its own right, and it obtains in some cases where the knowledge 
condition doesn’t, then K-Entailment is false.  
In order to show that condition Ψ is a factive, stative attitude, I try to isolate 
the requirements that mark the difference between factive, stative attitudes and other 
factive conditions.  As we discover, there is only one plausible argument for blocking 
Ψ’s membership in the category of factive, stative attitudes. The argument relies on a 
knowledge requirement on evidence: one’s evidence is constituted only by those 
proposition that one knows. The next chapter argues against this requirement, and thus 
indirectly for Ψ’s membership in the category of factive, stative attitudes. If that 
argument is sound, K-Entailment is false. 
 
1.1 Straightforward strategies. There are two different, straightforward ways for 
arguing against  
K-Entailment. The first one has the following structure:  
1. We choose an uncontroversial member Φ from the category of factive, 
stative attitudes.  
2. We isolate a set of sufficient conditions for bearing Φ to a proposition p.  
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 3. We show that there is a case α where this set of conditions obtains with 
regard to a particular proposition p—and hence one bears Φ to p—but one 
fails to know p in α.  
The second way has a slightly different structure:  
4. We start, again, by choosing an uncontroversial member Φ from the 
category of factive, stative atitudes.  
5. We isolate a set of necessary conditions for knowing a proposition p.  
6. We show that there is a case α where this set of conditions doesn’t obtain 
with regard to a particular proposition p—and hence one doesn’t know p—
and yet one bears Φ to p in α.  
Both strategies try to establish the conclusion that a certain factive, stative attitude can 
obtain in some cases where the corresponding knowledge condition doesn’t. If this 
conclusion is true K-Entailment is false.  The next few sections develop these two 
strategies in more detail.  
 
1.2 The First strategy. Starting with the first strategy, let Φ be an uncontroversial 
member of the category of factive, stative attitudes (from now on FSAs). Let Cp be a 
set of sufficient conditions for bearing Φ to a particular proposition p. If in some case 
α, one doesn’t know p even though Cp obtains in α, then bearing Φ to a proposition 
doesn’t entail knowing it. If one member of the FSA category of conditions doesn’t 
entail knowledge, K-Entailment is false.  
Many in the literature (Dretske 1969, 1981; Kvart 1993; Williamson 2000; 
Cassam forthcoming) take the condition expressed by the locution “S sees that p” (for 
some proposition p) to be an uncontroversial member of the class of factive, stative 
attitudes. This condition will be our chosen Φ.  
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 As Dretske (1969:1) points out, the construction “S sees that p” is used in 
many different ways: not only do we claim to see that something is in trouble but also 
“what caused it and how to remedy it.” We will be concerned with the special case 
where the construction is used in what Dretske (1969) calls its primary sense: in this 
sense one can’t see that an object b is P, unless one sees b.82 One sees that b is P in a 
non-primary, or secondary sense when one sees that b is P without seeing b. (Dretske 
1969: 79-80) If seeing in the primary sense is a special case of seeing that p, then 
seeing (in the primary sense) that b is P is sufficient for bearing our chosen attitude Φ 
to the proposition that b is P. A fortiori, a set of sufficient conditions for seeing that b 
is P in the primary sense is also a set of sufficient conditions for bearing our chosen Φ 
to the proposition that b is P. The next step is to isolate a set of sufficient conditions 
for seeing that b is P in the primary sense: the chosen set will be the set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions for seeing that b is P in this sense. 83  
                                                 
82   The condition that S sees b is what Dretske calls non-epistemic seeing. According to Dretske,  
unlike seeing that b is P in the primary sense, non-epistemic seeing doesn’t logically entail the 
condition that S has some particular belief. Here is Dretske’s informal way of drawing the 
distinction: “I am concerned [with] an ability [non-epistemic seeing] whose successful exercise 
is devoid of positive belief content. With respect to its positive belief content seeing a bug in 
this fundamental way is like stepping on a bug; neither performance involves, in any essential 
respect, a particular belief or set of beliefs on the part of the agent. Nothing one believes is 
logically relevant to what one has done. Purposely stepping on a bug is something else again, 
and so is seeing that it is a bug, or what kind of bug it is. Both of these latter accomplishments, 
if I can call them that, have a positive belief content.” (1969: 6) In light of Dretske’s remark 
non-doxastic seeing would perhaps be a more fitting term for this condition, for after all it is in 
terms of the absence of a logical relation between seeing b and the beliefs that the subject has 
that the condition is introduced. Thanks to Gail Fine for calling my attention to this 
terminological problem.  
83  Why choose the set of necessary and sufficient conditions to present our case, instead of any  
other set of sufficient conditions whatsoever? First, notice, that for every set Sp of sufficient 
conditions for bearing an attitude Ω to a proposition p, there is a set Sp* that includes Sp and 
the condition that one knows p such that Sp* is also sufficient for bearing Ω to p.  So, not all 
sets of sufficient conditions for bearing Ω to p can be instrumental in showing that Ω doesn’t 
entail the condition that one knows p.  How do we go about isolating a set of sufficient 
conditions that can establish this conclusion? The set of necessary and sufficient conditions, 
for bearing Ω to a proposition p (N&Sp) is the weakest set of sufficient conditions for bearing 
Ω to p, in the sense that for every set of sufficient conditions Sp, Sp entails N&Sp. Now, if 
there is a set of sufficient conditions Sp for bearing Ω to a proposition p, such that Sp doesn’t 
entail the condition that one knows p (Kp), then the set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for bearing Ω to p (N&Sp) doesn’t entail Kp.  
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1.3 Dretske’s proposal. Dretske’s proposal is a helpful place to start. According to 
Dretske (1969: 78-88) a person S sees that b is P in the primary sense84 if and only if 
the following four conditions are satisfied:  
1. b is P.  
2. S sees b.  
3. The conditions under which S sees b are such that b would not look, L, the way 
it now looks to S unless it was P.  
4. S, believing that the conditions are as described in (3), believes b to be P.  
In what follows I argue that condition (3) is too strong. One way of motivating this 
kind of objection to (3) is suggested by Igal Kvart (1993: 294).  Suppose b is in fact 
shivering; S sees b, and he looks like he is shivering. But the conditions under which b 
looks like he is shivering are such that, had he not been shivering a back-up, visual 
effect would have kicked in to ensure that b looked like he was shivering to S. When S 
looks at b the back-up effect is on stand-by mode because b is in fact shivering. Kvart 
thinks, and I agree, that this is a case where S sees that b is shivering despite the 
presence of the back-up mechanism, (i.e., despite it being the case that the conditions 
under which S sees b are not such that b would not look how it in fact does unless it 
was P).85   
I will refer to the type of case Kvart describes as the “back-up” case. If one 
                                                                                                                                            
Proof: Suppose Sp doesn’t entail Kp.  Then there is a case α such that Sp obtains in α 
and Kp doesn’t obtain in α. But since Sp entails N&Sp, then N&Sp obtains in α. Since N&Sp 
obtains in α but Kp doesn’t obtain in α, then N&Sp doesn’t entail Kp.  
So our attempt to show that there is a set of sufficient conditions for bearing Ω to p 
can succeed only if we can show that the set of necessary and sufficient conditions for bearing 
Ω to p doesn’t entail knowing p. This is what we will try to show in this section by first 
identifying the set of necessary and sufficient conditions for Ω being “primary seeing.”   
84  In what follows I will omit the qualification “in the primary sense” for ease of exposition; the  
reader should assume that the condition discussed in this chapter is seeing in the primary sense, 
unless otherwise indicated.   
85  Pappas and Swain (1973) also argue for the same conclusion.  
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 sees that the relevant b is P in a “back-up” case then Dretske’s condition (3) is not a 
necessary condition for seeing that b is P, for in this case the condition is not satisfied 
and yet one allegedly sees that the relevant b is P.  
There is some intuitive plausibility to Kvart’s suggestion that “back-up” cases 
are cases of successful seeing that the relevant b is P. After all, the back-up 
mechanism stays idle. It’s as if it isn’t even there: the mechanism doesn’t interfere 
with the visual process or the conceptual repertoire of the perceiver. How then does it 
block one from seeing that b is P? The answer has perhaps something to do with the 
fact that the perceiver’s epistemic position is weakened in some relevant respect. 
Perhaps the perceiver fails to know the relevant proposition via visual means in these 
cases. But even this suggestion is controversial. One might argue, and some actually 
have86, that not only does the subject see that b is P in “back-up” cases, but he also 
knows that.  In fact a famous example in the epistemological literature, Nozick’s 
“grandmother” case, is arguably “a back-up” case, where consensus has it that the 
subject both sees and knows that the relevant b is P:  
“Grandmother”: A grandmother sees her grandson is well when he comes to visit; but 
if he were sick or dead, others would tell her he was well to spare her upset. Yet this 
does not mean that she doesn’t know he is well (or at least ambulatory) when she sees 
him. (1981: 179) 
If one’s epistemic position is good enough for knowing that p via visual means in a 
“back-up” case, then there is no obvious reason for thinking that it is not good enough 
for seeing that p.87  
                                                 
86  See, Neta and Rohrbaugh (forthcoming).  
87  One might object that the “grandmother” case is relevantly different from Kvart’s “back-up”  
case: in the “grandmother” case the subject would believe that her grandson was ambulatory (if  
he was dead) via a different method (testimony) from that by which she comes to believe that 
he is ambulatory when she sees him (visual inspection). In the “back-up” case, the subject 
would believe that b is shivering via the same method (visual inspection) both in the actual 
scenario when he sees b shivering and in the counterfactual scenario when the back-up 
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 If, in turn, “back-up” cases are cases of successful (primary) seeing, 
then we should modify condition (3) in Dretske’s analysis for it to deliver the 
right verdict in this type of case.  
How do we do that? To a first approximation the right answer would 
have to involve a way of rendering irrelevant the presence of the back-up 
mechanism. The details of how to accomplish this are suggested by recent 
work in the metaphysics of causation.  This is in part because “back-up” cases 
such as the one introduced by Kvart are strikingly similar in their causal 
structure to some recently discussed cases in the literature on token-level 
causation, where the focus is on the question, what does it mean that a 
condition c actually caused condition e?88 Consider the following case 
introduced by Christopher Hitchcock (2001a: 276): 
“Assassin”: an assassin in training is on his first mission. Trainee is an excellent shot: 
if he shoots his gun the bullet will fell Victim. Supervisor is also present, in case 
Trainee has last minute loss of nerve (a common affliction among student assassins) 
and fails to pull the trigger. If Trainee does not shoot, Supervisor will shoot Victim 
                                                                                                                                            
mechanism makes b look like he is shivering. This is true if methods are individuated 
“internally” in the way suggested by Nozick (1981) . According to Nozick “a method will have 
a final upshot in experience on which the belief is based, such as visual experience and then (a) 
no method without this upshot will be the same method, and (b) any method experientially the 
same “from the inside” will count as the same method.” If as suggested by Nozick, we 
individuate methods “internally” then in Kvart’s “back-up” case if the relevant p were false, S 
would believe p via the same method that he does in the actual scenario—visual inspection.  If 
methods are individuated by a more fine-grained standard that also involves the causal 
mechanism producing the belief, the method by which one believes that b is P when the back-
up visual mechanism is on stand-by mode will count as a different method from that by which 
one comes to believe the same proposition when the mechanism is activated. Deciding what is 
the best way for individuating methods is a complicated discussion best left for another time. 
Suffice it to say that there are serious problems with Nozick’s way of individuating methods. 
See, (Williamson 2000: 152-61) for some powerful objections.  
88  For a detailed discussion of the distinction between token-level and type-level causation see  
Sober 1985 and Eells 1991. The distinction is nicely illustrated by Christopher Hitchcock: 
“Type level causal relations are described by causal generalizations such as “smoking causes 
lung cancer’ while token-level causal relations involve particular events” ‘the loud party next 
door caused Jennifer’s headache…Token-level causal relations…require analysis that are more 
sensitive to the spatio-temporal details of the causal processes.’ (2001b: 361)  
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 herself. In fact, Trainee performs admirably, firing his gun and killing Victim.  
As Hitchcock points out “ it seems that Trainee’s shot caused the death of the Victim, 
even though Victim’s death doesn’t counterfactually depend upon Trainee’s shot.” 
(2001: 276) The causal facts are very similar in Kvart’s “back-up” case: a particular 
mental condition e (b looking P to S) is caused by a condition c (the condition that b is 
P), despite it being the case that e doesn’t counterfactually depend on c (if b were not 
P, it would still look P to S due to the triggering of the back up mechanism). If one 
successfully sees that b is P in a “back-up” case, then perhaps successful (primary) 
seeing tracks the causal rather than the counterfactual relation between the relevant 
pair c and e.  This diagnosis suggests the following way of fixing Dretske’s condition 
(3).  
(3*)  The conditions under which S sees b are such that the condition that b  
is P causes the way, L, that b now looks to S.  
Condition (4) should also be changed to reflect the modification in (3):  
(4*)  S believing that the conditions are as described in (3*), believes b to be 
P.  
If we modify Dretske’s analysis in the way suggested by (3*) and (4*) the 
analysis gives us the right verdict in “back-up” cases.  
The causal facts in the standard “back-up” cases are clear, but this is not 
always true in other cases of epistemological interest. If we are to replace the 
counterfactual condition (3) in Dretske’s definition with a causal requirement, we need 
an analysis of token-level causation that is both plausible and sufficiently substantive 
to discipline our causal intuitions in those cases of epistemological interest where the 
causal facts are not entirely clear.89  The next section summarizes an analysis of 
causation that, I think, satisfies both of these desiderata.  
                                                 
89  Thanks to Nico Silins for pressing me for an explanation of this point.  
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1.3 Hitchcock’s analysis of causation. The analysis of causation that I am about to 
summarize is motivated by problems arising with David Lewis’s original 
counterfactual account of causation. According to Lewis’s analysis, if an event e 
counterfactually depends on c, then e causally depends on c, or in other words, c is a 
cause of e. According to this theory, counterfactual dependence is sufficient but not 
necessary for causation. Event c is a cause of event e if and only if they are connected 
by a chain of counterfactual dependence; in the simple case, the chain has just one 
link. (Lewis, 1986)  
As Christopher Hitchcock indicates, this formula renders causation transitive 
by definition. (Hitchcock, 2001a) So, given Lewis’s formula for any three events a, b, 
c, if a counterfactually depends on b and b counterfactually depends on c, then c is a 
cause of a even if a does not counterfactually depend on c. This picture is very 
appealing when dealing with ordinary cases. Yet problems arise when dealing with 
some unusual cases such as the following   “boulder” case, first introduced by 
Hitchcock (2001a: 276).  
“Boulder”: A boulder is dislodged and begins rolling ominously towards Hiker. 
Before it reaches him, Hiker sees the boulder and ducks. The boulder sails harmlessly 
over his head with nary a centimeter to spare. Hiker survives his ordeal.  
It is clear that in this case the Hiker’s ducking is counterfactually dependent 
upon the boulder’s fall and the Hiker’s survival is counterfactually dependent on the 
Hiker’s ducking. Yet we are reluctant to say that the boulder’s fall caused the Hiker’s 
survival, even though there is a chain of counterfactual dependence running from one 
event to the other. Hitchcock’s preliminary diagnosis of cases like “the boulder case” 
boils down to the claim “that causation is not transitive in general.” Meanwhile, his 
alternative proposal has the burden of accounting for those cases in which a chain of 
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 counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation in a way that explains why a 
similar counterfactual chain is not sufficient in cases similar to the “boulder” case. 
Hitchcock’s analysis makes use of what he calls “systems of structural 
equations” which are construed as ordered pairs 〈V, E〉 where E is a sequence of 
equations relating the values of the variables (representing conditions90) belonging to 
the set of variables V. A quick run through the details of these causal models, as 
described by Hitchcock, is necessary for understanding his analysis.  
The elements of V represent conditions obtaining in (centered) worlds. They 
can be both exogenous and endogenous variables. Equations with an exogenous 
variable in the left hand side have the simple form X = x, where x is the actual 
numerical value for X. (If X is a binary variable then X =1 or X = 0 depending on 
whether or not X obtained.) Equations with an endogenous variable on the left hand 
side express the value of this variable as a function of the value of other variables in 
V. This latter class of equations encodes counterfactual dependences. Hitchcock 
upholds Lewis’s “no-backtracking-counterfactuals” restriction in his analysis of 
causation. So, the switching of the variables from one side of the equation to another is 
not permitted.  
The structural equations use sentential symbols to represent relations between 
variables. So,  
¬ X ≡ 1 – X 
X ∨ Y ≡ max [X, Y] 
X ∧ Y ≡ min [X, Y]  
If a variable Y appears on the right hand side of an equation with an 
endogenous variable X on the left hand side, then Y is a parent of X. The system of 
                                                 
90  In Hitchcock’s analysis the variables in V represent properties or eventualities, but my switch  
to talk of conditions will not affect the analysis since there is no relevant difference between 
conditions as understood here and eventualities in Hitchcock’s sense.   
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 the structural equations is given a graphical representation. The nodes in the graph are 
elements of the set of variables V. An arrow is drawn from a variable-representing 
node X to a variable-representing node Y, if X is a parent of Y. “A route between two 
variables X and Z is an ordered sequence of variables 〈X, Y1, Y2….Yn, Z〉 such that 
each variable in the sequence is in V and is a parent of its successor in the sequence.” 
A route between X and Z is graphically represented by a directed path which is a 
sequence of arrows lined up tip to tail connecting X with Z. A variable Z, which is 
distinct from both X and Y is an intermediate variable between X and Y if it belongs 
to some route between X and Y.  
How do structural equation systems help Hitchcock deal with problem cases 
such as “the boulder case” within the framework of the counterfactual theory of 
causation? To illustrate Hitchcock’s proposal let us represent the causal structure of 
the “boulder” case using the structural equations apparatus developed so far. The 
causal graph for “the boulder case” is depicted in Figure 1 below.  
 
   D 
 
 
F                                                                       S 
 
  Figure 1 
 
F=1, 0 depending on whether or not the boulder falls. D=1, 0 depending on 
whether or not the Hiker ducks. S=1, 0 depending on whether or not the Hiker 
survives. The set of structural equations E is the following: 
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 F=1; D=F; S= ¬ F ∨ D91                                                                       
Given this set of structural equations, we can determine the value for S.  
D=1 
            S= max [¬F ∨ D] 
S= max [0, 1]   
S=1 
            Hitchcock’s central proposal is the following: 
 
Let c and e be distinct occurrent [conditions], and let X and Z be 
variables such that the values of X and Z represent alterations of c 
and e respectively. Then c is a cause of e if and only if there is an 
active causal route from X to Z in an appropriate causal model 〈V, 
E〉.  (Hitchcock, 2001a: 286) 
 
A route from X to Z is active in the causal model in question if and only if Z 
depends counterfactually upon X within a new system of equations E1 constructed 
from E as follows: for all variables Y such that they are intermediate between X and Z 
but do not belong to this route, we replace the equation for Y with one that sets Y 
equal to its actual value in E. (If there are no intermediate variables that belong to this 
route, then E1 is just E.) 
Going back to the “boulder case” The direct route from F to S, 〈F, S〉 is not 
active, because holding D fixed at its actual value (D = 1), and changing the value of F 
from 1 to 0, the value of S (S = max [¬F ∨ D]; S = max [1- 0, 1]) remains the same as 
before, namely 1. Intuitively, if the Hiker had ducked while the boulder had not fallen 
                                                 
91  In words: the boulder falls; if the boulder hadn’t fallen, the hiker wouldn’t have ducked; if the  
boulder had fallen and the hiker hadn’t ducked, the hiker would not have survived.  
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 the Hiker would have survived. So, S doesn’t counterfactually depend on F along this 
route. If we consider route 〈F, D, S〉 we see that there are no intermediate variables to 
hold fixed along other routes. If the value of F changes from 1 to 0, the value of D 
changes from 1 to 0, but the value of S = max [¬F ∨ D] (S = max [1- 0, 0]) remains 
the same, namely 1. Thus, S doesn’t counterfactually depend on F along this route 
either.  Intuitively, if the boulder hadn’t fallen, then the Hiker’s life wouldn’t have 
even been put at risk, i.e., he would have survived. According to Hitchcock’s analysis 
of token-level causation, the fact that there are no active routes from F to S is 
sufficient for concluding that the boulder’s fall didn’t cause the Hiker’s survival.  
The advantage of Hitchcock’s analysis of token-level causation consists in its 
ability to better track the pronouncements of common sense regarding causal facts in 
problematic cases.92 The analysis also gives the right verdict in “back-up” cases like 
the “assassin” case and Kvart’s case introduced earlier.  The details are sketched in the 
Appendix.  
If Dretske’s analysis of primary seeing is modified in the way suggested in the 
previous section, and if the causal relation invoked in (3*) is cashed out in the way 
developed by Hitchcock, then seeing that p doesn’t entail knowing that p. 
  
1.4 The Barn façade case. To see why consider the following well-worn case. 
Barn façade case: Henry is driving in the countryside with his son. 
Identifying various objects in the landscape as they come into view, 
they drive by a barn and Henry says to his son “that’s a barn”. He 
has no doubt about the fact that the object in view is a barn; it has 
all the identifying features of barns. It, also, happens that the object 
in question is actually a barn. Yet, unbeknownst to Henry, the 
                                                 
92  See Hitchcock 2001a and Halpern and Pearl 2000 for more evidence.  
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 district he had just entered is full of barn facades, without back 
walls, or interiors, quite incapable of being used as barns.  Does 
Henry know that the barn that he saw was a barn? 
There is some consensus in the literature that the answer is “no”, even though the 
necessary and sufficient conditions on seeing that the object is a barn are satisfied. 
Conditions (1), (2) and (4*) are clearly satisfied: the subject sees the object, the object 
is a barn, and the subject, taking his barn-appearances to have been caused by the 
presence of a barn, believes that the object is a barn. To see whether condition (3*), is 
satisfied, we must decide on a causal model for the “barn façade” case.  
There are two different ways for modeling this case. What’s important is that, 
as we will see, condition (3*) is satisfied in both models.  We begin with the simplest 
model. B= 1, 0 depending on whether or not b, the object Henry sees and points to, is 
a barn, F= 1, 0 depending on whether or not b is a barn façade. L = 1, 0 depending on 
whether or not it looks to Henry as if the object he sees is a barn. In one understanding 
of the “barn façade” case, conditions are such that if b, the object Henry saw, weren’t 
a barn, it would have been a barn-façade. So, the set of equations for this case will be 
E: B=1, F=¬B, L = B ∨ F. The graphical representation of the case is depicted in 
Figure 2 below: 
          
       B                                 L 
 
      F     
Figure 2 
The values of our variables in E are the following: B= 1, F = 0, L = 1. The 
direct route from B to L is active for if we change the value of B from 1 to 0 holding 
the value of F fixed (F= 0), we get the following new set of equations E*: B=0, F=0, 
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 L=0. So, L counterfactually depends on B along 〈B, L〉, which according to 
Hitchcock’s definition means that there is an active route from B to L, and hence that 
the condition represented by B causes the condition represented by L. According to 
the analysis, requirement (3*) for seeing that b is a barn is satisfied in this model: the 
condition that b is a barn causes the way that b looks to S.  
A second way of modeling the “barn façade” case is suggested by considering 
that the counterfactual, if b weren’t a barn it would have been a barn façade, is not 
clearly true in this case.93  As far as we are told, it’s quite possible that if b weren’t a 
barn it would have been a nursery, or perhaps a shooting range. What’s true is that (1) 
if b weren’t a barn, then Henry wouldn’t have seen a barn and (2) if he hadn’t seen a 
barn he would have seen a barn façade.  Neither (1) or (2) tell us what b would have 
been if it hadn’t been a barn. If this is how we understand the case then we need two 
extra variables for the two new conditions that we need to represent. The two 
conditions are the condition that Henry sees a barn (represented below by the variable 
E) and the condition that Henry sees a barn-façade (represented below by the variable 
G). The set of structural equations in this model would be the following. E: B = 1 (b is 
a barn), E = B (first counterfactual), G = ¬ E (second counterfactual), L = G ∨ E (if 
Henry hadn’t seen a barn or a barn façade it wouldn’t have looked to Henry as if he 
saw a barn). The graphical representation of the case is depicted in Figure 3 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
93  Thanks to Zach Abrahams for pressing me to think of another way for modeling this case.  
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Figure 3 
 
Solving the equations in E we get the following values: B = 1, E = 1, G = 0 and 
L =1. To see whether there is an active route from B to L we need to see whether the 
value of L changes, if we change the value of B from 0 to 1, along one of the routes, if 
we keep the values of intermediate variables fixed along the other routes.  Route 〈B, E, 
L〉 is active: if we change the value of B from 1 to 0, while keeping the value of G 
along the 〈B, E, G, L〉 route fixed at the value 0, the value of L changes from 1 to 0.94 
Since route 〈B, E, L〉 is active the condition represented by B causes the condition 
represented by L even in this second model. So, condition (3*) is satisfied in this case 
as well: the condition that b is a barn causes the way, L, that b looks to S.  
 Which of these two models best represents the “barn-façade” case? For the 
moment, the answer doesn’t much matter. Since condition (3*) is satisfied in both 
models—together with conditions (1), (2) and (4*)—according to our analysis, Henry 
sees that the edifice is a barn in the “barn-façade” case. Yet, intuitively, he doesn’t 
know that it is a barn.  In other words, if our analysis of primary seeing is correct, the 
“barn façade” case is a counterexample to K-Entailment.  
However, the distinction highlighted by the two models will turn out to be 
important. To get a better grasp of this distinction consider a variant of the “assassin” 
case introduced earlier. In this variant Trainee and Supervisor both shoot at the same 
                                                 
94  If we change the value of B from 1 to 0, the value of E changes from 1 to 0 and thus the value  
of L = max[G, E] changes from 1 to 0.  
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 time, but Trainee’s bullet reaches Victim’s chest a split second before Supervisor’s 
bullet. If Trainee’s bullet hadn’t killed Victim, Supervisor’s bullet would have. The 
original “assassin” case and the new variant just introduced illustrate an important 
distinction highlighted by David Lewis: that between early and late preemption: “[i]n 
early preemption the process running from the preempted alternative is cut off well 
before the main process running from the preempting cause has gone to completion.” 
(1986: 200) This is not the case with late preemption where “the alternative is cut 
off….by the continuation of the main process beyond the effect.” (1986: 2003) As L. 
A. Paul explains, in the case of late preemption “the alternative causal process runs 
more slowly than the main process, so that the alternative process is cut off by the 
effect itself. If the preempted cause had been left to produce the effect, the effect 
would have been delayed.” (1998: 192) 
 Going back to our two models of the barn façade case, in the first model the 
process of seeing a barn façade is cut off early by the fact that b is a barn. In the 
second model, the process of seeing a barn façade is cut off late by the effect of seeing 
b (the barn) rather than the building next door, a barn façade. Hence, according to the 
first model, the “barn façade” case, like Kvart’s “back-up” case, is a case of early 
preemption. According to the second model, unlike Kvart’s case, the “barn façade” 
case is a case of late preemption.  
 The distinction is important, for the defender of K-Entailment can argue as 
follows: early preemption cases like Kvart’s “back-up” case are in fact cases where 
one both knows and sees that the relevant b is P. On the other hand, both knowing and 
primary seeing are absent in cases of late preemption. The “barn façade” case is best 
modeled as a late preemption case and thus is relevantly different from the “back-up” 
case. Hence, any analysis of primary seeing that groups these two cases in the same 
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 category is incorrect. This is a plausible objection. In fact, I will assume that the 
objection is correct in the second part of the chapter.  
However, if we assume that our analysis of primary seeing is correct, we have 
good reasons to think that K-Entailment is false. To summarize, we have (1) isolated 
an FSA Φ, i.e., seeing that p; (2) we have isolated a set of sufficient conditions for the 
obtaining of Φ; and (3) we have shown that this set of conditions obtains in some 
cases where the relevant knowledge condition doesn’t. Hence, there are some cases 
where for some FSA Φ, S Φs that p but doesn’t know that p. If this conclusion is 
correct then the generalization we set out to disprove at the beginning, K-Entailment, 
is false.  The next section develops the second straightforward strategy for arguing 
against K-Entailment. 
 
1.6 The second strategy. In this section we continue to focus our attention on the 
condition that one sees that p (for some proposition p). The plan is to consider several 
candidate requirements for knowing that p and then show that there are cases where 
the requirements are not satisfied and yet the condition that one sees that p obtains in 
these cases. If this conclusion is true, and if any of these requirements is in fact a 
necessary condition for knowledge then K-Entailment is false.  
This particular strategy for arguing against K-Entailment has an important 
drawback. There are certain conditions that uncontroversially must be satisfied in 
order for one to know that p: the two obvious ones are the condition that one believes 
that p and the condition that p is true. However, these are also generally thought to be 
conditions that must be satisfied in order for one to see that p. 95 On the other hand, 
there are certain other conditions that need not be satisfied in order for one to see that 
                                                 
95  In the case of the truth condition, this is trivially true by the Factivity requirement for FSAs.  
See (Dretske 1969) for a defense of the belief requirement. (Kvart 1993) and (Williamson 
2000) also indirectly endorse the belief requirement.  
68 
 p or, so I will argue. But it is a controversial matter whether such conditions need to be 
satisfied in order for one to know that p. I plan to discuss two such conditions: what 
have come to be known in the literature as the sensitivity and the safety requirements 
for knowledge.  
The most famous formulation of the sensitivity requirement is the one 
proposed by Robert Nozick (1981)96: S knows that that p only if, if p were not true, S 
would not believe that p. Nozick himself (1981: 179), and following him many others, 
have pointed out that the sensitivity requirement formulated in this way faces certain 
counterexamples. The following is a counterexample offered by John Hawthorne 
(2004: 34)97 98:  
“Cats and Dogs”: Suppose a real dog and a fake cat are in a room, the former 
keeping the latter from view. I look at the dog and form the belief that there is a dog 
in the room. From this I infer there is an animal in the room. Suppose further that if 
there hadn’t been a dog in the room, I would have seen the fake cat and formed the 
belief that it was a (real) animal. Then my belief that there is a dog in the room passes 
the Nozick test, but my belief that there is an animal in the room does not. 
Hawthorne’s belief that there is an animal in the room doesn’t pass Nozick’s 
test because the counterfactual, if there were no animal in the room, Hawthorne 
                                                 
96  Nozick calls this the “variation” requirement for knowledge. He ultimately rejects this  
condition in his final analysis.  
97  Nozick offers a similar counterexample to the sensitivity requirement, the “grandmother” case  
quoted earlier in this chapter. The suggestion is that the variation condition is violated in this 
case: if the grandson were sick or dead, the grandmother would have still believed that he was 
well based on the testimony of others. Nozick, famously, appeals to methods to solve the 
problem: if the grandson was not well, and the grandmother were to use the same method 
(visual inspection) to come to a belief whether or not he was well, then she would not believe 
that he was well by that method. This solution has come under attack for reasons that I 
discussed earlier in this chapter: suffice it to say that Nozick’s way of individuating methods 
“from the inside” – “by the differences a person would notice”— faces further 
counterexamples. (Nozick 1981: 233) [See (BonJour 1984) (Brueckner 1984) and 
(Williamsons 2000: 154) for counterexamples to the solution involving Nozick’s way of 
individuating methods.]  
98  I am using Hawthorne’s counterexample instead of Nozick’s, because the former allows for  
modifications that go hand to hand with an attempt to fix the sensitivity requirement. I  
discuss this attempt below.  
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 wouldn’t believe there was one, is false. If there were no animal in the room, 
Hawthorne would have believed that there was an animal in the room after seeing the 
fake cat. Hence the sensitivity requirement, as formulated by Nozick, is violated in the 
case of Hawthorne’s belief that there is an animal in the room, even though intuitively 
Hawthorne knows that there is an animal in the room. Conclusion: knowledge doesn’t 
require the satisfaction of the sensitivity requirement as formulated by Nozick. 
Fred Dretske tries to fix the sensitivity requirement by appealing to one’s 
reasons for believing the proposition in question: S knows that p only if S has 
conclusive reasons for p. Reasons R are conclusive reasons for p if and only if 
(crudely) S wouldn’t have reasons R unless p was true.99 In summary, S knows that p 
only if S believes p based on reasons R, and S wouldn’t have reasons R unless p was 
true. Dretske’s version of the sensitivity requirement is consistent with the intuition 
that Hawthorne knows that there is an animal in the room in “cats and dogs”: the 
requirement is not violated vis-à-vis the belief that there is an animal in the room.  
Here is Hawthorne’s explanation of the advantage of Dretske’s formulation of 
sensitivity:  
Suppose one’s reasons for believing that there is an animal in the room are one or 
both of: (a) doggish experiences; (b) the belief that there is a dog in the room. If there 
were no animal in the room one would not have had those reasons for believing there 
to be an animal in the room (though one might have had others). So, one has 
conclusive reasons for believing that there is an animal in the room. (Hawthorne 
2004: 35) 
We don’t need to look very far to see that the advantage of Dretske’s account 
might not be that significant. Consider the following case:  
                                                 
99  This is how Drestke’s version of the sensitivity requirement is often interpreted in the  
literature. See (Fogelin 1994) and (Hawthorne 2004: 34-35) for this interpretation. I am going 
to go along with this interpretation for now, even though I am not fully convinced that it is the 
correct one.  
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 “Just Dogs”: Just like Cats and Dogs, except what is kept from view by the real dog 
is a fake dog, indistinguishable from the real dog by visual inspection; and if there 
hadn’t been a dog in the room, Hawthorne would have seen the fake dog and inferred 
that there was an animal in the room.  
I take it that just like in “cats and dogs”, in “just dogs”, Hawthorne’s reasons 
for believing that there is an animal in the room are one or both of: (a) doggish 
experiences; (b) the belief that there is a dog in the room. Yet, if there were no animal 
in the room, Hawthorne would have still had those very reasons for believing there 
was an animal in the room. (Remember, one’s experiences of seeing the fake dog 
would be “doggish experiences”, i.e., the same experiences Hawthorne has when he 
sees the real dog, for by the stipulation of the case the real and fake dogs are visually 
indistinguishable.) So, the sensitivity requirement as formulated by Dretske is 
violated. The question is whether the subject knows that there is an animal in the room 
in “just dogs”. The answer is not clear.  
On the one hand, it would be strange if the replacement of a fake cat with a 
fake dog, neither of which Hawthorne can see, made a difference to whether or not he 
knows that there is an animal in the room. This consideration might lead one to 
conclude that, just like in “cats and dogs”, in “just dogs”, Hawthorne knows that there 
is an animal in the room. If this is so, then the sensitivity condition, as formulated by 
Dretske, is incorrect: one can know even if the sensitivity requirement is not satisfied.  
On the other hand, there is an asymmetry between “cats and dogs” and “just 
dogs”. Intuitively, one knows that there is a dog in the room in “cats and dogs.” It is 
not so clear whether this is true in “just dogs”. One might argue that with regard to the 
belief that there is a dog in the room “just dogs” is similar to “barn façade”: the 
subject’s knowledge that there is an F here (where F stands for barn/dog) is 
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 undermined by the presence of fake Fs in the vicinity. 100  If one doesn’t know that 
there is a dog in the room, one’s belief that there is an animal in the room, in so far as 
the latter is based on the former, might fall short of knowledge as well.  
If the sensitivity requirement as understood by Dretske is correct, and if, as 
argued earlier, “back-up” cases are cases of successful seeing that b is P, then K-
Entailment is false; for one’s belief in a “back-up” case is not Dretske-sensitive. To 
see why, consider again the subject in Kvart’s case. It is false that the subject in 
Kvart’s case has conclusive reasons (in Dretske’s sense) for believing that b is 
shivering: if b weren’t shivering the back-up mechanism would have kicked in and the 
subject would have had the same reasons for believing that b is shivering. In other 
words, there are cases where one sees that p but the belief one forms is not Dretske-
sensitive. Hence, if Dretske-sensitivity is in fact a requirement for knowing that p, K-
Entailment is false, because there are cases where one sees but doesn’t know that p for 
some proposition p.   
But perhaps Dretske’s sensitivity requirement is not correct. There is a 
growing suspicion among epistemologists that the modal requirement for knowledge 
is different from, though easily confused with, sensitivity. A new candidate 
requirement has been proposed, what has come to be known in the recent literature as 
the safety requirement for knowledge.101 According to the safety requirement, if one 
knows that p, then “one could not easily have been wrong in a similar case.” 
                                                 
100  Gendler and Hawthorne (2005: 337) suggest a principle that draws a distinction between “barn  
façade” and “just dogs”. They call it the “Gaze Principle”: [c]andidate defeaters are relevant in 
cases where we leave the world as it is, altering the observer’s perceptual orientation within it, 
and irrelevant in cases where we leave the observer’s perceptual orientation as it is altering 
only features of the world around her. In the first sort of case, one might say, the defeaters are 
there, but the observer’s gaze happens not to fall upon them; in the second sort of case, her 
gaze is there, but the defeaters on which it might have fallen happen not to be around.” In 
“barn façade”, Henry is driving and thus continuously changing his perceptual orientation 
while Hawthorne, in “just dogs”, is (presumably) standing still, and thus not changing his 
perceptual orientation.  
101   See  (Sosa 1999 and 2004), (Williamson 2000), (Pryor 2004), (DeRose 2005), (Cohen 2005)  
for discussions of different versions of the safety requirement.  
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 (Williamson 2000: 147) (emphasis mine) Understood in this rough and ready way, 
safety seems to explain why one knows in “cats and dogs” but doesn’t know in “barn-
façade”: Hawthorne could not easily have been wrong in believing that there is an 
animal in the room, but Henry could easily have been wrong in believing that the 
building was a barn.  
 Different epistemologists propose different ways of formulating the safety 
requirement. Here is a popular formulation proposed by Ernest Sosa (2004: 40): The 
belief that p “is safe [if and only if] it is based on an experiential reason <r> such that 
r → p. (Where x → y is short for ‘It would be so that x only if it were so that y’.)”102 
 It is not clear how to understand the safety condition as formulated by Sosa. 
One way to understand the conditional r → p in the safety clause is as a counterfactual 
conditional with a true antecedent: the subject does in fact have reasons r for believing 
p. According to the standard semantics for counterfactuals (Lewis 1973: 26) “a 
counterfactual with a true antecedent is true if and only if the consequent is true.” So, 
according to the standard semantics for counterfactuals, the safety condition, thus 
understood, is satisfied every time the subject believes something true. Sosa and the 
other defenders of the safety requirement do not expect us to employ the standard 
semantics for counterfactuals in evaluating the conditional “r → p” in the safety 
clause. Otherwise, one’s belief that George Bush is American, when based on the 
reason r: George Carlin is American, will count as safe, and this is not the intended 
result. The intended result is the following: one’s belief that p (based on experiential 
reasons r) is safe if and only if one has reasons r, and p is true not just in the actual 
                                                 
102  Sosa points out that the sensitivity requirement advanced by Dretske involves the  
contraposition of the conditional r → p, that appears on the right hand side of the biconditional 
in the safety clause: the belief that p “is sensitive [if and only if] it is based on an experiential 
reason <r> such that ∼ p → ∼ r. He also suggests that the unfortunate attraction of the 
sensitivity requirement derives “from how easy it is to assume, falsely, that strong conditionals 
contrapose.” (Sosa 1999, 2004: 40) 
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 world but “in a range of nearby possible worlds as well.” 103 As it stands the proposal 
is uninformative.104 The question is what fixes the relevant range of nearby possible 
worlds.105 This question doesn’t seem to have an answer independent of our intuitions 
about knowledge. 
 To summarize, the sensitivity requirement for knowledge as formulated by 
Dretske is both informative and plausible. But if it’s true then K-Entailment is false. 
The safety requirement, on the other hand, is too uninformative to be useful in 
disciplining our discussion of cases where the obtaining of the knowledge condition is 
in question. The next section sketches an important objection to the straightforward 
argument against K-Entailment. 
 
1.7 Summary of the straightforward argument. The straightforward argument against 
K-Entailment tries to show that a particular factive, stative attitude—seeing that p (for 
some proposition p)—obtains in some cases where the corresponding knowledge 
condition doesn’t. The conclusion that there are such cases can be resisted. With 
regard to the first strategy (see Sections 1.2-1.5) one might argue that the condition 
uniquely characterized by our analysis of primary seeing is not identical to the 
condition that one sees that b is P. One way of motivating this objection has already 
been suggested: the distinction between early and late preemption is epistemically 
significant. Even though one both sees and knows that the relevant b is P in a “back-
                                                 
103  The quote is from (Pryor 2004: 69).  
104  As far as I can see, the clearest account (though perhaps not the most plausible) is that offered  
by Nozick.  According to Nozick when dealing with counterfactual conditionals with true 
antecedents the “remedy [is to say that]…p → q is true if and only if q is true in all the p 
worlds closer (by the metric) to the actual world than is any not-p world.” (1981: ) But as 
Pryor (2004: 69-70) has argued this response seems to render the safety requirement very 
weak; in some plausible similarity metrics Henry’s belief that the object is a barn satisfies this 
requirement in the “barn-façade” case. 
105  For sophisticated discussions of this issue see (Sainsbury 1997),  (Williamson 2000: 123- 
128), (Pryor 2004) and (Sosa 2004: especially footnotes 4 and 5).  
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 up” case, one falls short of both achievements in a “barn-façade” case, for in the 
former case the belief one forms on visual grounds couldn’t have easily been false: the 
back-up process by which one would have formed a false belief is cut off way before 
the normal visual process produces the relevant true belief. Things are different in a 
“barn-façade” case: there the fall-back process that would have produced a false belief 
is cut off much later by the actual process’s production of the true belief.  In this later 
case the belief one forms on visual grounds could have easily been false, because it 
could have easily been the product of a causal process involving a barn façade rather 
than a barn. In fact the objector might suggest that the distinction between early and 
late preemption is a useful way of capturing the safety requirement for knowledge in 
cases of primary seeing.  
 As with regard to the second strategy, the defender of K-Entailment might very 
well concede that Dretske-sensitivity is not a requirement for knowledge. So, even 
though one sees that the relevant b is P in a “back-up” case, one also knows that fact, 
despite it being the case that one’s belief is not Dretske-sensitive.  
 This objection is plausible: it concedes that “back-up” cases are cases of 
successful seeing (and knowing) that the relevant b is P. But it rejects our analysis of 
primary seeing on the grounds that it is too weak: the analysis classifies as cases of 
primary seeing, “barn-façade” cases where one neither knows nor sees that the 
relevant b is P.  
 Let’s suppose that our account is incorrect as an analysis of primary seeing. Is 
the condition uniquely characterized by our account—call it condition Ψ—nonetheless 
a factive, stative attitude? In order to answer this question we need a formal account 
that would give substance to the category of factive, stative attitudes.  
 
2.1 A formal account of the FSA category. A formal account of FSAs is provided by 
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 Timothy Williamson106 (2000: 34-37). According to Williamson “we can give 
substance to the category of factive, stative attitudes by describing its realization in a 
natural language,” in our case English. (2000: 34) FSAs are expressed by what 
Williamson calls “a factive mental state operator” (FMSO). FMSOs have the 
following four characteristics:  
• Factivity. FMSOs are factive in the sense that for every FMSO, A, the 
inference from “S As that p” to “p” is deductively valid. (Williamson 2000: 35) 
• Stativity. FMSOs are stative in the sense that “they are used to denote (mental) 
states.” (Williamson 2000: 35) 
• Propositional Attitude Ascription. For every FMSO, A, “S As that p” entails 
“S grasps the proposition that p.”107   
• Semantic Unanalysability. An FMSO is semantically unanalysable in the 
sense that “it is not synonymous with any complex expression whose meaning 
is composed of the meanings of its parts.” (Williamson: 34-35).  
A quick word about the first three characteristics. According to Williamson (2000: 
35), if  “A” is an FMSO, “S As that p” has “p” as a deductive consequence, “not 
merely as a cancelable presupposition.” In other words, the sentence “S falsely As that 
p” (where “A” is an FMSO) expresses a contradiction.  
FMSOs denote mental states. Certain linguistic tests are meant to capture the 
contrast between expressions denoting states and those denoting other 
“eventualities”108—events and processes. The distinction between states and processes 
                                                 
106  This paragraph consists in a summary of Williamson’s account.  
107  As indicated earlier, the distinction between the two constructions is also pointed out by  
Dretske (1969). For Dretske the two constructions express two different cognitive 
achievements; in the case of seeing, epistemic and non-epistemic seeing. Epistemic seeing 
requires Betty to grasp (in Dretske’s case also believe) the proposition that the barn is red.  
108  The generic term “eventualities” was introduced by Bach (1986) to cover events, states and  
processes.  
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 is marked by the impropriety of using progressive tenses for expressions denoting 
states. Compare:  
(a) Betty is seeing that the building is a barn. (State) 
(b) Betty is proving a difficult theorem. (Process) 
Sentence (a) is deviant because unlike “proving”, the construction “sees that” denotes 
a state.109  
But as Terence Parsons points out, the contrast between states and all other 
“eventualities” is perhaps best marked by the impropriety of using pseudo-clefts in 
state-sentences. Compare:  
(a) What John did was know the answer. (State) 
(b) What John did was run. (Process) 
(c) What John did was make a birthday cake. (Event)110 
Sentence (a), unlike (b) and (c), is deviant.  
The qualification “mental” is also important: FMSOs in Williamson’s account do not 
denote conjunctions of mental and non-mental conditions, even when the latter happen 
to be states. Here we encounter the first wrinkle: it is not entirely clear whether the 
verb “believes truly” denotes a mental state. This is in part because the condition it 
denotes passes the test that Williamson uses for arguing that knowledge is a mental 
condition (2000: chap.3).111 Suppose that believing truly that p is a non-mental 
condition: the conjunction of a mental and a non-mental component. Then there is 
some mental condition C such that for every case α if C obtains in α, then there is a 
case β where one is in the same mental state as in α and one truly believes p. The most 
plausible candidate for C is the condition that one believes p. But even this condition 
doesn’t seem to work in cases where one’s belief is about a particular mental 
                                                 
109  See Williamson (2000: 35) and Parsons (1990: 34-35) for further discussion. 
110  The examples are from Parsons (1990: 37).  
111  See the previous chapter, “The Conjunctive Account of Knowing,” for a discussion of  
Williamson’s test as it applies to the knowledge condition.  
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 condition, for example the condition that one is in pain. Suppose one (falsely) believes 
that one is in pain in α. Then there is no case β where one is in the same mental state 
as in α and one believes truly that one is in pain, for then one would have to be in pain 
in α since one is in the same mental state in both α and β. But by the stipulation of the 
case one is not in pain in α.112  
It is also crucial to distinguish between two different constructions that use verbs 
like “see” and “smell” that can be used in FMSO constructions. For example, we must 
distinguish between “Betty sees that the barn is red” and “Betty sees the red barn.” 
Betty can see the red barn, without seeing that the barn is red. This is the possibility 
that the third characteristic calls our attention to. To see that the barn is red, Betty’s 
conceptual repertoire must include the concepts “barn” and “red”. More specifically, 
Betty must be able to grasp the proposition that the barn is red. The next section 
discusses the fourth requirement in more detail and raises an objection against it.   
 
2.2 An objection to the formal account. The fourth characteristic is both crucial and 
controversial. It is crucial to the plausibility of an important claim that Williamson 
makes about FMSOs:  
K-Inference. For every FMSO, A, the inference from “S As that p” to “S  
knows that p” is valid.  
Here is why. The verb “believe truly” has the first three characteristics: it is 
factive, stative, and it passes the test that for every subject S and proposition p,  “S 
believes truly that p” entails “S grasps the proposition that p.” If the first three 
characteristics were sufficient for a verb to count as an FMSO then K-Inference would 
                                                 
112  We can certainly decide to dismiss the test as telling, but that just weakens the case for the  
thesis that knowledge is a mental condition. Conversely, it strengthens the case for the thesis 
argued in this dissertation: knowledge is a conjunction of a mental and a non-mental 
component. I am inclined to think that the test is relevant; but if it isn’t, the case for the 
conjunctive account of knowing is even stronger. 
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 be false: the inference from “S believes truly that p” to “S knows that p” is not valid. 
“The condition of semantic unanalysability ensures that ‘believe truly’ does not count 
as an FMSO.” (Williamson 2000: 39) 
 Is the fourth requirement correct? There is no obvious reason for thinking that 
there is a connection between semantic unanalysability and an expression being a 
FMSO.113 This is in stark contrast with the other requirements. The other three 
requirements are metaphysically anchored in the sense that they track certain natural 
distinctions that we believe exist in the world: the distinction between bearing a 
relation to a true as opposed to a false proposition; the distinction between states, 
events and processes; and that between the condition that one grasps, or understands a 
proposition and the condition that one fails to do so. What is the metaphysical 
distinction marked by semantic unanalysability?  
As we saw earlier, the requirement doesn’t seem to track the distinction 
between mental and non-mental conditions: factive, stative attitudes expressed by 
constructions that are (allegedly) semantically unanalysable are mental, but then so it 
seems is the condition expressed by the semantically analyzable expression “believing 
truly that p.”  Does the requirement track the distinction between prime and composite 
conditions? 114  Again the answer seems to be “no”. Factive, stative attitudes expressed 
by constructions that are (allegedly) semantically unanalysable are prime but so it 
                                                 
113  See Reed (forthcoming) for a full discussion of this point. 
114  I want to quickly remind the reader of the distinction between prime and composite conditions.  
For Williamson a case α is internally like a case β if and only if the total physical state of the 
agent in α is exactly the same as the total physical state of the agent in β. A condition is 
narrow if and only if for any two cases α and β, where α is internally like β, the condition 
obtains in α if and only if the condition obtains in β. On the other hand a case α is externally 
like a case β if and only if the total physical state of the external environment in α is exactly 
the same as the total physical state of the external environment in β. A condition is 
environmental if and only if for any two cases α and β, where α is externally like β the 
condition obtains in α if and only if the condition obtains in β. A condition is composite if and 
only if it is the conjunction of some narrow and some environmental condition. A condition is 
prime if and only if it is not composite. The distinction is introduced by Williamson (2000). It 
is also summarized in Chapter 2. 
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 seems is the condition expressed by the semantically analyzable expression “believing 
truly that p”: the condition that one believes truly that p passes Williamson’s test for 
primeness. The argument is sketched below.  
According to Williamson (1998: 392, 409) we can show that a condition C is 
prime “simply by exhibiting three cases α, β, and γ such that γ is internally like α and 
externally like β and C obtains in α and β, but not in γ…Conversely C is composite if 
no such triple of cases exists.” Williamson shows that the relevant triple of cases exists 
for the condition that one believes that p, (for some proposition p). (1998: 394): For 
some case α and some case β, one believes that p in both α and β, but not in a case γ, 
where γ is internally like α and externally like β. The argument assumes content 
externalism, but clearly doesn’t depend on the choice of p, or the fact that one falsely 
believes p in α and β. So, one can very well believe truly that p in the α and β that 
Williamson describes and fail to truly believe p in γ, by failing to believe p in γ. The 
existence of a triple of cases α, β, and γ, such that one believes truly that p in α and β, 
but not in γ (where γ is internally like α and externally like β) guarantees, according to 
Williamson’s test, the status of true belief as a prime condition. But perhaps the 
requirement of semantic unanalysability tracks a slightly different distinction. I try to 
develop this distinction below.  
 Suppose we define internal likeness slightly differently from Williamson: 
internal likeness doesn’t require sameness in the total internal physical state of the 
agent, but sameness in one’s representational states. So, two cases α and β are 
internally* alike if and only if one has the same non-factive mental states (to the same 
degree) in both cases: the same beliefs, experiences, apparent memories and so on.115 
Say that a condition C is internal* if and only if for every pair of cases α and β such 
                                                 
115  The subjects in these two cases are what Nico Silins (2005) calls “internal twins”. See also  
Wedgwood (2002) 
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 that α is internally* like β, C obtains in α if and only if C obtains in β. Two cases α 
and β are externally* alike if and only if they are the same in all non-representational 
respects (including certain physical conditions obtaining within the subject’s skin). 
Say that a condition C is external* if and only if for every case α and β such that α is 
externally* like β, C obtains in α if and only if C obtains in β. A condition is 
composite* if and only if it is the conjunction of an internal* and an external* 
condition. A condition is prime* if and only if it is not composite*. The suggestion is 
that the requirement of semantic unanalysability tracks the distinction between prime* 
and composite* conditions.  
There is some initial plausibility to the suggestion that the requirement of 
semantic unanalysability tracks the distinction between prime* and composite* 
conditions. So, for example, the condition that one truly believes p is not prime*. 
Proof116: Suppose there is a triple of cases α, β and γ (where γ is internally* like α but 
externally* like β) such that one truly believes p in both α and β, but not in γ. Now, p 
is either about some internal* condition, some external* condition, or some 
composite* condition in γ. So if p is false then some internal*, or some external*, or 
some composite* condition C doesn’t obtain in γ. C can’t be an internal* condition, 
for γ is internally* like α, and p is true in α. C can’t be an external* condition, for γ is 
externally* like β and p is true in β. Suppose C is a composite* condition, the 
conjunction of the internal* condition I and external* condition D.  Then I ^ D obtains 
in both α and β. But since γ is internally* like α then I obtains in γ and since γ is 
externally* like β then D obtains in γ and since both I and D obtain in γ then their 
conjunction, I ^ D, obtains in γ. So, C cannot be composite* either. So, there is no 
condition C that can obtain in both α, β but not in γ. So, there is no proposition p, such 
                                                 
116  The first thing to notice is that now we have to hold the belief condition steady in all three  
cases: if one truly believes that p in α and β, then one believes that p in γ, for otherwise γ 
would be internally* unlike both α and β. 
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 that one truly believes that p in both α, β but not in γ. Hence, the condition that one 
believes truly that p is composite*.  
But there is trouble down the road. Our semantically analyzable expression 
“Ψ” turns out to denote a prime* condition. Again, we can show that a condition C is 
prime* if there is a triple of cases α, β and γ (where γ is internally* like α and 
externally* like β), and C obtains in both α and β but not in γ. Now suppose that in α 
Henry is again in barn façade country looking at the only barn, b, once with his left 
eye and once with his right eye. His left eye is in good working order, but a strange 
brain lesion blocks him from processing the visual input from the right eye, as 
anything other than “x is a barn” for every object x that Henry sees through the right 
eye. Henry trusts the information he receives from his left eye, but not his right eye, 
and thus comes to believe that b is a barn. In β Henry is again in barn façade country 
looking at the only barn, b, once with his left eye and once with his right eye. In β his 
right eye is in good working order, and a strange brain lesion blocks him from 
processing the visual input from the left eye, as anything other than “x is a barn” for 
every object x that Henry sees through the left eye. Henry trusts the information he 
receives from his right eye, but not his left eye, and thus comes to believe that b is a 
barn. Case γ is internally* like α (it looks to Henry through both eyes as if b is a barn 
and Henry trust his left eye rather than his right eye) but externally* like β: it is his 
right eye that is in good working order, and it is his left eye that is impacted by the 
brain lesion.  
This case shows that the condition uniquely characterized by our four 
requirements—condition Ψ—is prime*. The four conditions are satisfied in both α and 
β, but they are not all satisfied in γ: condition (3*) is violated in γ with regard to the 
way things look to Henry through the left eye (the way that b looks to Henry in γ 
through the left eye is not caused by b being a barn, but by the brain lesion affecting 
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 the processing of information from the right eye117); condition (4*) is violated in γ 
with regard to the way things look to Henry through the right eye (Henry doesn’t 
believe that the way that b looks to Henry in γ through the right eye is caused by b 
being a barn, for he doesn’t trust the right eye in γ). But, then this shows that the 
requirement of semantic unanalyzability doesn’t track the distinction between prime* 
and composite* conditions: “Ψ” is semantically analyzable but also prime*. Absent 
some metaphysical grounding, the requirement of semantic unanalyzability seems 
rather ad hoc, a useful way of ruling believing truly out of the category of factive, 
stative attitudes.  
To summarize, there are three uncontroversial requirements on FMSOs: 
factivity, stativity, and the requirement of propositional attitude ascription. “Ψ” 
satisfies all three of them: it is factive, for the relevant b must be P, in order for the 
condition denoted by “Ψ” to obtain; it is stative in so far as  the condition “Ψ” denotes 
is a state of belief with a visual pedigree; and being in this condition requires one to 
believe that b is P and thus grasp the proposition that b is P. “Ψ” doesn’t satisfy the 
requirement of semantic unanalyzability but as I have tried to show the requirement is 
not metaphysically grounded: there is no reason to think that linguistic expressions 
satisfying all four requirements pick out a metaphysically important distinction.  
A sensible fourth requirement on FMSOs might be the following: FMSOs 
                                                 
117   Again let the binary variable B represent the condition that b is a barn. B = 1, 0 depending on  
whether or not b is a barn. Let the binary variable L represent the condition that it looks to 
Henry as if the building is a barn (through his left eye).  L = 1, 0 depending on whether or not 
b looks to Henry as if it is a barn. Now, in γ a strange brain lesion blocks Henry from 
processing the visual input from the left eye, as anything other than “x is a barn” for every 
object x that Henry sees through the left eye. So, if b weren’t a barn, it would have still looked 
to Henry as if it was. The following structural equation captures this fact of the case:  L = 1∧ 
B. Since, L is the only endogenous variable in this case the equation L = 1∧ B is the only 
equation in our system of equations E. There is no active route from B to L because if we 
construct a new system of equations E* by changing the value of B from 1 to 0 the value of L, 
min[1, B=0]), will remain the same, namely 1. Since the route <B, L> is the only route from B 
to L in this system of equations then there is no active route from B to L. Given Hitchcock’s 
analysis of causation the absence of an active route guarantees the lack of a causal connection 
between the condition represented by B and that represented by L. 
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 denote conditions that are prime*.  As indicated earlier, “Ψ” satisfies this requirement. 
But going back to Henry’s case above, we notice that the relation between the 
internal* condition I (it looks to Henry as if b is a barn) and the external* condition E 
(b is a barn) doesn’t have to be causal in order for us to be able generate a triple of 
cases where the relation is absent in γ even though it’s present in both α and β. A 
different kind of relation between I and E would also work. So, though perhaps, 
necessary, the primeness* condition when added to the other three doesn’t constitute a 
set of necessary and sufficient conditions for bearing a factive, stative attitude towards 
a proposition. The relation between I and E must be epistemically relevant. As 
Williamson (2000: 40) points out “factive stative attitudes are important to us as states 
whose essence includes a matching between mind and world…Of course something 
needs to be said about the nature and significance of this matching, but that is a further 
problem.” This problem is at the heart of this project. There is a strong intuition that 
the “matching” between I and E has to be non-accidental in some epistemically 
relevant respect. One might argue that the “matching” has to be non-accidental in a 
way that guarantees knowledge, and that’s what makes K-Entailment true. Arguing for 
K-Entailment by assuming a knowledge requirement for the category of factive, 
stative attitudes is as question begging as arguing against it by simply dismissing the 
requirement. A more plausible suggestion is that the “matching” between I and E has 
to be non-accidental in a way that is evidentially relevant. This suggestion is supported 
by the thought that paradigmatic factive, stative attitudes like seeing that p, hearing 
that p, smelling that p, are ways of collecting evidence about our world.  This thought 
motivates another way for arguing against the thesis that Ψ—the condition uniquely 
characterized by our four requirements laid out in the first part of the paper—is a 
factive stative attitude. I will close by sketching this argument below. 
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 2.3 The final obstacle. The argument goes like this:  
1. For every factive, attitude Φ and every proposition p, if one Φs that p 
then p is part of one’s evidence.  
2. For every proposition p, such that p is part of one’s evidence, one 
knows p.  
3. For some proposition p one Ψs that p but one doesn’t know that p. 
4. Hence, Ψ is not a factive, stative attitude.    
The crucial premise in this argument is premise 2. The next chapter will try to show 
that this premise is unmotivated. This is not to say that there is no connection between 
factive, stative attitudes and evidence, but rather that the epistemic threshold for both 
bearing a factive, stative attitude to a proposition and for that proposition to be part of 
one’s evidence is lower than the epistemic threshold for knowledge.  
 
Conclusion 
I have tried to argue that bearing a factive, stative attitude to a proposition doesn’t 
guarantee knowing it. The first part of the argument was straightforward: I tried to 
show that a particular factive, stative attitude holds in certain cases where the 
corresponding knowledge condition doesn’t. I still believe that these cases are genuine 
counterexamples, and that the chosen factive, stative attitude holds in these cases. The 
second part of the chapter considers the possibility that this belief results from a modal 
illusion: a condition easily confused with the chosen factive, stative attitude obtains in 
these counterexample cases. I try to show that even if this possibility is actual there are 
no metaphysical reasons for thinking that this condition is not a factive, stative attitude 
in its own right. I close by considering a certain epistemological argument for the 
conclusion that this condition is not a factive, stative attitude. The next chapter will 
explain why this argument is unsound. 
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 CHAPTER THREE 
 
Evidential Status 
Introduction 
A theory of evidence is concerned with at least two questions: that of evidential 
relevance (when does evidence e speak in favor of a hypothesis h?); and that of 
evidential status118 (what kind of epistemic status must e enjoy in order to serve as 
evidence for other hypothesis?).  This chapter addresses the question of evidential 
status. I start by arguing that a plausible theory of evidential status must satisfy two 
desiderata: what I call accessibility (one is, for the most part, in a position to know 
what one’s evidence is) and creditable epistemic standing (a proposition must have a 
requisite degree of positive epistemic status vis-à-vis a subject in order to serve her as 
evidence for other propositions). Both desiderata flow from the theoretical function of 
our concept of evidence in its connection with that of rational belief.  
In the second part of the chapter I discuss the E=K theory—one’s evidence is all 
and only those propositions that one knows—as part of the attempt to decide on a 
theory of evidential status that satisfies both accessibility and creditable epistemic 
standing. Reflection on this theory reveals that the two desiderata pull us in different 
directions: conditions of a “lesser” epistemic standing than knowledge score better 
than it on the accessibility dimension; conditions of a “higher” epistemic standing than 
knowledge score even worse than knowledge on the accessibility dimension. The 
                                                 
118  I borrow the terms “evidential relevance” and “evidential status” from Joyce (2004). The  
distinction between these two different parts of a theory of evidence is highlighted by 
Williamson (2000). Williamson proposes and defends both a theory of evidential relevance 
and a theory of evidential status. They are nicely summarized by Joyce (2004: 296-7): 
Evidential Relevance: “e is positively evidentially relevant to h for S just in case the objective 
evidential probability of h conditional on e and all of S’s other evidence exceeds the objective 
evidential probability of h conditional on S’s other evidence alone.”  
Evidential Status: “A proposition e has the status of evidence for a person S just in case S 
knows e.”  
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 argument that E=K is the best compromise in weighting these desiderata is not trivial. 
The third part of the chapter argues that it is not persuasive either. The claim that 
knowledge is a requirement for evidence is undermined in the process. I close by 
proposing a theory of evidential status that offers a better compromise than E=K in 
weighting our two desiderata.  
 
1.1 Preliminaries. In what follows, I assume a propositional view of evidence: one’s  
evidence is a set of propositions that satisfies some further criteria. For example, a 
propositional theory might identify one’s evidence with those propositions that one 
believes119, those propositions that one knows120, or those propositions that one knows 
directly by experience121. According to such views a bloody knife found next to the 
victim’s body does not count as evidence, despite the ordinary usage of this term. By 
contrast, the proposition that a bloody knife was found next to the victim’s body can 
potentially be evidence for other propositions—for example, the proposition that a 
knife was used in committing the crime.122  
I also assume a categorical view of evidential status: for every proposition p, p 
either is, or is not part of one’s evidence in a particular case. According to the rival, 
gradationalist view, the evidential status of a proposition “falls along a spectrum that 
ranges from the best sort of evidence, through intermediate grades to [propositions]… 
that are not evidence at all.”123  
                                                 
119  Certain Subjective Bayesian views identify evidence with those propositions that one  
believes, where the latter are understood as propositions of subjective probability 1.  
120  See Williamson (2000: chap. 9) for a defense of this view.  
121  This seems to be the view proposed by Patrick Maher (1996). See Bird (2004) for a discussion  
and criticism of Maher’s view.  
122  The distinction between propositional and non-propositional views of evidence is clear and  
substantive. I don’t have anything new to offer in defense of the propositional view. I find the 
defense offered by Williamson (2000: 194-200) convincing and will not rehearse that 
argument here. 
123  The quote is from Joyce (2004: 299). The distinction between the categorical and the  
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 These assumptions narrow the field of candidates for a theory of evidential status 
by default. The extent to which this is a drawback depends on how promising the 
prospects of non-propositional and gradationalist views are. I believe they are not very 
promising, but an argument in support of this claim goes beyond the scope of this 
chapter; suffice it to say that there are serious problems with non-propositional 
views124, and no gradationalist theory is (to my knowledge) available.  So, the 
discussion here will focus on the relative strengths of theories that are both 
propositional and categorical. We ask, “what general desiderata must these theories 
                                                                                                                                            
gradationalist view is not quite clear, in part because there is no developed gradationalist 
account of evidence. If we assume a propositional view of evidence, a straightforward way of 
interpreting the gradationalist view is the following. For each subject S, there is an ordering of 
propositions by degrees of evidentiality into sets of propositions with degree of evidentiality d, 
where d is a number in the interval [0,1] (with 1 being the highest degree of evidentiality). 
Now, suppose that by some measure of relevance, the probability of p is 0.9 on the set of 
propositions with degree of evidentiality d but 0.1 on the set of propositions with degree of 
evidentiality d+δ, for some subject in a particular case. What is the probability of p on the 
subject’s (total) evidence in that case? As Williamson (2004a: 317) indicates, there is no clear 
answer to this question on this interpretation of the gradationalist account. The answer is 
important in so far as how rational one’s degree of belief in p is depends to a large extent on 
what the probability of p is on one’s (total) evidence: matching the former to the latter is often 
thought to be a requirement of rationality. In other words, it is not clear on this interpretation 
of the gradationalist view of evidential status what rationality would require of one in a 
particular case, and whether that requirement is satisfied. So, an important link between what 
evidence one has and what one is rational in believing on the basis of that evidence is left 
obscure. An important desideratum for a theory of evidential status is respecting the links 
between evidence and rationality; the fact that a theory obscures these links is a strike against 
that theory.  
This is not a knock-down argument against the gradationalist view; it’s just a problem 
that plagues one of its interpretations. In fact, there is something correct about what the 
gradationalist proposes. To see why consider the following simple example.  Suppose that a 
proposition p doesn’t fully satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for being part of a 
subject’s evidence, but it nevertheless comes very close. Doesn’t this subject have better 
evidence for a proposition q that p entails than another subject who is in a far worse epistemic 
position than her with regard to p? A categorical theory of evidence must find ways to 
accommodate the difference between the subjects’ evidence in this and similar cases.  A 
promising proposal is to appeal to propositions about first order probabilities.  According to 
this proposal, the proposition “probably p to some degree δ” will be part of the first subject’s 
evidence and the proposition “probably p to some degree γ” will be part of the second subject’s 
evidence (where δ >> γ); the conditional probability of q on these two different propositions 
will be different, thereby explaining differences in the “quality” of the subjects’ evidence. See 
Joyce (2004: 298-300) for more discussion of the distinction between the two views. See 
Williamson (2004a) for further objections against the gradationalist view.  
124  See Williamson (2000: 9.5) for an excellent discussion of problems that plague non- 
propositonal views.  
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 satisfy?” and “which propositional and categorical theory satisfies them better?”  
The arguments in this chapter will often involve two important concepts: that of 
believing, and that of being in a position to know a certain proposition. It is 
appropriate to clarify the assumptions I make about the conditions picked out by these 
concepts upfront.  
With regard to the condition picked out by the locution “one believes that p” I 
make two assumptions.  
• B-Distribution. For every pair of propositions p and q and every case125 α, if 
the condition that one believes that p & q obtains in α, then the conditions that 
one believes that p, and that one believes that q obtain in α.  
• The B-K Principle. For every proposition p and every case α, if the condition 
that one believes that p obtains in α, then the condition that one believes that 
one knows that p obtains in α.126 
I believe that in general both principles are true of the condition picked out by our 
ordinary uses of the verb “believes.” Distribution seems uncontroversial. The B-K 
Principle is problematic for reasons I am about to discuss, but before I do so I want to 
flag the important feature of believing that the principle is meant to reflect. When one 
believes a certain proposition, one not only believes something about the truth-value 
of that proposition, but also something about how strong one’s epistemic position is 
with regard to that proposition. If one thought that one’s epistemic position with 
regard to a proposition p was not good enough for knowledge, one would also refrain 
from believing p outright127; at most, one would believe that probably p, or something 
                                                 
125  A “case” is a centered world in the sense specified in the second chapter.  
126  This is what Halpern (1994: 2) calls “the (positive) certainty property.” See, Lamarre and  
Shoham (1994) for a defense of the principle. Williamson (2000: 47) comes barely short of 
endorsing the  B-K principle when he suggests that “believing p is something like treating p as 
if one knows p.” 
127  Believing p outright is giving p credence 1 in the sense explained in the second chapter.  
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 equally fitting to the doxastic hesitation the subject experiences in that kind of 
circumstance.  
However, the BK-Principle is problematic for in its simple, stated form it involves 
certain idealizations. For example it is only true of subjects whose conceptual 
repertoire includes the concept “know.”128 It also entails that for every proposition p 
                                                 
128  Not everybody agrees that the principle is true even of those subjects who posses the concept  
of knowledge. For example, Carl Ginet (1970: 164-167) argues for a principle that, given 
certain uncontroversial assumptions, is inconsistent with the BK-Principle. The principle Ginet 
defends is the following: “it is not necessarily true that: if a person knows that p and 
understands the proposition that he knows that p, then he believes that he knows that p.” (1970: 
64). (This is thesis (2) in Ginet’s article.) If this principle is true then it is possible for one to 
know, and thus—on the assumption that knowledge entails belief—believe that p, but fail to 
believe that he knows that p even if one understands the proposition that one knows that p, i.e., 
even if one possesses the concept of knowledge. Ginet admits that “this possibility is not likely 
to be realized very often,” but he argues that “such an unreasonableness, though unlikely is not 
impossible.” (1970: 167) According to Ginet, “the unreasonable” but “possible” situation 
where one knows and thus believes that p, but doesn’t believe that one knows that p arises in 
those cases where one due to “carelessness, confusion, inattention or sluggishness or paralysis 
of the understanding…fail[s] (at least temporarily) to recognize that his position (as it must be 
if one knows that p) justifies confident belief [that one] know[s] that p.” (1970: 166) Suppose 
that one considers whether one believes that one knows p and due to some confusion 
concludes that she doesn’t: does she still believe  (let alone know) that p in that case? It’s 
difficult to say for—paraphrasing Williamson—the difference between believing p outright 
and believing that probably p depends to some extent on one’s dispositions to practical 
reasoning and “action manifested in counterfactual circumstances.” (2000: 24) However, 
reflection on those cases where one fails to believe that one knows a certain proposition 
displays a feature of believing that supports the B-K Principle. If one believes p then one 
believes that p is true; this much seems uncontroversial. So, when one believes p one can’t 
believe that one doesn’t know p because p is false. So, one must believe that he doesn’t know p 
for some other reason—for example one might think that one is not justified in believing p. 
But can one believe that p is true, while at the same time believing that one is not epistemically 
justified in believing p? In my opinion the answer is “no.” That is because our epistemic 
position with regard to a proposition is our only guide to truth—a fallible guide to be sure, but 
indispensable nonetheless. If I am in a deserted island and can tell exact atmospheric pressure 
only by looking at a barometer, can I be sure about the exact value of atmospheric pressure, 
while having doubts about the reliability of my barometer? I believe the answer is “no.”  
Similarly if I have doubts about my justification as to whether or not p, I also have doubts 
about whether or not p. Believing p while at the same time believing that one is not justified in 
believing p, is not just unreasonable, it is impossible. This is not to deny that in certain 
contexts, for the purpose of calling attention to one’s dogmatism, one might openly claim that 
one is not justified in believing p, but does believe p nonetheless. One might even be sincere in 
such avowals, and thus really believe that he is in this condition. However, such assertions and 
beliefs do not show that the condition is possible: both the assertion and the belief in these 
cases can be false. As Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument shows one is not always in a 
position to know whether one is in a certain mental condition. (This might be the case with 
certain avowals of religious belief—where one thinks one lacks epistemic justification for what 
one believes. But this is not the case with all religious beliefs—especially those that are 
explicitly colored with perceptual language. As John Greco points out “Jesuits claim to see 
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 that a subject believes not only does she believe that she knows p, but also that she 
knows that she knows p, and that she knows that she knows that she knows p, and so 
on for an infinite number of iterations of “know.” One can object that the entailment is 
false on the grounds that most subjects are unable to even grasp propositions involving 
more than a certain number of iterations of “know”—let alone believe them.  
Both concerns are legitimate. In response, we can explicitly restrict the principle to 
apply only to subjects who can grasp the concept of knowledge and to propositions 
that involve no, or at least a restricted number of, iterations of “know.” It’s hard to see 
how one can accomplish this—especially in the case of the second restriction—in a 
way that is not ad hoc. Alternatively, we can leave the principle as is and use the 
formalizing power it provides to gain certain insights about the relation of knowledge 
to other epistemic conditions in central cases at the cost of sacrificing some descriptive 
detail about the ordinary use of the verb “believes” in the more marginal ones. The 
trade-off proposed by the second strategy is as rewarding as the insights it allows us to 
gain. Section 2.2 uses this strategy to elucidate the ranking of knowledge in the 
accessibility dimension relative to other epistemic conditions. The picture that the 
principle helps generate confirms and explains our intuitive judgments about the 
relatively low ranking of knowledge in this dimension.  
Pace Williamson (2000: 95), I use the locution “one is in the position to know p” 
in the sense that “no obstacle blocks one’s path” to knowing p when the former 
condition obtains. With regard to the condition picked out by this locution I make four 
assumptions.  
• PK-K Principle. For every proposition p and every case α, if one knows that p 
in α, then one is in the position to know that p in α.  
                                                                                                                                            
God in all things,” and their claim is not meant to be understood metaphorically. See Greco’s 
“Catholics vs. Calvinists on Religious Knowledge” [1997:13-34] for more discussion.)  
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 • PK-Distribution. For every pair of propositions p and q and every case α, if the 
condition that one is in the position to know that p & q obtains in α, then the 
conditions that one is in the position to know that p and that one is in the 
position to know that q obtain in α.  
• P-K Closure. For every pair of propositions p and q and every case α, if the 
conditions that one is in the position to know p and that one is in the position 
to know that p entails q obtain in α, then the condition that one is in the 
position to know q obtains in α. 
• Safety. For every proposition p and every case α, one is in the position to know 
that p in α if and only if one is safe from error in believing that p in α. One is 
safe from error in believing that p in α if and only if there is no case close to α 
in which one falsely believes that p.  
The first assumption is rather trivial: one cannot know that p unless one is, at least, 
in the position to know that p.  I also take the second principle to be uncontroversial. 
P-K Closure is more plausible than the analogue closure principle about knowledge: if 
one is in the position to know both p and that p entails q, (and one is equipped with the 
cognitive powers to perform the simple deduction) then, intuitively, nothing blocks 
one’s path from knowing q, and thus one is in the position to know q.  This is not so 
with knowledge: one can both know p and that p entail q, (and be equipped with the 
relevant cognitive powers of deduction) and yet fail to know q for the simple reason of 
not having performed the deduction due to disinterest, or inattention. The fourth 
assumption attempts to provide a rigorous framework for our discussion by 
formalizing the kind of reliability that is required for one to be in a position to know a 
certain proposition.129  I do not assume that we can specify which cases count as close 
                                                 
129  See Williamson (2000: 100-101) for a discussion and defense of this way of cashing out  
the reliability relevant to knowledge.  
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 to a case α for the purposes of determining whether one is safe from error in believing 
p in α, independently of the concept of knowledge. So, the safety requirement is not 
offered as a heuristic device for effectively deciding in which cases the knowledge 
condition doesn’t obtain. As I argued in the previous chapter, the requirement is not an 
elucidating guide when used for that purpose. 
The only assumption I make about the closeness relation is that it is not transitive. 
This is a plausible assumption. In the simplest case we judge the closeness of cases 
based on how they differ along some parameter x, for example the length of a stick, or 
the duration of a frown. A case α is close to a case β if and only if the difference 
between the value of some parameter measured by x in α and the value of the same 
parameter measured by x in β is less than some non-negative real number d [x(α) - 
x(β) < d]. The closeness relation understood in this way is not transitive, for it is 
possible for x(α) - x(γ) > d, even if x(α) - x(β) < d and x(β) - x(γ) < d.  
With these preliminaries out of the way, the next two sections introduce what I 
take to be two desiderata that a plausible theory of evidential status must satisfy.  
 
1.2 Accessibility. Evidence must be sufficiently accessible, in the sense that, for 
the most part, one must be in the position to know what one’s evidence is. The 
requirement is central to the theoretical function of our concept of evidence in 
connection to that of rationality. Consensus has it that rational subjects respect their 
evidence. The platitude is often spelled out as a rationality constraint on degrees of 
belief:  rationality requires subjects to proportion their degree of belief in a proposition 
to the support it receives from their evidence.130 Call this the rationality injunction. A 
theory of evidential status must assume that one is usually, at least, in a position to 
                                                 
130  The idea goes back to David Hume: “[a] wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the  
evidence.” See (Williamson 2000: chaps. 8-12) for a sophisticated discussion. See Christensen 
(forthcoming) for certain reservations.  
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 comply with the injunction. But how can one be in a position to comply with the 
injunction unless one is, for the most part, in the position to know what one’s evidence 
is? Less rhetorically, one’s evidence must be sufficiently accessible to subjects, in the 
sense that for the most part, if p is part of one’s evidence, then one is in a position to 
know that p is part of one’s evidence. 
Different theories of evidential status propose different propositional attitudes 
as necessary and sufficient conditions for possessing evidence that p: believing p, 
justifiably believing p, being certain that p, knowing p, or knowing p directly through 
experience. If bearing a certain attitude to a proposition is what’s necessary and 
sufficient for that proposition to count as part of one’s evidence, then being in the 
position to know that a certain proposition is part of one’s evidence requires being in 
the position to know that one bears the relevant attitude towards that proposition. So, 
crucial to evaluating theories of evidential status that offer a propositional attitude 
C(p) as a necessary and sufficient condition for possessing evidence that p,  is 
inquiring into whether the proposed attitude is sufficiently accessible, in the sense that, 
for the most part, when C(p) obtains one is in the position to know that C(p) obtains.  
Accessibility comes in degrees: some conditions are more accessible than 
others.131 For any two conditions C and C*, C* is more accessible than C, if and only 
if,  
(i) For every case α, where both C and C* obtain, if one is in the position to 
know that C obtains in α, then one is in the position to know that C* 
obtains in α.  
(ii) For some case β, where both C and C* obtain, one is in the position to 
know that C* obtains in β, but one is not in the position to know that C 
obtains in β.    
                                                 
131  As I will try to show below, this point is often missed.  
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 We evaluate a theory of evidence that offers a propositional attitude C(p) as a 
necessary and sufficient condition for possessing evidence that p, in part by deciding 
where C(p) stands in the accessibility scale.  I earlier suggested that the condition must 
be sufficiently accessible to allow for genuine compliance with the rationality 
injunction. But we lack a pre-theoretical sense of what counts as sufficiently 
accessible for this purpose.  Instead of positing arbitrary cutoff points, we can appeal 
to assessments of comparative accessibility to render the accessibility criterion 
workable.   
Let TΦ and TΨ be two candidate theories proposing, respectively, Φ(p) and Ψ(p) as 
necessary and sufficient conditions for possessing evidence that p. If Ψ(p) is 
sufficiently accessible but less accessible than Φ(p), then Φ(p) is sufficiently 
accessible. Lacking a clear sense of what counts as sufficiently accessible, for any two 
candidate conditions one is a more plausible candidate than the other if one is more 
accessible than the other and all else is equal. The italicized clause is not trivial: 
accessibility is only one of the dimensions along which we evaluate theories of 
evidential status. Let, D1…Dn be the others. If Φ(p) ranks higher than Ψ(p) in the 
accessibility dimension, but equally well along the other dimensions, D1…Dn, then TΦ 
is a more plausible theory of evidential status than TΨ. So stated the criterion affirms 
the probative value of accessibility in choosing among competing theories of 
evidential status, while recognizing that the ranking along this dimension is only a 
defeasible guide in this choice. The next section discusses a second desideratum, and 
thus a second criterion for evaluating theories of evidential status.  
 
1.3 Creditable Epistemic Standing. Evidence must have a high degree of creditable 
epistemic standing, in the sense that one’s epistemic position with regard to the 
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 propositions constituting one’s evidence must be sufficiently strong in order for these 
propositions to count as evidence for other propositions.  
Different epistemic conditions (knowing, knowing that one knows, justifiably 
believing, truly believing, believing, grasping a proposition, and so on) enjoy different 
degrees of creditable epistemic standing: intuitively, some are—epistemically 
speaking—better to be in with regard to a proposition than others. One way of cashing 
out the notion of creditable epistemic standing is by way of the more familiar notion of 
“relative strength of epistemic position.”132 Let Φ(p) and Ψ(p) be two epistemic 
conditions that a subject can be in with regard to the proposition p. Φ(p) enjoys a 
higher creditable epistemic standing than Ψ(p) if and only if: if one Φs that p then one 
is in a stronger epistemic position with regard to p, than one who merely Ψs that p.  
How do we determine the relative strength of epistemic position among 
different epistemic conditions? I don’t have a formal test to offer for this purpose. The 
only current option is to rely on our considered judgments about the relative epistemic 
strength of the conditions involved in particular cases.133   
Going back to the main point of this section: what epistemic standing must a 
condition enjoy in order for it to be a necessary and sufficient requirement on 
evidence? In other words, how strong must one’s epistemic position be with regard to 
those propositions that constitute one’s evidence? The rationality injunction suggests 
that there is a lower limit: if one is to proportion one’s degree of belief to the support it 
receives from one’s evidence, then the propositions that constitute one’s evidence 
need to be to some degree psychologically available134 to the subject. So, certain 
propositions that are, intuitively, psychologically unavailable to the subject at a time 
                                                 
132  The term is introduced by DeRose (1995).  
133  Many thanks to Tamar Gendler for helping me see the inadequacies of a familiar test that I had  
tried to put to use.  
134  I borrow the term from Feldman (2004: 226).  
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 are excluded from her evidence at that time. Writing on this topic Richard Feldman 
(2004: 226) proposes that,  
[t]hings that one has never learned about, even if they are known by others, are 
excluded. Things that one once knew but could not recall with any amount of 
prompting are also excluded. And finally, things that one does not yet believe, but 
would first come to believe as a result of prompting are also excluded…I exclude 
these items from consideration because the topic here is the evidence a subject has at 
a time, and I assume that facts which are completely out of one’s cognizance, as these 
things are, are plainly not part of the evidence one has. (emphasis mine) 
But as Feldman (2004: 227) goes on to point out psychological availability is 
not sufficient for securing the kind of epistemic strength with regard to a proposition 
that is necessary for rendering that proposition part of one’s evidence.  
[Some] might hold that anything that is [psychologically] available is part of the 
evidence one has. Some simple examples suggest that this view is incorrect. If I 
believe for no good reason, that P and infer (correctly) from this that Q, I don’t think 
we want to say that I ‘have’ P as evidence for Q. Only things that I believe (or could 
believe) rationally, or perhaps, with justification, count as part of the evidence I have. 
It seems to me that this is a good reason to include an epistemic acceptability 
constraint on evidence possessed, but I will not pursue the point here. (emphasis 
mine) 
Feldman proposes that evidence propositions must not be merely 
psychologically available, but also, to use his term, epistemically acceptable135 
for the subject. We can think of Feldman’s notions of psychological 
availability and epistemic acceptability as marking different points in the scale 
of “strength of epistemic position” that a subject is in with regard to a 
                                                 
135  See Feldman (2004: 227).  
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 proposition. If a proposition is not psychologically available to a subject—for 
example, if a subject cannot even grasp the proposition—then her epistemic 
position with regard to that proposition is weak.  Viewed this way, 
psychological availability is a necessary condition for epistemic acceptability 
but not vice-versa. But a version of the original question still remains: how 
strong must one’s epistemic position be with regard to a proposition that is 
psychologically available in order for that proposition to count as epistemically 
acceptable for a subject in a particular case?  
As in the case of accessibility, we don’t have a pre-theoretical grasp of the 
relevant “cutoff” point: Feldman’s suggestion that rational, or justified, belief is the 
appropriate limit, though intuitively in the right track, seems arbitrary. So, as in the 
case of accessibility, we will have to rely on comparative judgments to make the 
creditable epistemic standing criterion workable.  
 Let TΦ and TΨ be two candidate theories proposing, respectively, Φ(p) and 
Ψ(p) as necessary and sufficient conditions for possessing evidence that p. If Ψ(p) has 
a sufficiently high creditable epistemic standing for guaranteeing that p is part of one’s 
evidence but a lower creditable standing than Φ(p), then Φ(p) has a sufficiently high 
creditable epistemic standing for guaranteeing that p is part of one’s evidence. Lacking 
a clear sense of what counts as sufficiently high for this purpose, for any two 
candidate conditions one is a more plausible candidate than the other if one has a 
higher epistemic standing than the other and all else is equal. As in the case of 
accessibility, the italicized clause is not trivial: epistemic standing is only one of the 
dimensions along which we evaluate theories of evidential status—we have seen in the 
previous section that accessibility is another. If Φ(p) ranks higher than Ψ(p) in the 
epistemic standing dimension, but equally well along the other dimensions, D1…Dn, 
then TΦ is a more plausible theory of evidential status than TΨ. So stated the criterion 
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 affirms the probative value of epistemic standing in choosing among competing 
theories of evidential status, while recognizing that the ranking along this dimension is 
not the decisive consideration in this choice. 
 
2.1 E=K. One’s evidence is all and only those propositions that one knows.136 This 
theory of evidence is both propositional and categorical in the sense explained in 
Section 1.1. Is it plausible? This depends, in part, on how well the condition that one 
knows a certain proposition scores on the accessibility and the creditable epistemic 
standing dimensions compared to other candidate conditions. The next two sections 
try to show that conditions of a “lesser” epistemic standing than knowledge score 
better than it on the accessibility dimension and conditions of a “higher” epistemic 
standing than knowledge score even worse than knowledge on this dimension.137 The 
two desiderata pull us in different directions. An argument that knowledge is the 
optimal theoretical compromise is needed. I will argue in the third part of this chapter 
that the arguments offered are not convincing.  
 
2.2 True belief and knowledge. This section argues that some conditions of a 
“lesser” epistemic standing than knowledge score better than it on the accessibility 
dimension: we will use the condition that one truly believes p to motivate this 
conclusion. The results generalize to other factive conditions that entail true belief and 
are entailed—but don’t entail—knowledge.  
Knowledge scores higher than true belief in the scale of creditable epistemic 
standing: one is in a stronger epistemic position with regard to a proposition p if one 
knows that p than one who (merely) truly believes that p.  
                                                 
136  As indicated earlier, Timothy Williamson (2000: chap. 9) defends this theory of evidence.   
137  Joyce 2004: 304 makes a similar claim.  
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 As indicated earlier, in order to show that a condition C* is more accessible than a 
condition C we need to show two things:  
(i) For every case α, where both C and C* obtain, if one is in the position to 
know that C obtains in α then one is in the position to know that C* 
obtains in α.  
(ii) For some case β, where both C and C* obtain, one is in the position to 
know that C* obtains in β, but one is not in the position to know that C 
obtains in β.    
The case that interests us here is that where C and C* are respectively the condition 
that one knows p and the condition that one truly believes p. So, in order to show that 
the latter is more accessible than the former we need to show that the relevant 
instances of (i) and (ii) hold:  
(iii) For every case α, where one both knows and (thus trivially) truly believes 
that p in α, if one is in the position to know that one knows p in α then one 
is in the position to know that one truly believes p in α.  
(iv) For some case β, where one both knows and (thus trivially) truly believes 
that p in β, one is in the position to know that one truly believes p in β but 
one is not in the position to know that one knows p in β.    
The argument for (iii) goes something like this. The conditions that one knows that p 
and one truly believes that p are “snug” in a sense to be specified below. All “snug” 
conditions satisfy the relevant instance of (i). Hence the conditions that one knows that 
p and that one truly believes that p satisfy the relevant instance of (i), namely (iii).  
The argument for (iv) is straightforward: we describe a model in which (iv) is true. We 
start by defining “snugness” and proving the general conclusion about “snug” 
conditions indicated above.   
Let an ordered pair of conditions <C, C*> be “snug” for a subject S if and only 
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 if (1) C entails C*; and (2) for every case α if S believes that C* obtains in α than S 
believes that C obtains in α. The following is true of snug conditions. For any ordered 
pair of snug conditions <C, C*> if one is in the position to know that C obtains in α, 
then one is in the position to know that C* obtains in α.138  
 The conditions that one knows that p and that one truly believes that p are snug 
for subjects like us. First, the former entails the latter: this much is for, the most part, 
uncontroversial. They also satisfy the second requirement for snugness: if one believes 
that one truly believes that p139 then one believes that one knows that p. The result 
follows from the two assumptions we made about the condition that one believes that 
p, in Section 1.1. Suppose that in some case α, one believes that one truly believes that 
p. Then, trivially, what one believes in α is the proposition, p & I believe that p. By 
Distribution, one believes that p in α. By the B-K Principle, one believes that one 
knows that p in α. So, if one believes that one truly believes that p in α, then one 
believes that one knows that p in α. Since the conditions that one knows that p and the 
condition that one truly believes that p are “snug,” they satisfy the relevant instance of 
(i), namely (iii).  
 To show that the two conditions also satisfy (iv) we need to describe a model 
in which in some case α, where one both knows and (thus trivially) truly believes that 
                                                 
138  Proof. Suppose one is in the position to know that C obtains in α, but one is not in the position  
to know that C* obtains in α. By the second conjunct and Safety there is a case β that is close 
to α, such that one falsely believes that C* obtains in β. If one falsely believes that C* obtains 
in β, C* doesn’t obtain in β. If C* doesn’t obtain in β, then by the entailment of conditions, C 
doesn’t obtain in β. By the definition of snugness, one believes that C obtains in β, for one 
believes that C* obtains in β. Given that C doesn’t obtain in β, one falsely believes that C 
obtains in β, which by Safety contradicts the supposition that one is in the position to know that 
C obtains in α. Conclusion: if one is in the position to know that C obtains in α, then one is in 
the position to know that C* obtains in α. Hence, for any ordered pair of conditions <C, C*> if 
the pair is snug, then C and C* satisfy (i). 
139  The expression “one believes that one truly believes that p” has two readings: (1) one believes  
that one believes that p and that his first-order belief that p is true; and (2) one believes that 
one really believes that p. It’s the first reading that I am concerned with here. Thanks to Gail 
Fine for calling this to my attention.  
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 p, one is in the position to know that one truly believes that p but one is not in the 
position to know that one knows that p. The following simple model will do. Let α, β, 
and γ be three cases such that the only cases that are close to α and β are respectively 
α, β and α, β, γ.140 The following is true of the three cases: one knows p in α; one 
believes p in β and γ; p is false in γ. Since one knows p in α, one truly believes that p 
in α (by the fact that knowledge entails true belief) and in β (by Safety, and the 
stipulations that one knows p in α and believes p in β). Since α and β are the only 
cases close to α and one truly believes that p in both cases, then there are no cases 
close to α where one falsely believes that one truly believes p. Hence, one is in the 
position to know that one truly believes p in α.. However, one is not in the position to 
know that one knows p in α. Here is why. One falsely believes p in one of the close 
cases to β, namely γ. Hence, by Safety, one is not in the position to know p in β, and 
hence by the P-K principle one doesn’t know p in β. But, since one believes p in β, by 
the B-K principle, one believes that one knows p in β. So, one falsely believes that one 
knows p in β. Since one falsely believes that one knows p in β, and β is close to α, 
then one is not in the position to know that one knows p in α.  
In the simple model I have just described one is not in the position to know 
that one knows p in α, even though one is in the position to know that one truly 
believes p in α. The model shows that the two conditions—one knows that p and one 
truly believes that p—satisfy requirement (iv). Since they also satisfy (iii), the 
condition that one truly believes that p is more accessible than the condition that one 
                                                 
140  In this model γ is not close to α, even though γ is close to β and β is close to α. As indicated in  
Section 1.1 I assume that the closeness relation is not transitive. The model reflects this 
assumption. The closeness relation in this model is reflexive and symmetrical, to stay loyal to 
the simple picture of closeness introduced in Section 1.1 (i.e., that according to which 
closeness is determined by the difference in the numerical value of a single parameter). The 
argument doesn’t depend on the relation being reflexive and symmetrical: the model would 
work even if the only case close to α was β, and the only case close to β was γ, i.e., even if the 
closeness relation was neither reflexive nor symmetrical. 
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 knows that p in the relevant sense of accessibility specified in Section 1.2. The result 
generalizes. The same can be shown for any other epistemic condition C(p) that entails 
true belief and is entailed—but doesn’t entail—knowledge, and for which the 
following inference rule is valid: If one believes that C(p) obtains in a case α, then one 
believes that p is true in α. As an example, the condition that one truly and justifiably 
believes p is condition that satisfies all three requirements.  
To summarize, this section has argued that certain conditions of a lesser 
creditable epistemic standing than knowledge score better than it in the accessibility 
dimension. The next section shows that conditions of a higher epistemic standing than 
knowledge score even worse than it on the accessibility dimension.  
 
2.3 Knowledge and knowledge that one knows. Knowledge that one knows scores 
higher than knowledge in the scale of creditable epistemic standing: one is in a 
stronger epistemic position with regard to a proposition p if one knows that one knows 
p than one who (merely) knows p. But though enjoying a higher creditable standing, 
knowledge that one knows is less accessible than knowledge in the sense specified 
above. First we show that the conditions are snug and thus satisfy the relevant instance 
(i)—for every case α (where both KKp and Kp obtain) if one is in the position to 
know that one knows that one knows p then one is in the position to know that one 
knows p. Then, we give a model which shows that they also satisfy the relevant 
instance of (ii)—for some case β (where both KKp and Kp obtain) one is in the 
position to know that one knows p, but one is not in the position to know that one 
knows that one knows p.  
 The two conditions are snug. On the one hand, knowing that one knows entails 
knowing, for knowledge is factive. On the other hand if one believes that one knows 
that p then by the B-K principle one also believes that one knows that one knows p. So 
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 the <KKp, Kp> pair satisfies the two requirements for snugness. That means that the 
conditions satisfy the relevant instance of (i): for every case α and proposition p, if 
one is in the position to know that one knows that one knows p then one is in the 
position to know that one knows p. 
 They also satisfy the relevant instance of (ii). The following model shows that 
this is so. Let δ, α, β, and γ be four cases such that the close cases to δ, α and β are 
respectively (δ, α), (δ, α, β) and (α, β, γ).141 The following is true of the four cases: 
one knows that one knows p in δ; one knows p in α; one believes p in β and γ; p is 
false in γ. Since one knows that one knows p in δ, one knows p in δ. Since δ and α are 
the only close cases to δ, then by Safety one is in the position to know that one knows 
p in δ. However, one is not in the position to know that one knows that one knows p in 
δ. Here is why. One falsely believes p in one of the close cases to β, namely γ. Hence, 
by Safety, one is not in the position to know p in β, and hence by the P-K principle one 
doesn’t know p in β. But since one believes p in β, by the B-K principle, one believes 
that one knows p in β. So one falsely believes that one knows p in β. Since one falsely 
believes that one knows p in β, and β is close to α, then one is not in the position to 
know that one knows p in α. So, by the P-K principle one doesn’t know that one 
knows p in α. But by the B-K principle, one believes that one knows that one knows p 
in α, for one knows and thus believes p in α. So, by Safety and the fact that α is close 
to δ, one is not in the position to know that one knows that one knows p in δ.  
To summarize, this section has argued that conditions of a higher creditable 
epistemic standing than knowledge—the condition that one knows that one knows a 
certain proposition—score even worse than it in the accessibility dimension.  
 
                                                 
141  We are, again, assuming that the closeness relation is not transitive. In this model the relation  
is reflexive and symmetrical, but as in the model described in the previous section, the same 
can be shown without making these assumptions.  
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 3.1 E=K and Luminosity. The arguments in the previous two sections exploit the 
snugness of certain epistemic conditions to show that their relative rankings in the 
accessibility and epistemic dimensions are inversed. More specifically, with regard to 
the three conditions investigated— in obvious symbolism, TB, K and KK—we have a 
first-to-last ranking in the accessibility dimension and a last-to-first ranking in the 
creditable epistemic standing dimension. The picture undermines a potentially 
straightforward argument for the E=K thesis:  
1. Knowledge scores equally with all other candidate conditions along one 
dimension.  
2. Knowledge scores better than all other candidate conditions along the other 
dimension(s).  
3. Therefore, E=K is a more plausible theory of evidential status than other 
candidate theories.  
The picture makes vivid the conclusion that no such argument can be sound: no matter 
what dimension(s) of evaluation are appealed to in the first and second premises, both 
premises are false.  
A particularly tempting version of this argument is generated by substituting 
accessibility for the dimension appealed to in the first premise, and epistemic standing 
for the dimension appealed to in the second premise.   
4. Knowledge scores equally with all other candidate conditions along the 
accessibility dimension.  
5. Knowledge scores better than all other candidate conditions along the 
epistemic standing dimension.  
6. Therefore, E=K is a more plausible theory of evidential status than other 
candidate theories.  
Premise (4) gains a certain plausibility from the anti-luminosity thesis defended by 
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 Williamson (2000:  chap. 4). This section tries to explain why this plausibility is 
spurious.  
A condition is perfectly accessible if and only if one is always in a position to 
know that it obtains when it does in fact obtain. More rigorously, a condition is 
perfectly accessible if and only if “for every case α, if in α C obtains, then in α one is 
in the position to know that C obtains.” (Williamson 2000: 95) A perfectly accessible 
condition is what Williamson calls a luminous condition. Williamson’s anti-luminosity 
argument purports to show that no non-trivial condition142 is luminous. (Williamson 
2000: 106-109) Since epistemic conditions (such as true belief, knowledge, and 
knowledge that one knows) are non-trivial in the relevant respect, no epistemic 
condition is luminous, or perfectly accessible, in the sense specified above. It is this 
corollary of the anti-luminosity argument that might mislead one into thinking that (4) 
is plausible, in so far as with respect to perfect accessibility all epistemic conditions 
are on a par: neither is perfectly accessible, or luminous in Williamson’s sense.    
Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument is controversial, but for the purposes of 
this chapter I have assumed that its conclusion is correct. Nonetheless, the move from 
the corollary of the anti-luminosity argument to premise (4) is fallacious: certain 
epistemic conditions might be more accessible than others, even if none of them is 
perfectly accessible, or luminous in Williamson’s sense. Thus the anti-luminosity 
conclusion, even if true, cannot be used to motivate (4), the thesis that knowledge 
scores equally well with other candidate conditions on the accessibility scale. The 
discussion in Sections 1.2 and 2.1 tried to show that this thesis is in fact false: certain 
factive conditions score better than knowledge on the accessibility dimension. Since 
the anti-luminosity thesis doesn’t entail (4), this conclusion is compatible with the 
                                                 
142  To a first approximation, a trivial condition is one that obtains in all cases or none. See  
(Williamson 2000:107-108) for more details.  
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 thesis. 
However, a more subtle appeal to the anti-luminosity thesis might help generate 
support for premise (4). Williamson (2000) often gestures at such an argument in his 
defense of the E=K thesis. 143 Here is a quote from the Introduction of his (2000):  
To complain that we are not always in a position to know whether we know 
something is to bankrupt the notion of evidence, for only luminous conditions meet 
that more stringent constraint and luminous conditions are trivial. Although the 
constraint might drive us to suppose that one’s evidence consists of appearances to 
oneself, the discrimination argument [this is the anti-luminosity argument in Section 4 
of Williamson (2000)] shows that not even the condition that things appear to one in a 
given way is luminous…. Once the standard for the epistemic accessibility of 
evidence is set at an attainable level, knowledge meets the standard.” (2000: 15) 
(emphasis is mine.) 
According to Williamson the anti-luminosity argument shows that perfect 
accessibility is an unattainable standard no matter what epistemic condition 
one offers as a necessary and sufficient requirement for evidence: theories 
identifying evidence with what one believes (E=B), what one truly believes 
(E=TB), or what it appears to one to be the case (E=A), like E=K, fail to meet 
the standard. This calls into question the correctness of perfect accessibility as 
the standard for a theory of evidence. It also motivates the thought that the 
standard must be at a lower, more reasonable level. According to Williamson, 
knowledge meets the standard, when set at this lower, more reasonable level. 
The important point about this argument is that knowledge, perhaps like other 
candidate conditions—true belief, appearances, and so on—meets the relevant 
standard for accessibility required for possessing evidence. So, any differences 
                                                 
143  See especially Sections, 8.7, 9.3 and pp. 222-223 in Section 10.3.  
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 between knowledge and other epistemic conditions in the accessibility 
dimension are ones that don’t end up making a difference: the low ranking of 
knowledge along the accessibility scale relative to rival conditions is 
insignificant in so far as knowledge ranks above the threshold of accessibility 
sufficient for possessing evidence. Even if the other conditions rank above the 
threshold, that just puts all candidates in equal footing as far as accessibility is 
concerned: premise (4) still stands.  
 Obviously the question, “where should the standard be set?” must be 
answered at least in a preliminary fashion, prior to making the assessment as to 
whether or not knowledge meets the standard.  Williamson suggests that the 
standard must be set at a level where it allows for genuine compliance with 
(what in Section 2.1 I called) the rationality injunction. Earlier we used the 
following rough and ready way to give substance to this requirement: one must 
be for the most part in a position to know that the candidate condition obtains, 
when it does in fact obtain. Does knowledge satisfy this requirement? It 
depends on how often we are in a situation in which we know a proposition 
without being in a position to know that we know it: if this happens a lot, then 
knowledge ranks below the threshold of accessibility required for evidence.  
 It’s interesting to notice that we can never be in a position to know that 
we are in such a situation when we are in it: one cannot be in a position to 
know the proposition, I know p, but I am not in a position to know that I know 
p. If the case were possible, then by PK-Distribution one would be in a 
position to know that one knows p and be in a position to know that one 
doesn’t know that one knows p. Since, “being in a position to know” is factive, 
one would be in a position to know that one knows p and not be in a position to 
know that one knows p, which is impossible. If we are never in a position to 
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 know that such a situation obtains when it does obtain, how can we be sure that 
it doesn’t obtain very often?  
Perhaps we can reassure ourselves by reflecting on our previous 
epistemic condition at a later time. But even then, the results are not quite 
reassuring. As argued by Gilbert Harman (1973:  143-144; 1980: 164-165) and 
others (Goldman 1976: 772-3; Williamson 2000: 79), one’s knowledge can be 
undermined by evidence one doesn’t posses. Assuming that one is always in 
the position to know (a priori) this analytic truth about knowledge and also, for 
the most part,  in the position to know that one knows a certain proposition, 
then (by P-K Closure) one is, for the most part, in a position to know with 
regard to such propositions that no undermining evidence exists against them.  
A modification of one of Harman’s cases can be used to illustrate the 
point. Suppose I saw Tom stealing a book from the Cornell library and 
reported him to the campus police in Ithaca.  The next day, I flew out of town 
and am now sitting on a beach in Durrës considering whether I knew 
yesterday, while sitting on the airplane, that Tom stole a book from the library.  
We stipulate that the relevant conditions for the acquisition of knowledge in 
this case are all in place: I have 20/20 vision, the weather is clear, I have 
known Tom for may years, and his mother hasn’t testified anywhere about 
Tom’s kleptomaniac, twin brother while I am in the plane. So, by most 
accounts, I know that Tom stole the book. Was I in a position to know that 
there is no undermining evidence to my knowledge, while on the plane? In 
particular, was I in a position to know that his mother hadn’t testified on the 
existence of a kleptomaniac twin brother? If not, how could I have been in a 
position to know that I knew that Tom stole the book?  
A Moorean response is available in this case, as in the case of first 
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 order knowledge: you were in a position to know that his mother hadn’t 
testified to the existence of a kleptomaniac twin brother by merely being in a 
position to know that you knew that Tom stole the book. Despite the merits of 
the Moorean response to skepticism about fist-order knowledge, this type of 
response in the case of second-order knowledge strikes me as shallow. In this 
case, as in many others where we come to know things about our environment, 
I have no evidence one way or another as to the existence of any undermining 
evidence which I don’t posses. But then, how can I be in the position to know 
that there is no such undermining evidence? And if I am not in a position to 
know that there is no such evidence, how can I be in the position to know that I 
know that Tom stole the book?  My answer is that I don’t, and that this is not 
an exception, but the rule when it comes to most of the items in our inventory 
of knowledge.  
In summary, an argument that one is for the most part in a position to 
know that one knows a certain proposition, when one knows it, is needed to 
motivate the claim that knowledge can meet a demanding standard of 
accessibility. I have tried to give some reason for thinking that the claim is 
non-trivial and seemingly implausible. An argument in its support is both 
necessary and unavailable.  
Suppose that such an argument can be given to motivate premise (4) in 
the argument considered above. By the results of the previous sections the 
argument for (6) is still unsound, for premise (5) is false: certain conditions 
enjoy a higher creditable standing than knowledge, for example the condition 
that one knows that one knows a certain propositions. Furthermore, it is not 
clear that they do not satisfy the standard of accessibility when it’s set at the 
lower, reasonable level suggested by Williamson. More specifically, if one is, 
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 for the most part, in a position to know that one knows that one knows a 
certain proposition when one in fact does, and if knowledge that one knows 
has a higher creditable standing then knowledge, then knowledge that one 
knows is a more plausible candidate for a theory of evidential status than 
knowledge, for it satisfies the demand of accessibility just like knowledge 
does, while outranking the latter in the creditable epistemic standing 
dimension.  
 
3.2 Tradeoffs. Different candidate conditions offer different trade-offs of 
accessibility and creditable epistemic standing. A theory that identifies 
evidence with those propositions that one truly believes trades off creditable 
epistemic standing for higher accessibility. The E=K theory does the opposite: 
it trades off lower accessibility for higher creditable epistemic standing. 
Section 2.2. argued that it is not the only theory that is in a position to do so: a 
theory that identifies evidence with those propositions that one knows  that one 
knows (E=KK) offers a similar tradeoff. Which of these trade-offs most 
accurately captures the main theoretical functions of our ordinary concept of 
evidence is a vexed matter.  A more subtle, but less direct (and perhaps less 
convincing), argument for the E=K thesis would be one that shows knowledge 
to be a unique tradeoff in the following important respect: for every other rival 
condition C knowledge outranks C by a large margin in one dimension of 
evaluation, while scoring sufficiently close to it in the other dimension. More 
specifically, the argument would need to show that there is an important 
difference between knowledge and true belief in creditable epistemic standing, 
but an insignificant difference between the two in accessibility, while at the 
same time showing that there is little difference between knowledge and 
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 knowledge that one knows in creditable epistemic standing, but a significant 
difference between them in accessibility, with knowledge being far more 
accessible than knowledge that one knows. No theoretical argument along 
these lines has been attempted. My suspicion is that even if attempted, such an 
argument would ultimately fail for reasons hinted at in the previous section: 
despite its higher creditable epistemic standing the gap between knowledge 
and other candidate conditions of a lower epistemic standing as far as 
accessibility is concerned, is quite significant.  
The next section considers and tries to undermine a more direct 
argument for the E=K thesis; one that ultimately appeals to our intuitions about 
particular cases. The argument is unconvincing, but the cases to which it 
appeals illustrate an important connection between evidence propositions and 
objective chance.  I will suggest that the connection sheds light on the nature of 
the category of conditions discussed in the previous chapter: factive,stative 
attitudes.  
  
3.3 E⇒K. Williamson (2000: 193) advances the following argument for the E=K 
thesis: 
1. All evidence is propositional. 144   
2. All propositional evidence is knowledge (E⇒K) 
3. All knowledge is evidence. (K⇒E)145 
4. All and only knowledge is evidence. (E=K) 
This section challenges the conclusion by calling into question premise (2). I will try 
                                                 
144  See the section titled Preliminaries.  
145  See (Bird 2004) and (Weatherson ms.) for arguments respectively for and against this  
premise.  
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 to show that the support for (2) is weak. Williamson tries to motivate premise (2) by 
way of an example:  
Bag 
Suppose that balls are drawn from a bag, with replacement. In order to avoid issues 
about the present truth-values of statements about the future, assume that someone 
else has already made the draws; I watch them on film. For a suitable number n, the 
following situation can arise. I have seen draws 1 to n; each was red (produced a red 
ball). I have not yet seen draw n+1. I reason probabilistically and form a justified 
belief that draw n+1 was red too. My belief is in fact true. But I do not know that 
draw n+1 was red. Consider two false hypothesis:  
h:  Draws 1 to n were red; draw n+1 was black.  
h*:  Draw 1 was black; draws 2 to n+1 were red.  
It is natural to say that h is consistent with my evidence and that h* is not. In 
particular it is consistent with my evidence that draw n+1 was black; it is not 
consistent with my evidence that draw 1 was black. Thus my evidence does not 
include the proposition that draw n+1 was red. Why not? After all by hypothesis, I 
have a justified true belief that it was red. The obvious answer is that I don’t know 
that draw n+1 was red; the unsatisfied necessary condition for evidence is knowledge. 
(Williamsons 2000: 200-201) 
Williamson’s explanation of the asymmetry between h and h* is questionable.  In 
what follows, I consider two different arguments against this explanation. The first is 
advanced by Brian Weatherson. It tries to show that in a case structurally similar to 
Bag, a knowledge asymmetry cannot explain the asymmetry in evidential status of two 
different propositions.  Weatherson’s conclusion relies on the assumption that we can 
have knowledge of propositions believed on probabilistic grounds, where the 
probability of the proposition being true is short of 1. The argument is as plausible as 
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 the assumption it makes. In the second part of this section I consider a rival 
explanation for the asymmetry highlighted in Bag, that also explains the asymmetry in 
Weatherson’s case; this explanation doesn’t support premise (2) and doesn’t rely on 
Weatherson’s controversial assumption. In so far as my explanation of the asymmetry 
of evidence works for both Bag and Weatherson’s case, it is superior to the knowledge 
explanation provided by Williamson.  If Williamson’s explanation is not required for 
explaining the alleged asymmetry in these cases, premise (2) remains unmotivated. 
The next section uses these results to draw certain conclusions about the nature of 
factive, stative attitudes. We start with Weatherson’s argument against premise (2).  
Consider the following case146:  
 
Movie 
Suppose that the movie Ronin is still in theatres. I have seen it twice; once on Monday 
and once on Wednesday; I have not seen it on any other day of the week. The movie 
is screened with the same ending on both occasions: it ends with the Robert DeNiro 
character saying “ good bye” to the Jean Reno character in a coffee shop in Paris. Call 
this the “good bye” ending. Today is Saturday. Now consider the following false 
hypotheses:  
 
h:  The movie was not screened with the “good bye” ending on Friday.  
h*:  The movie was not screened with the “good bye” ending on Monday.  
 
Just like in Bag, it is natural to say that h is consistent with my evidence, but h* is not. 
Again the question is why not? Weatherson argues in the following way. Williamson’s 
explanation involving a knowledge asymmetry on the part of the subject—I do know 
                                                 
146  This is an adaptation of a case given by Brian Weatherson (ms.).   
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 that the movie was screened with the “good bye” ending on Monday, but I don’t know 
that the movie was screened with the “good bye” ending on Friday—is of doubtful 
plausibility in the Movie case. Why don’t I know that the movie was screened with the 
“good bye” ending on Friday? Movie theatres do not screen movies with alternate 
endings on different days. Williamson’s answer, if correct, requires a strong 
skepticism about the unobserved that goes against our ordinary intuitions about the 
correct application of the concept “knows”; according to Weatherson, that the movie 
was screened with the “good bye” ending on Friday is one of those things we take 
ourselves to know. If Weatherson is correct, then the knowledge asymmetry doesn’t 
explain the asymmetry with regard to evidence in Movie. However, Weatherson’s 
argument depends on the crucial assumption that in Movie, one has knowledge of the 
proposition concerning what one hasn’t observed, namely that the movie was screened 
with the “good bye” ending on Friday. It is unclear whether one can have knowledge 
of such propositions given that one believes them on probabilistic grounds on which 
the probability of the relevant proposition is short of 1.147  
 My argument will not rely on this assumption. As indicated earlier, I will offer 
a different explanation for the evidential asymmetry between h and h*--one that 
doesn’t support premise (2). We start with a few definitions. A branching possibility 
of a case α ,<i, t>, is any world β that shares the entire history and laws of nature with 
α until time t. A proposition p has a nonzero objective chance in α at t if and only if 
there is some branching possibility β of  α where p is true. Let a propositional attitude 
C(p) be truth guaranteeing if and only if for every case α if one bears C to a 
proposition p  in α at t, then not-p doesn’t have a nonzero objective chance in α  at t.  
Obviously, non-factive attitudes are not truth-guaranteeing. I can guess that a 
coin that’s about to be flipped will land tails even if the objective chance of it landing 
                                                 
147  See (Williamson 2000: 117 & chap 11.2) for more discussion of this issue.  
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 heads is nonzero. The same is true of other non-factive conditions: believing, 
conjecturing, predicting, and so on. Some factive attitudes are not truth-guaranteeing 
either: I can truly and justifiably believe that the coin will land tails based on the 
reliable but faulty information that it is biased towards tails, even if the objective 
chance of it landing heads is nonzero. Obviously the same holds of true belief.  
However, certain propositional attitudes satisfy the schema: paradigmatic 
factive, stative attitudes like seeing that p or remembering that p are truth-guaranteeing 
in the sense specified above.  The sentence “one sees that p in α but not-p has a 
nonzero objective chance in α”, expresses a contradiction; the same is true for 
remembering and other factive stative attitudes. Condition Ψ (discussed in the 
previous chapter) exemplified by the condition obtaining when one comes to believe 
of a real barn that it is a barn in the middle of barn-façade country, also satisfies the 
requirement for being truth-guaranteeing. Since Ψ, as argued in the previous chapter, 
doesn’t entail knowledge, bearing a truth-guaranteeing attitude towards a proposition 
doesn’t entail knowing it. 
Going back to the cases discussed earlier in this section, the evidential 
asymmetry between the relevant instances of h and h* in both Bag and Movie can be 
explained by the distinction between truth-guaranteeing and non-truth guaranteeing 
conditions. In both cases the subject bears a truth-guaranteeing attitude towards the 
negation of h*--the subject remembers not-h*. What about the negations of the two 
relevant instances of h? In the Bag case the answer is a compelling “no”: one has a 
true justified belief in the negation of h, but, as indicated earlier, true, justified belief is 
not truth-guaranteeing. The same is true of the subject in the Movie case. The 
following argument tries to motivate this conclusion.  
1. If the subject bears a truth-guaranteeing attitude to not- h on Saturday, then 
he bears a truth-guaranteeing attitude to not-h on Thursday.  
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 2. If the subject bears a truth-guaranteeing attitude to not- h on Thursday, 
proposition h doesn’t have a nonzero objective chance on Thursday.  
3. Proposition h has a nonzero objective chance on Thursday.  
4. Hence, the subject doesn’t bear a truth-guaranteeing attitude to not-h on 
Saturday.  
The crucial premise here is (1). The thought behind this premise is that the epistemic 
position the subject occupies with regard to not-h on Saturday is, at best, the same as 
the epistemic position the subject occupies with regard to not-h on Thursday. After all, 
the subject gains no extra evidence in support of not-h any time between Wednesday 
and Saturday. How then can his epistemic position change with regard to not-h 
between Thursday and Saturday? The plausible answer is that it cannot. If this mini-
argument convinces, then the subjects on Bag and Movie bear a truth-guaranteeing 
attitude to the negation of the relevant instance of h*, but they fail to bear a truth-
guaranteeing attitude to the negation of h. This, I submit, is what explains the 
asymmetry between h and h* in the two cases. 
This explanation is not equivalent with the knowledge explanation proposed by 
Williamson, for as we noted above, bearing a truth-guaranteeing attitude towards a 
proposition doesn’t entail knowing it. If an asymmetry in knowledge is not required 
for explaining the evidential asymmetry between h and h* in the cases under 
discussion, then Williamson’s premise (2) is left unmotivated. If (2) is unmotivated, 
the E=K thesis which is the conclusion of the argument involving premise (2) 
sketched at the beginning of this section remains unsupported. So, Williamson’s direct 
argument for the E=K thesis is ultimately unconvincing, as well.   
 
3.4 Factive, Stative Attitudes, Objective Chance, and Evidence. Our explanation of 
Bag and Movie suggests that bearing a truth-guaranteeing attitude towards a 
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 proposition is necessary for that proposition to be part of one’s evidence in a particular 
case. We have also seen that paradigmatic factive, stative attitudes like seeing that, 
and remembering that, are truth-guaranteeing in the sense specified in the previous 
section: if one bears one of these factive, stative attitudes to a certain proposition at a 
certain time, then the objective chance of that proposition’s negation is zero at that 
time. So, these attitudes satisfy the necessary condition for possessing evidence 
suggested by our discussion.  
The “truth guaranteeing” requirement on possessing evidence sheds light on an 
issue that was left open at the end of last chapter. There we tried to give substance to 
the category of factive, stative attitudes by outlining the requirements satisfied by the 
expressions used to denote these attitudes in English: what Williamson (and we) 
referred to as factive, mental state operators (FMSOs).  The fourth requirement I 
suggested for this category of expressions was that they denote conditions that are 
prime*, in the technical sense explained in the previous chapter. I also cautioned that, 
though necessary, the primeness* requirement when added to the other three 
conditions specified earlier—factiveness, stativeness, and propositional attitude 
ascription—doesn’t constitute a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for being an 
FMSO. I suggested that the relation between the internal* and external* relata that the 
prime* condition denoted by an FMSO involves must be epistemically relevant. The 
suggestion was backed up by the intuition that in the case of factive, stative attitudes 
the “matching” between the internal* and external* relata148 is non-accidental in a 
way that guarantees evidence, for as I pointed out  there, paradigmatic factive, sta
attitudes like seeing that, hearing that, smelling that, are ways of collecting evidence 
about our world.  
tive 
                                                 
148  I am using “internal*” and “external*” here in the technical sense specified in the previous  
chapter.  
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 By defending a knowledge requirement on possessing evidence, Williamson 
proposes that an evidence-securing “matching” between the internal* and external* 
relata has to be non-accidental in a way that guarantees knowledge. I have tried to 
show that the knowledge requirement on evidence is unmotivated; by the same token, 
so is a knowledge requirement on factive, stative attitudes. I have tried to argue that 
the relation between mind and world required for possessing evidence is one that only 
guarantees truth, in the sense specified earlier.  There is no reason, then, to think that 
bearing a factive, stative attitude towards a propsition requires more than that. The 
difference between my proposal and Williamson’s is the following: for me the 
matching between the internal* and external* relata in the case of factive stative 
attitudes is non-accidental in a way that guarantees truth; for him, this matching is 
non-accidental in a way that guarantees knowledge.   
If my proposal is correct than the following fifth, and final, requirement for an 
FMSO, when combined with the other four, discussed in the previous chapter, gives us 
a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the FMSO category.  
Chance:  For every FMSO Φ, the expression “S Φs that p at t” has the 
expression “the objective chance of not-p at t is zero” as its 
deductive consequence.  
These five requirements for being an FMSO give content to the category of 
factive, stative attitudes.149  
 
3.5 Is “knowing that” an FMSO? This section explains why the “yes” and “no” 
answers are both plausible. The next section develops a theory of evidence that 
assumes the “yes” answer. I don’t have a knock-down argument for this theory of 
                                                 
149  In fact, Chance makes Factivity redundant for if one’s attitude to p in a case α is truth- 
guaranteeing then p is true in α.  
119 
 evidence, in part because I don’t have a knock-down argument for the claim that 
“knowing that” satisfies Chance: the argument from Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio 
considered below might fail to convince. However the argument is powerful enough to 
allow us to tentatively offer a theory of evidence that relies on the assumption that 
“knowing that” satisfies Chance. In any case, let’s start with the “no” answer to our 
title-question.  
Ordinarily we think we have lots of knowledge about the future. But as 
Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio remind us in a recent article, “contemporary wisdom 
has it that indeterminism prevails in such a way that just about any proposition about 
the future has a non-zero chance of being false.” (ms.: 1) If for some case α, one 
knows a proposition p  (about the future) but not-p has a nonzero chance of being true 
in α, then the expression “one knows p at t” doesn’t have “the objective chance of not-
p at t is zero” as its deductive consequence. By Chance, that means that “knowing 
that” is not an FMSO. So, assuming indeterminism and Chance, the possibility of 
having knowledge of propositions about the future, motivates the “no” answer to our 
question in the title, thus ruling knowledge out of the category of factive, stative 
attitudes.  
However, there are theoretical reasons that support the “yes” answer as well, 
despite what ordinary speech might lead us to believe. In their article, Hawthorne and 
Lasonen-Aarnio offer a powerful argument for skepticism about knowledge of 
propositions about the future. I summarize their argument below150.  
Let S be a set of subjects, {s1, s2, …..sn⎬ inhabiting a world w, and P be a set of 
propositions ⎨p1, p2, …..pn⎬ about the future that the subjects respectively believe: for 
example, propositions of the form “the marble I am about to drop will not tunnel 
throughout the house leaving the matter it penetrates intact” (where “I” denotes the 
                                                 
150  This is the argument in Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio (ms.: 6-9) 
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 subject believing the proposition in question). Call these marble-propositions. We 
assume that the number of subject-proposition pairs is large enough to render the 
objective chance that the conjunction of all the propositions in P, p1& p2 &…..pn, in w 
at t,very low, and thus the objective chance of the negation of this conjunction, ∼ p1 or 
∼p2 or…..∼pn, in w at t, very high. If any knowledge about the future is possible, these 
sorts of propositions are those we ordinarily take to know. Then we reason as follows.   
1. For any world w and proposition p, if the objective chance of not-p 
in w is high, then there is a close, branching world151 to w in which 
not-p is true. (HCCP)152 
2. If one knows p in a world w, then there is no world close to w in 
which one falsely believes p.153 (Safety) 
3. Assume that for some world w for a large set of propositions P = ⎨p1, 
p2, …..pn⎬ (where pi is a marble-proposition) there is a set of subjects 
S = ⎨s1, s2, …..sn⎬ such that for every si in S, si knows pi in w at t.  
4. Assume that the number of subject-proposition pairs is large enough 
to render the objective chance that the conjunction of all the 
propositions in P, p1& p2 &…..pn, in w at t, very low, and thus the 
objective chance of the negation of this conjunction, ∼ p1 or ∼p2 
or…..∼pn, in w at t, very high.  
5. By (5) and HCCP, there is a branching world w’ that’s close to w, 
such that the conjunction ∼ p1 or ∼p2 or…..∼pn is true in w’.  
                                                 
151  A “branching world” is to be understood similarly to a “branching case” as the latter in the  
sense specified in the previous section.  
152  This is what Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio call the High-Chance-Close-Possibility Principle.  
153  This is similar to the Safety Principle involving cases, which we have used earlier. I am setting  
up the argument in terms of “worlds” instead of “cases” to follow the terminology used by 
Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio.  
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 6. Assuming that for each subject si, si believes pi in w’, there is some 
subject si who falsely believes pi in w’.154  
7. By (6) and Safety, for some subject si and proposition pi, si fails to 
know pi in w.  
Now, if (7) is true, then one of our subjects doesn’t know that his marble will not 
tunnel. Which one? Considering that the subjects are epistemically symmetrically 
situated, it is tempting to think that they either all know their respective propositions, 
or none of them does. Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio’s argument tries to show that 
the first option is untenable. In so far as the argument is successful, it motivates 
skepticism about propositions concerning the future. If the possibility of knowledge 
about the future is undermined, there is no reason to think that “knowing that” doesn’t 
satisfy Chance. If “knowing that” satisfies Chance then the condition picked out by 
this locution is truth-guaranteeing in the sense specified above. Assuming that 
knowledge is truth-guaranteeing in the sense specified above, and it also satisfies the 
other conditions for being a factive stative attitude laid out in the previous chapter, 
knowledge is itself a factive stative attitude. Relying on this conclusion, the next 
section will try to show that a theory of evidence that makes bearing a factive, stative 
attitude towards a proposition both necessary and sufficient for evidence is more 
plausible than E=K.  
 
3.6. E=FSA. Bearing a factive, stative attitude (FSA) towards a proposition is both 
necessary and sufficient for that proposition to count as part of one’s evidence. This is 
the theory of evidential status I try to motivate in this concluding section. I do so by 
                                                 
154  Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio motivate this assumption in the following way. Since the  
subjects know their respective propositions in w, they believe them there. Since they believe 
them in w at t, they will believe the same propositions in all branching worlds to w, for all 
branching worlds share the same history with w until time t, and “there is no reason to think 
that which content [one] entertain[s] [in a particular world] depends on the future.” (ms. : 8)  
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 showing that FSA is more accessible than K in the sense specified earlier, while the 
difference between the two conditions on the creditable epistemic standing dimension 
is sufficiently insignificant for it to matter. We start with the ranking of the two 
conditions in the accessibility dimension.  
Bearing an FSA towards a proposition and knowing it are snug in the sense 
specified in the second part of this chapter. Assuming that knowledge is itself a FSA, 
knowing a proposition entails bearing an FSA towards it. On the other hand, if one 
believes that one bears a FSA towards a proposition, then trivially one believes that 
that proposition is true, and by the B-K Principle one believes that one knows that 
proposition. So, FSA and K satisfy the two conditions for snugness laid out earlier. 
That means that for every case α, and proposition p, if one is in the position to know 
that one knows p in α, then one is in the position to know that one bears an FSA to p 
in α. But for some case α, one can be in a position to know that one bears a FSA to p 
in α, without being in the position to know that one knows p in α. It’s easy to see why. 
We just need to make a small modification to the model considered in Section 2.2: we 
need to stipulate that in that model one bears a FSA to p in β, without knowing p in β. 
This type of case is made possible by the mere existence of what in the last chapter we 
called condition Ψ. Since, the following two conditions are satisfied,  
• For every case α, and proposition p, if one is in the position to know that one 
knows p in α, then one is in the position to know that one bears a FSA to p in 
α; and, 
• For some case α, one can be in a position to know that one bears a FSA to p in 
α, without being in the position to know that one knows p in α,  
then FSA ranks higher than knowledge in the accessibility dimension. How about the 
creditable epistemic standing dimension? There, FSA ranks lower then knowledge 
does: intuitively one is in a better epistemic position in a real barn case than in a barn-
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 façade case, even though one knows in one and merely bears an FSA to the relevant 
proposition in the other.  But as I will try to show, the difference is insignificant when 
we consider why creditable standing matters for evidence. Consider Williamson’s 
explanation:  
If evidence required only justified true belief, or some other good cognitive status 
short of knowledge, then a critical mass of evidence could set off a kind of chain 
reaction. Our known evidence justifies true belief in various true hypotheses; they 
would count as evidence too, so this larger evidence set would justify belief in still 
more true hypotheses, which would in turn count as further evidence….The result 
would be  very different from our present conception of evidence. (2000: 201) 
The kind of chain-reaction that Williamson fears in the case of true, justified belief 
doesn’t plague FSA. It’s possible for one to bear a FSA towards a proposition p, and 
to justifiably believe a true proposition q on the basis of p, without bearing a FSA 
towards q, i.e., without q ending up as part of one’s evidence. For example, I bore a 
FSA to the proposition, the sun rose today, on Tuesday, for I saw it rise. I justifiably 
believed the following true proposition q, on the basis of p, on Tuesday, the sun will 
rise on Wednesday. Yet, I didn’t bear a FSA to q on Tuesday; thus, only p was part of 
my evidence on Tuesday. So unlike justified, true belief and other non-truth-
guaranteeing conditions, other FSAs—like knowledge—don’t face the “chain 
reaction” problem raised by Williamson. In other words, the higher epistemic standing 
of knowledge relative to FSA is not significant in a way that should affect our choice 
of a theory of evidence. In the meantime, FSA’s superior ranking in the accessibility 
dimension might be enough to break the “tie” with E=K, for a theory of evidential 
status.  
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 Conclusion 
This chapter has tried to show that having a proposition as part of one’s evidence 
doesn’t require knowing it. There are two different arguments that can motivate this 
thesis: one relies on the general desiderata for a theory of evidential status; and one is 
a direct argument that relies on our intuitions about evidence. I have tried to show that 
both arguments are unconvincing. A better understanding of the category of factive, 
stative attitudes is gained in the process. On the plausible assumption that knowledge 
is a member of this category, I have sketched an alternative theory of evidential status 
that equates one’s evidence with those propositions towards which one bears a factive, 
stative attitude. The next, concluding section tries to summarize how these results bear 
on important questions in epistemology and philosophy of mind.  
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 CONCLUSION 
 
1.1 This concluding section summarizes and works out the implications of the 
discussion in the previous three chapters. It has three parts. The first provides a 
summary of the results and works out some of their epistemological implications. The 
second part explains how these results bear on an important issue in philosophy of 
mind. The third part discusses the relation between these philosophy of mind 
implications and a particularly appealing skeptical argument; it argues that the 
implications disarm the argument.  
 
1.2 Chapter One argued in a preliminary fashion for a conjunctive account of 
knowing. According to this account, the knowledge condition is the conjunction of a 
mental and a non-mental component. The chapter also sketched a theory of rational 
belief that renders this condition the most plausible candidate for playing the role of 
the mental component. It also fended off an attempt to argue that rational belief—so 
construed—is not a mental condition, but is itself, the conjunction of mental and non-
mental constituents.  
According to the minimal theory of rational belief sketched in Chapter One, 
the only propositions that can be rationally believed are those of evidential probability 
1, i.e., those propositions that are entailed by one’s evidence. The view has as one of 
its trivial consequences that evidence entails rational belief.155  
We concluded by showing that rational belief—specified in the way suggested 
by this minimal sketch—clearly satisfies two of the four requirements for being the 
                                                 
155  This is because according to condition (3) in the minimal theory of rational belief developed  
in Chapter One, one rationally believes p in a case if and only if one’s belief in p is non-
accidentally proportionate to the probability of p conditional on one’s evidence. Evidence 
propositions—which according to our theory are a subset of those propositions that are 
believed--trivially satisfy this requirement.  
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 mental component of knowledge: it is mental; and it entails every mental condition 
that knowledge entails.156 Whether it satisfied the other two requirements—
requirement (b) that knowledge entails it, and requirement (d) that it doesn’t entail 
knowledge—was left open. I argued that the answer depended on what counts as the 
correct theory of evidence. More specifically, if all knowledge propositions were part 
of one’s evidence—in other words, if knowledge entailed evidence—then rational 
belief satisfied requirement (b). If having a proposition as part of one’s evidence 
didn’t require knowledge, rational belief also satisfied requirement (d).  
The theory of evidence proposed and defended by Timothy Williamson—that 
according to which evidence proposition are all and only those propositions that one 
knows—collapses rational belief and knowledge. Given the E=K view of evidence, 
rational belief satisfies condition (b) but not condition (d): it entails knowledge. 
Chapters Two and Three argued against the left-to-right side of the equivalence 
defended by Williamson: I tried to show that evidence doesn’t entail knowledge, and 
consequently that rational belief satisfied condition (d). 
The first part of the argument went through the discussion of a category of 
conditions—which Williamson calls factive, stative attitudes. I started from the 
assumption that bearing one of these attitudes to a proposition is sufficient for having 
that proposition as part of one’s evidence. Then I argued that bearing one of these 
attitudes to a proposition is insufficient for knowing it. If both the assumption and the 
argument were correct the conclusion that evidence doesn’t entail knowledge follows. 
The argument was inconclusive, for if evidence did require knowledge, and the 
assumption about the relation between factive, stative attitudes and evidence was 
correct, then the condition featuring in my argument was not a factive, stative attitude 
after all, and my argument failed. Despite it being inconclusive, the argument in this 
                                                 
156  These are requirements (a) and (c) in our list. See Chapter One, Section 1.5 for more detail. 
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 chapter identifies an important feature of the category of factive, stative attitudes—one 
that rules the problematic condition of true belief out of this category, without relying 
on the seemingly ad hoc requirement of semantic unanalysability proposed by 
Williamson.  
The Third Chapter takes a closer look at the argument that evidence requires 
knowledge. I identify two ways one can argue for this thesis—one based on general 
desiderata that a theory of evidence must satisfy; another based on intuitions about 
evidence we have in particular cases. I try to show that neither is convincing. 
However, a better understanding of the category of factive, stative attitudes and their 
relation to questions of objective chance is gained in the process. More specifically, 
we identify a new necessary requirement for membership in the category of factive, 
stative attitudes, which combined with the other requirements gives us a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the category. I also try to show 
that knowledge meets all those requirements and thus is a member of the category of 
factive, stative attitudes.  
I end this chapter by proposing a theory of evidence according to which 
bearing a factive, stative attitude towards a proposition is both necessary and sufficient 
for that proposition to be part of one’s evidence (E=FSA). I show that this theory does 
a better job then E=K in satisfying the two desiderate for a correct theory of evidence.  
If the E=FSA theory is correct, knowing a proposition is sufficient for having it 
as part of one’s evidence, and thus sufficient for rationally believing it. Consequently, 
rational belief satisfies condition (b) for being the mental component of knowledge:  
knowledge entails it. On the other hand, if the theory is correct, then certain evidential 
propositions are both rationally believed and not known. For example, the proposition 
that the building is a barn, in a barn façade case. So, rational belief also satisfies 
requirement (d) for being the mental component of knowledge:  it doesn’t entail 
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 knowledge. Since rational belief satisfies all four requirements for being the mental 
component of knowledge this completes the argument for the conjunctive account of 
knowing commenced in Chapter One.  
There is a lingering question one is left with at the end of the three chapters: if 
rational belief is the mental component, then what is the non-mental component of 
knowledge? Reflection on barn-façade cases, and other similar ones where one’s 
knowledge is undermined by evidence one doesn’t posses, suggest that in addition to 
rationally believing p, the subject must inhabit a world where there is no condition 
such that if the subject became aware of it, he would stop rationally believing p in that 
world. It helps if we phrase things more precisely in terms of propositions: the subject 
must inhabit a world where there is no true proposition q such that if q were added to 
the subject’s evidence, the conditional probability of p on the subject’s new evidence 
would drop to a number that’s less then 1. Such a proposition q is commonly referred 
to in the epistemological literature as a defeater.157  
Intuitively, a defeater is a proposition that the subject doesn’t have as part of 
one’s evidence, but which is negatively relevant to p, relative to the evidence the 
subject has. Here the question of relevance becomes important: when is q relevant to 
p? Does the proposition that a fake barn exists in Albania defeat my knowledge that a 
particular building is a barn in Ithaca, New York? Seemingly not. But it is hard to 
decide where to draw the line158, or whether a line can be drawn in a way that doesn’t 
involve the concept “of rational belief”. This is a matter for further investigation.  
The conjunctive account of knowing is not in jeopardy if we don’t have a final 
definition of what counts as a defeater. However, getting clear about the non-mental 
component of knowledge is important for the project of analyzing knowledge in terms 
                                                 
157  See for example (Klein 1971) and (Neta forthcoming).  
158  See (Humberstone 1988) for an interesting discussion.  
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 of concepts corresponding to its mental and non-mental components. I hope this 
chapter has provided us with a better grasp of the mental component: rational belief. In 
so far as this is so, we are a step ahead in the project of analysis. It’s the nature of this 
component to which I now turn.  
If evidence is constituted by all and only those propositions towards which one 
bears a factive, stative attitudes, then all one’s evidence is true. A factive view of 
evidence renders rational belief a factive condition as well: if all the propositions that 
are rationally believed are those of evidential probability 1—i.e., those entailed by 
one’s evidence—then all the  propositions that are rationally believed are true. The 
view that rational belief is both factive and mental has important consequences for 
philosophy of mind.  
 
1.3 As indicated in the Preface, the correct boundary between mind and world is an 
important issue in philosophy of mind. The results of the previous three chapters show 
that a certain intuitively plausible view about this boundary is false.  
Suppose we define internal likeness between two subjects in the way suggested 
in Chapter II.159 So, two cases α and β are internally alike if and only if the subject has 
the same non-factive mental states (to the same degree) in both cases: the same beliefs, 
experiences, apparent memories and so on.160 Say that a condition C is internal in this 
sense, if and only if for every pair of cases α and β such that α is internally like β, C 
obtains in α if and only if C obtains in β.  
A seemingly plausible version of internalism about mental conditions claims 
that one is  in the same mental condition in two cases if and only if for every internal 
                                                 
159  This is what in Chapter Two I refer to as internal* likeness.  
160  As indicated earlier the subjects in these two cases are what Nico Silins (2005) calls “internal  
twins”.  
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 condition C, C obtains in one if and only if C obtains in the other.  This type of 
internalism is compatible with what in Chapter One, I called concept externalism—the 
view that the concepts constituting the contents of our representational attitudes are 
individuated in part by conditions obtaining outside the subject’s skin. However, if the 
picture of evidence and rational belief developed in the previous chapters is correct, 
this version of internalism is also false.  
If rational belief is both factive and a mental condition, then certain mental 
conditions are not internal in the sense specified above. More specifically, rational 
belief isn’t: of two subjects in exactly the same internal state, one may rationally 
believe that the object in front of her is a cat, while the other staring at a fake, but 
visually indistinguishable replica of the cat, doesn’t rationally believe that it is. This is 
because the first subject sees and the second doesn’t that the object in front of her is a 
cat. Given our account of evidence, the first has the proposition, that is a cat, as part of 
one’s evidence and the second doesn’t. That means that the evidential probability of 
that proposition is different in the two cases: it’s 1 for the first subject and less then 1 
for the second. Consequently, the first subject rationally believes that proposition but 
the second subject doesn’t. If rational belief is a mental condition, then there is a 
mental condition with regard to which the subjects differ. That means that they are in 
two different mental states even if they are internally in the same state. If this 
conclusion is true, the version of internalism sketched above is false. In short, the 
suggestion is that factive conditions can be states of mind, even if the boundary of the 
mental doesn’t stretch far enough to include knowledge.  
 
1.4 Undermining the kind of internalism articulated above is important to 
epistemology.  
If this kind of internalism is proven false, then certain skeptical arguments loose their 
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 appeal. Consider the following general, skeptical argument:  
(1) If one is exactly in the same mental state in two situations, then one 
is in as strong an epistemic position in one as one is in the other.  
(2) One is exactly in the same mental state in the good and the bad 
case.161  
(3) So, one is in as strong an epistemic position in the good case as one 
is in the bad case.  
(4) One is in a very weak epistemic position in the bad case.  
(5) Therefore, one is in a very weak epistemic position in the good 
case.  
One way of motivating (2) is by stipulating that the subjects in the two cases are 
internal twins, i.e., identical in all representational respects:  they have the same 
beliefs, experiences and apparent memories in both cases.162 When combined with the 
version of internalism sketched above this stipulation supports premise (2). By calling 
into question this kind of internalism, our theory of rational belief blocks the 
motivation for the second premise and the skeptical argument that premise helps 
support.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
161  Again, here I am using “good case” and “bad case” to stand respectively for a case where  
things appear as they ordinarily do and are that way, and a case where things appear as they 
ordinarily do and are not that way. 
162  Suppose that the bad case is set up in a way that avoids worries about concept possession: one  
has the same concepts in the good case as in the bad case. Perhaps, one starts his life as a 
normal human being and then is transformed to a brain-in-a-vat. 
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 APPENDIX 
 
Assassin case. T= 1, 0 depending on whether or not the Trainee shoots. S = 1, 0 
depending on whether or not Supervisor shoots and V= 1, 0 depending on whether or 
not Victim dies. The set of structural equations for this case is the following. E: T =1 
(Trainee shoots); S= ¬ T (If Trainee shoots, Supervisor doesn’t) and V= T ∨ S (If 
Supervisor and Trainee hadn’t shot, Victim would not have died.) Solving the 
equations in E we get the following values: T = 1, S = 0, V = 1. The graph for this case 
is sketched in Figure 4 below.  
 
 
       T                                 V 
 
      S     
Figure 4 
According to Hitchcock’s analysis Trainee’s shot caused Victim’s death because one 
route from T to V, the direct route 〈T, V〉, is active: in a new system of equations E1 
where we change the value of T from 1 to 0, keeping the value of intermediate 
variables on other routes fixed—i.e.,  the value of S = 0 along the 〈T, S, V〉 route—the 
value of V (V = max [S, T]; V = max [0, 0]), changes from 1 to 0.  
 
The Back-up case. S= 1, 0 depending on whether or not b is shivering. V= 1, 0 
depending on whether or not the visual effect is on standby. L= 1, 0 depending on 
whether or not b looks to the observer like he is shivering. In the example two 
counterfactuals are true: (1) if b were shivering the visual effect would not be 
activated to make b look like he is shivering; and (2) if b weren’t shivering and the 
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 visual effect didn’t make him look like he was shivering, b wouldn’t look to S like he 
was shivering. So, the set of structural equations for this case will be E: S=1 (b was 
shivering), V=¬S (the first counterfactual), L = V ∨ S (the second counterfactual). 
The graphical representation of the case is depicted in Figure 5 below: 
           
       S                                 L 
 
      V     
Figure 5 
The values of our variables in E are the following: S = 1, V= 0, L = 1. The direct route 
from S to L is active because in a new system of equations where we change the value 
of S from 1 to 0 holding the value of V fixed—(V = 0) along the 〈S, V, L〉 route—we 
get the following new set of equations E1: S = 0, V= 0, L = max [S, L], i.e., L= 0. So,  
L counterfactually depends on S along 〈S, L〉, which according to Hitchcock’s 
definition means that there is an active route from S to L. Assuming Hitchcock’s 
analysis of causation, the existence of an active causal route from S to L guarantees 
that the condition that b is shivering causes the condition that b looks to S like he is  
shivering in Kvart’s “back-up” case. 
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